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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the regional leadership in Sverdlovsk Oblast between 1989 and 
1999. Focusing on the identity of the regional governor, Eduard Rossel’, who rose to 
power at the end of the Soviet period and dominated the region throughout the El’tsin 
decade, the research considers the role and use of networks as critically important to 
the exercise of regional power. The research questions consider the nature of the 
political system that Rossel’ installed, focusing on how his involvement in different 
vertical and horizontal networks, both as patron and client, facilitated the construction 
of a personalised power system in this heavily industrialised region. It finds that the 
activation and use of different relationships at the numerous critical junctures that 
emerged in centre-regional relations during the El’tsin decade protected Rossel’’s grip 
over regional power, through use of a ‘boundary control’ model that ensured he was 
the only actor capable of leading the region in this decade. Whereas many previous 
studies of regional politics in the 1990s have focused on the development of 
institutions, this research considers that the ability of the Sverdlovsk leader to 
participate in, and lead, overlapping networks outweighed the consolidation of 
institutions, resulting in his personal domination of the regional political space. The 
thesis considers the effect of Putin’s recentralization programme on the personalised 
system of power that Rossel’ constructed, finding that the introduction of alternative 
routes to the centre weakened his position amongst the regional and inter-regional 
elites. 
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Introduction  
The regional elite in post-Communist Russia have provided a rich area of research into 
the development of new political regimes in transition states. This thesis examines the 
features of regional leadership in Sverdlovsk Oblast between 1989 and 1999, focusing 
on the nature of the regional political leadership, the role of network structures and the 
strategies pursued to consolidate and preserve power during the uncertain period of 
the El’tsin decade.  
 
The thesis seeks to further knowledge of regional processes during the 1990s by 
concentrating on the identity and actions of one of the leading figures in Russian 
centre-regional relations of this period, Eduard Rossel’, who was governor of the 
Sverdlovsk region from 1991 to 1993, and then from 1995 until his removal in 2009. By 
considering the exercise of control by individual figures over overlapping networks that 
existed at all levels of power, from national to local, this research shifts the emphasis 
away from institution-building aspects of regional politics to consideration of the 
personalised development of the individual political regimes that were characteristic of 
1990s Russia. With this in mind, this study constructs a rich understanding of the 
dynamics of the various network relations that typified Rossel’’s method of rule. These 
networks were based on vertical ties to Moscow, horizontal cooperation with leaders of 
other Russian regions and the projection of vertically-downwards power into the 
regions.  
 
Several factors identify Rossel’ and this time-period as worthy of detailed study; within 
the context of centre-regional relations of the 1990s, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and Rossel’ in 
particular, were at the heart of regional initiatives to increase the decentralization of 
power from Moscow to the provinces. In the late Soviet period, Sverdlovsk Oblast was 
a highly politicised region that was strongly pro-El’tsin (indeed it was Boris El’tsin’s 
native region), and had overwhelmingly supported the Russian President during the 
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first Russian Presidential elections in June 1991, during the 1991 August coup, and at 
subsequent times of need during his presidency. It was a heavily industrialised region, 
with a strong sense of what its own position had been in the USSR and what it should 
become under the new Russian state. Under Rossel’’s leadership the region was at the 
forefront of centre-regional relations in the first decade of post-communist Russia; it 
attempted to autonomously upgrade its federal status to that of a Republic in 1993, 
obtained the right to hold the first in a new round of officially sanctioned gubernatorial 
elections in 1995, and successfully concluded the agreement of the first bilateral treaty 
between a non-ethnicised region and the federal centre in 1996, all against the 
apparent wishes of the central political elite. The fluid and uncertain nature of Russian 
regional politics under El’tsin make these events stand out. Critical to the entire period 
is the identity of Rossel' and the longevity of his popular appeal and political power. 
Through examination of how Rossel' constructed and maintained his political support, 
even where it meant going against the centre, we can gain further insight into the 
political regime that developed in the region during this period and explain the longevity 
of Rossel’’s political power.  
 
A note should be made here on the terminology used throughout the thesis. The 
Russian Federation was made up of 89 units during the 1990s. Of these, a distinction 
should be made between the 21 titular ethnic republics and the remaining 68 oblasts 
and krais. The term ‘regions’ refers to all units of the federation, although where 
necessary the difference between the republics and the remaining regions has been 
noted. ‘Regional leaders’ and ‘governors’ has been used to note the actors in the 
leading political position in the oblasts and krais, with the leaders of the republics noted 
as ‘presidents’. The transliteration of Russian names and words has been done 
according to the Library of Congress format, with the Russian soft sign being 
represented with an apostrophe, for example, in the spelling of Boris El’tsin. 
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El’tsin’s Russia, elites and networks – a literature review 
Many different aspects of regional politics, economics and society have been explored 
by researchers in order to understand the dynamics of change within the Russian state. 
Among the areas of change monitored with great interest were those to state structure 
and organization of political process in the vast territory that Russia encompasses, and 
in particular, the process of decentralization of centre-regional power relations that 
President Boris El’tsin initiated. By the end of the decade, analysis of the system of 
federal relations that had emerged led researchers, such as Martin Nicholson, to find 
that the prospects for a strong post-Soviet Russia lay in the strength of the regions as 
they attempted to force change in Russian state structure through developing centre-
regional relations from the bottom up.1 Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin the 
reverse has been observed, and criticised, by researchers. This area of study has been 
broken into many different sub-units, including the legal, institutional and social aspects 
of regional life. Despite the processes of the 1990s now being firmly in the past, there 
is still a requirement for continued research into regional issues of this period, in 
particular with regard to the individual nature of regional regimes and how critical 
political actors were able to transform Russia from a unitary state into a mosaic of 
territories with huge variations in practices. 
 
The first section of this literature review examines the role of regional political systems 
in El’tsin’s Russia, considering the institutions of regional political power and the role of 
regional governors. This is followed by a discussion on the changing nature of the 
political elite in post-Soviet Russia and the increasing influence of networks over most 
aspects of life. By examining the actions of Eduard Rossel’, we can demonstrate how 
he implemented and made use of overlapping, multi-functional network structures to 
consolidate political power within his region, allowing for the development of functioning 
patron-client relations with Boris El’tsin, the construction of borders around his political 
                                                 
1
 Martin Nicholson, (1999), Towards a Russia of the Regions, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
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power to protect against threats to his leadership and the assumption of satisfying the 
requirements of his own client networks to create a regional political regime that had 
influence outside of the formal borders of the Sverdlovsk region as well as within them.  
The construction of federalism and regional politics in El'tsin’s Russia  
The immediate tasks facing El'tsin and his reform government in the period following 
the August 1991 coup and until the events of October 1993 were to change the identity 
of the state, reposition it geopolitically, and carry out economic and political reform. Of 
these, Liliia Shevtsova and Michael McFaul have both noted that securing Russia’s 
borders (and its respective position in the world), changing the state’s ideology from 
communism and the urgent need for economic reform were the most pressing, with the 
building of functional political institutions seen as less of a priority.2 With a number of 
titular ethnic republics making political and economic demands for national self-
determination and sovereignty, Richard Sakwa has noted that the centre refrained from 
interfering in the regions in return for loyalty, and explains that ‘federal relations were a 
result of the immediate needs of the president’ with the regions creating a de facto 
bottom-up devolution of power that acted as a check on central power in place of an 
effective legislature or judiciary.3 This is argued to have come at the expense of long-
term political development, with Nicholson further noting that the outcome of a ‘state 
built on local units’ made it difficult for the centre to govern.4  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union forced Russia to move from being a unit within the 
federal structure of the Soviet Union to becoming a federal state itself, addressing 
issues of federal construction that it had no previous experience of. Significant 
research has been carried out, including by Alexei Salmin, Valerie Bunce, Alfred 
                                                 
2
 Michael McFaul, (2001), Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin, 
Ithaca NY and London, Cornell University Press, p.123; Liliia Shevtsova, (1999), Yeltsin’s Russia: 
Myths and Reality, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
3
 Richard Sakwa, (2002), Russian Politics and Society, Third Edition, London and New York, Routledge, 
pp. 232-3, p.253   
4
 Nicholson (1999), p.72 
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Stepan, Jeffrey Kahn, Cameron Ross, Elizabeth Pascal, Konstantin Kiselev, and 
Natal’ia Pankevich, on the development of Russian federalism spanning the El’tsin 
decade and Putin’s first presidency, approaching the problems faced by the state from 
the starting position that the inherited system of territorial-administrative divisions 
carried over from the RSFSR meant that the state structure was based on the Soviet 
structure rather than a newly negotiated process.5  Nicholas Lynn and Alexei Novikov 
stated that the asymmetric nature of federal relations, which favoured the titular ethnic 
republics over the remaining oblasts and krais, meant that the nature of early Russian 
federalism was hotly contested as to whether it should follow a top-down system with 
strong central structures and federal presence in the sub-national units, or a ‘bottom-
up’ system whereby the strength of the federation came from its member units.6 It was 
pointed out by Elizabeth Pascal that the perception of Russian federalism under El’tsin 
differed between Russian and Western observers; Russian observers focused on the 
reliance that the centre forced upon the regions for revenue and economic 
development, whereas Western researchers have concentrated more heavily upon the 
decentralization of power and the resulting problems that have arisen from this.7 
Discussion of the literature on Russian federalism in the 1990s in this section focuses 
in the first instance on the legal and institutional structure of the state and the role of 
the ethnic republics in determining outcomes.  
 
                                                 
5
 Alexei Salmin, (1993), ‘From the Union to the Commonwealth: the problem of the new federalism’, 
Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.33-56; Valerie Bunce, (1998), ‘Subversive institutions: 
the end of the Soviet state in comparative perspective’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp.323-354; 
Alfred Stepan, (2000), ‘Russian federalism in comparative perspective’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 16 No. 
2, pp.133-176;  Jeff Kahn, (2001), ‘What is the New Russian Federalism?’ in Archie Brown (ed.), (2001), 
Contemporary Russian Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.374-383; Jeffrey Kahn, (2002), 
Federalism, Democratization and the Rule of Law in Russia, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Cameron 
Ross, (2002), Federalism and Democratisation in Russia, Manchester, Manchester University Press; 
Elizabeth Pascal, (2003), Defining Russian Federalism, Westport, CT, Praeger; Konstantin Kiselev (ed.), 
2007, Federalizm i tsentralizatsiia, Ekaterinburg, Institut filosofii i prava UrO RAN; Natal’ia Pankevich, 
(2008), ‘Modeli federativnogo ustroistva’, Ekaterinburg , Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Ural’skoe 
Otdelenie 
6
 Nicholas Lynn and Alexei Novikov, (1997), ‘Refederalizing Russia: debates on the idea of federalism in 
Russia’, Publius, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp.187-203 
7
 Pascal (2003), p.2 
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The centre-region relationship is, by its very essence, defined by the structure of the 
state. In his study on the theory of federal systems, William Riker states that 
‘federalism is the main alternative to empire as a technique of aggregating large areas 
under one government.’8 Gregory Gleason has argued that the hesitation by the Soviet 
authorities to renegotiate federal relations and the effect of economic decentralization 
allowed federal units (with the Union Republics at the forefront) to seize the initiative 
and press for more rights against the centre.9 This hesitation turned into near paralysis 
in the new Russian state which continued to display a lack of a coherent regional policy 
leading to a continuing process of sub-national units seeking more powers vis-à-vis the 
federal centre. In practice, the conditions of centre-regional relations became a mixture 
of passivity from El’tsin and pragmatic decision-making based on practical 
requirements for support for his leadership at key junctures. In his detailed biography of 
El’tsin, Timothy Colton considered the President’s own perception of the centre-
regional structure, singling out his hands-off approach to the regions, whereby El’tsin 
allowed regional leaders the space ‘to solve their problems self-reliantly with minimal 
tutorship from Moscow’.10  
 
During the El’tsin decade, studies frequently focused on the exercise of the leverage 
that Moscow held over regional leaders as historical processes played themselves out. 
It has been suggested that the reality of the threat of removal made governors 
‘appointed bureaucrats’ implementing the centre’s will; a state of affairs that only 
changed with the introduction of popular election.11 Such a criticism of regional 
governors is an overly Moscow-centric view of the state of the regional political field 
and fails to consider the lack of guidance and the level of inconsistency in El’tsin’s 
approach to regional conditions resulting in sub-national territories taking an ad hoc 
approach to the development of institutions as events unfolded on the ground, 
                                                 
8
 William H. Riker, (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston MA, Little, Brown and 
Company, p.5 
9
 Gregory Gleason, (1992), ‘The federal formula and the collapse of the USSR’, Publius, Vol. 22 No. 3, 
p.147-148 
10
 Timothy Colton, (2008), Yeltsin: A Life, New York, Basic Books, p.286 
11
 Shevtsova (1999), p.204 
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assuming powers that the centre was not fulfilling, holding elections, and co-opting 
federal officials. The initial system of appointment of Regional Heads of Administration, 
which only settled into routine gubernatorial elections in 1995 following several false 
starts, constructed a delicate system of presidential-regional relations with the threat of 
dismissal acting as the lever with which the centre ensured gubernatorial loyalty, as 
noted by Sakwa and Colton.12 William Clark put forward the argument that the 
appointment of regional leaders presented El’tsin with a chain of command leading to 
his door, placing sufficient authority in the institution to remove the threat of the 
popularly elected regional soviets assuming a foothold in regional decision-making.13 
This interpretation of the appointment system suggests that El’tsin and his team 
intentionally returned to the traditional system of regional emissaries that the Russian 
Empire had used to control the regions, although the counter-argument can be made 
that there was little other option as the deterioration of regional conditions meant that 
they could not endure a long drawn-out process of regime building. Ironically, the 
settled approach echoed the subordination of former regional Party officials to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. As Clark stated, ‘not surprisingly, to the 
degree that El’tsin was interested in separating local soviets from the exercise of 
executive power throughout Russia, and to the degree that he wanted a greater degree 
of centralised executive authority to reside in his office, he was compelled to create an 
executive substitute for the Party committee secretariats that he had done so much to 
destroy.’14 
 
Darell Slider, Gerald Easter and Robert Orttung (et al) have all noted that out of this 
structure, as the regions struggled to consolidate and legitimise their regimes, the 
holding of unsanctioned gubernatorial elections, attempts to autonomously upgrade the 
federal status of regions and the struggle from the provinces for greater 
decentralisation all prompted responses from El’tsin resulting in the dismissal of his 
                                                 
12
 Sakwa (2002), p.225; Colton (2008), p.272 & 286 
13
 William Clark, (1998), ‘Presidential prefects in the Russian provinces: El’tsin’s regional cadres policy’, 
in Graeme Gill (ed.), Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics, Basingstoke, Macmillan, p.44 
14
 Clark (1998), p.28-29 
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appointees.15 While stating the above, Zlotnik noted that before the events of October 
1993, regional governors posed particular problems for El’tsin in areas where they 
were highly supported by the regional soviets.16 At the time of Zlotnik’s study, the 
emphasis of research was on the role that institution building would have on regional 
regimes. The expectation was that gubernatorial elections and the creation of the 
Federation Council would strengthen regional leaders through giving them a forum to 
influence federal policy making. He argued that El’tsin had to approach dismissing 
regional leaders carefully, citing the case of Irkustsk governor Iurii Nozhikov. The 
uncertainty of regional life prompted those leaders with a wider variety of sources of 
political capital to seek alternatives to the system of relying on the president, although 
even when dismissed, in several cases regional leaders were able to swiftly return to 
political life based on residual support from within their territories.17  
 
Regional (oblast and krai, as opposed to ethnic republics) attempts to equalise federal 
relations unilaterally have been referred to in common with the threat of secession that 
some ethnic republics pursued. In these cases, Remington has argued that as certain 
regional leaders sought to determine their own relationship with the centre they 
increased the threat of secessionism and state fragmentation.18 The threat of 
secession was of considerable concern to Western and Russian analysts during the 
early- to mid-nineties, as leading titular ethnic republics, particularly in the Volga region, 
refused to fall in line with the centre’s federalist plans, although in hindsight, this can 
now perhaps be viewed as part of the struggle for power and domination that was part 
of the state-building process under the new conditions of the state. The unfavourable 
federal relations that oblasts and krais found themselves to be participant in led some, 
                                                 
15
 Darrell Slider, (1994), ‘Federalism, discord, and accommodation: intergovernmental relations in post-
Soviet Russia’, in T.H. Friedgut and J.W. Hahn (eds), (1994), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics, 
Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, pp.239-269; Gerald Easter, (1997), ‘Redefining centre-regional relations in 
the Russian Federation. Sverdlovsk Oblast’’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49 No. 4, pp.617-635; Robert 
Orttung et al, (eds), (2000), The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, 
Policies, and Leaders, Armonk, NY, London, EastWest Institute 
16
 Marc Zlotnik, (1996), ‘Russia’s governors: all the President’s men?’, Problems of Post-Communism, 
Vol.43, No. 6, pp.26-34 
17
 Zlotnik (1996), p. 27 
18
 Thomas F. Remington, (1999), Politics in Russia, New York, Longman 
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as in the case of Rossel’, to challenge the asymmetric nature of the new state 
structure, however, while this has been argued by some to have been threatening 
secession, Rossel’’s attempt to upgrade Sverdlovsk Oblast’s status to that of a republic 
is viewed here as having the aim of consolidating his own personal power in his region 
rather than an attempt to obtain sovereignty for the Urals.19   
 
Centre-regional relations began to settle with the agreement of bilateral treaties with 
the ethnic republics in 1994, which led in turn to their agreement with the remaining 
regions, and the reversal of the practice of appointment to the position of Head of 
Regional Administration as El’tsin slowly allowed the introduction of gubernatorial 
elections in selected regions from 1995 onwards. These elections significantly 
overturned the existing centre-regional relationship by removing the leverage that 
El’tsin held over governors, but were a necessity for the ailing Russian president in 
order to shore up support ahead of his re-election campaign. The first of this new wave 
of gubernatorial elections was held in Sverdlovsk Oblast in 1995, following a personal 
agreement between El’tsin and Rossel’ (discussed in chapter four). Tolz and Busygina 
noted that the introduction of gubernatorial elections diminished the Presidential 
Administration’s ability to exert control over the regions, and Hahn supported this 
position finding that the introduction of gubernatorial elections provided more autonomy 
for regional leaders and marked the collapse of the vertical chain of power in the form 
that it had previously existed, mainly due to the fact that El’tsin’s national political 
struggles had left him too weak to enforce vertical power.20 Matsuzato later argued that 
the introduction of gubernatorial elections, initially as an exception in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast, was prompted by the 1996 presidential elections as part of a deal with regional 
                                                 
19
 Matthew Crosston, (2004), Shadow Separatism: Implications for Democratic Consolidation, Aldershot, 
Ashgate 
20
 Vera Tolz and Irina Busygina, (1997), ‘Regional governors and the Kremlin: the ongoing battle for 
power’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp.401-426; Jeffrey Hahn, (2002), ‘The 
development of political institutions in three regions of the Russian Far East’, in Cameron Ross (ed.), 
(2002), Regional Politics in Russia, Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp.95-119 
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leaders to shore-up El’tsin’s electoral base in key regions.21 Incumbent governors 
found themselves in a favourable position ahead of elections, as they exercised control 
over the appointment of the head of the regional electoral commission and were able to 
shape the electoral system to assist in their legitimisation of power, as found by 
Andrew Konitzer.22 Control over local channels of communication also placed the 
incumbent ahead of competitors, however, incumbency did not guarantee election and 
control of the media had to be done carefully, relying on managerial credentials rather 
than affiliation to a particular ideology.23 Furthermore, the centre had its own 
capabilities to influence outcomes and achieve the ‘right’ result. As noted by Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya:  
 
Governors often lost elections, a thing impossible had their administrative resource been 
the decisive factor in election campaigns. A current governor was often replaced under 
the influence of the federal administrative resource directed against him, rather than 
because of his insufficient popularity in his region. In a clash between a regional 
administrative resource and the federal one, it is normally the latter that got the upper 
hand.
24
 
 
Colton noted that an important feature of El’tsin’s leadership was his personalisation of 
relations between the president and small group of regional leaders. At the outset of 
the new Russia, the continuation of Soviet-era interpersonal relations was a significant 
resource for those able to make use of them. Within the appointment system, El’tsin’s 
personal relations with regional governors offered the potential for increased access to 
decision making.25 As part of a wider tendency in post-Soviet Russia that is discussed 
below in the section on networks, personal ties with the President vastly increased the 
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opportunity to promote regional cases and offered the possibility of avoiding external 
gatekeepers who tried to limit access to El’tsin. Even following gubernatorial elections 
and the lifting of the threat of removal, the importance of personal ties was still 
significant. A common theme in the research on El’tsin’s rule finds that when potentially 
significant rearrangements of the centre-regional relationship were attempted, imposing 
formal vertical relations on governors was difficult. An example of this is seen in 
changes to the Federation Council that gave elected governors an automatic seat in 
this upper chamber of the national legislative branch. At the time, the suggestion was 
made by Zlotnik, and Tolz and Busygina, that the increase in significance of regional 
leaders through election would re-define their role nationally. This did not occur and the 
Federation Council remained weak, due to what Nicholson and Yaroslav Startsev 
found to be a result of a lack of horizontal cooperation and the fact that stronger 
regional leaders placed self-promotion at the national level over the pursuit of benefits 
for all regions.26 
Regional regime building and individual leadership 
Research on the individual regional political regimes and leaders that emerged in the 
Russian regions has taken a mixture of approaches. Historical parallels have often 
been used to describe the type of regimes that were established. These have used 
Russian (and non-Russian) history in attempts to explain the fate of regional power 
through a form of historical path dependency. Razuvaev’s study of Moscow Mayor Iurii 
Luzhkov compared his regime with the boyars of medieval Rus’, the high ranking 
officials that were given extensive opportunity to rule over lands as long as they 
provided resources (mainly financial, but also military) to the centre.27 The parallel was 
drawn over how regional leaders slowly increase their powers as they rule over their 
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estates.28 Matsuzato also used a historical comparison when looking at Tatarstan 
President Mintimir Shaimiev and his development from Bonapartism in the early 1990s, 
whereby Shaimiev built himself the status of the ‘strong leader’ bringing his people to 
statehood, to a Latin American-style ‘Caciquismo’ system that was akin to Spanish 
leaders of the Conquistador era in Latin America.29 Comparative approaches have 
included Gel’man’s, Ryzhenkov’s and Brie’s research on the influence that regional 
leaders and their networks have played on the process of exiting transition to reaching 
stable regional political systems.30 Where institutional approaches broach the subject of 
individual actors’ specific actions, their treatment of the personal nature of regional 
politics in the 1990s is limited resulting in generalisations that are broadly applied to all 
regions. This downplays the specific nature and highly individualised conditions at 
ground level in the Russian regions that make each case different from the next. 
 
Specific research looking at Sverdlovsk Oblast has yielded insight into the institutional 
effects of Rossel’’s power. Where the role of Sverdlovsk Oblast has been examined 
with regards to Russian federalism, attention is paid to the declaration of the Urals 
Republic; as noted above, this is frequently equated with the threat of fragmentation 
posed to the Russian Federation, as suggested by Remington, or the unilateral 
imposition of a quasi-separatist autonomous region, as argued by Crosston. Gerald 
Easter instead argued that that the motivation for Sverdlovsk Oblast’s attempts to 
upgrade its federal status was within-system reform, placing the conflict between 
Sverdlovsk Oblast’ and the centre as an ‘intra-state elite power struggle over political, 
economic and status resources.’31 The idea of the construction of a sub-national myth 
surrounding the Urals identity to compete with ethnic nationalism in other parts of 
Russia as a strategy for increasing federal status as an important factor in the attempt 
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to create the Urals Republic has also been taken up by Alexander Kuznetsov.32 This 
study considers these findings, although takes the consequences of the Urals Republic 
on the regional political space alongside its effects nationally, considering it as a critical 
juncture in the internal power structure of the Sverdlovsk region and the personal 
ambitions of Rossel’, who was able to use the process to mobilise a new set of political 
resources to enhance his role. This promotes the understanding that Rossel’’s regime 
consisted of a consolidated regional elite through which he held power and considers 
the strategies used to consolidate this elite. The failure of the Urals Republic 
highlighted the necessity of making greater use of network connections, as raised by 
Easter in his analysis of elite cohesion:   
  
Elite cohesion grew out of the informal ties that had existed among regional political and 
economic actors in the Soviet period. These informal ties cut across the post-
communist political institutions, facilitating the coordination of goals, strategies and 
tactics. The major victories for the regional movement came during periods when 
executive and legislative organs acted in concert. While the personal relationship 
between El’tsin and Rossel was ultimately crucial to the outcome, the initial 
confrontation never would have unfolded had regional actors failed to mobilise their 
potential power resources.
33
 
 
The necessity and advantage of ties to the centre are underplayed in previous 
analyses of Sverdlovsk Oblast, the processes of the Urals Republic as well as the later 
push for gubernatorial elections and the agreement of the bilateral treaties between 
Sverdlovsk Oblast and the federal centre, and should be revisited. Easter broaches this 
subject by noting that Rossel'’s access to the centre was not solely the result of his 
previous contact with El'tsin, but also the result of elite ties within the region. Further to 
this, more research is required as to the nature and value of other elite interactions, 
and how they arose, were serviced and declined. Examining the period following 
Rossel’’s re-election in 1995, Startsev examined the factors behind and the 
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consequences of Rossel'’s growing domination of the region. The finding of this article 
pays particular attention to the ‘power infrastructure’ that elite support for Rossel’ 
provided, specifically through the construction and effective control that his own 
political movement, ‘Transformation of the Urals’, allowed him over regional affairs.34 
This, combined with his existing reputation as a strong economic manager, extended 
Rossel’’s influence beyond Sverdlovsk Oblast and into the wider Urals territory, most 
notably through his role as chair of the Association of Joint Economic Activity for the 
Republics and Regions of the Urals (Bol'shoi Ural).35 
 
Such activity also had a secondary but important symbolic significance. Not only the 
governor, but also the whole region and elements beyond its limits within the Urals, came 
to an understanding of the region as a territory bearing special status, which was most 
clearly visible in the coordination of economic matters.
36
  
 
The role of regional political parties and the level of organizational development that 
Sverdlovsk Oblast displayed in elections were examined by Gel'man and Golosov.37 
Taking the region as a single case to investigate a causal link between regional elites 
and political parties, they noted that when compared to Russian national-level and 
other regional political movements, democratic electoral competition was unusually 
strong. A connection is made between this and the presence of different elite groupings 
competing for power, which were ultimately unable to wholly defeat their opponents in 
the electoral process. They highlight the local creation of political parties in the region 
that were clearly distinguished from branches of national political parties, noting that 
the success Rossel' found through the use of his Transformation of the Urals 
(Preobrazhenie Urala) movement as a vehicle to get himself and his supporters elected 
to the Oblast Duma in April 1994, was copied by competing political actors in the region 
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who aligned themselves with federal political parties to try to emulate his success.38 
One important finding from this study is the implication of the division between the 
Oblast elite and the elite of the regional capital city, Ekaterinburg (called Sverdlovsk 
until September 1991). At the regional level, elite loyalty towards Rossel’ was 
particularly strong (and closely monitored and controlled) as his elite network neither 
took the opportunity of his dismissal as governor following the failed Urals Republic 
attempt to replace him with someone else from within their network nor shifted their 
support to his replacement.  
 
In so far as Rossel’ firmly controlled the executive and the legislature, no need of political 
parties had been felt. As soon as he was dismissed and started to fight to restore his 
authority, Transformation of the Urals had been launched. While the power struggle had 
been initiated by Moscow, and the federal authorities continued to be portrayed as an 
‘external enemy’, Rossel’’s immediate political rivals were those members of the 
Ekaterinburg elite who capitalised on his dismissal.
39
 
 
The development of a competitive political environment where there was agreement to 
follow a set of ‘rules’ for how to conduct political competition was later applied to the 
case of Volgograd, where reference is made to Sverdlovsk Oblast noting how the 
political elite established and observed the ‘rules of the game’ promoting stability in the 
region.40 The use of networks to undermine political institutions is taken up by Marie 
Mendras, who notes the nature of relationships within regions as being based upon an 
ongoing struggle for resources. She argued that Rossel’ offers a good example of this 
through his construction of a system that used informal hierarchies that allowed him to 
rule through coordination of his networks rather than developing the role of governor as 
an institution.41 
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While each of these articles offers great insight into the processes occurring regionally 
at the time, taking into account the role of the elite in these process and noting the 
existence of networks, there is a clear gap in the body of research that requires a more 
detailed account of how and where personalised network relations were applied, which 
would allow for a richer understanding of the overlap between the formal and informal 
aspects of regional leadership under El’tsin. This thesis pursues this angle of reseach 
through asking questions of how Rossel’ immersed himself in network relations and 
how he used them to protect and advance his position. This will facilitate understanding 
of how constituencies were built to support his actions and how he made use of his 
political, economic and social capital. 
Continuation and change of regional elites in Russia 
One of the key concepts of this study is Eyal’s, Szelényi’s and Townsley’s statement 
that in the transition from Communism ‘those who are able to adjust their trajectories to 
meet social change most successfully are those who possess the most diverse 
portfolio of different kinds of capital.’42 While this statement was made in the context of 
the construction of a middle class in post-communist Central Europe, it can be applied 
to Russia’s regions to suggest an explanation of the ability of the post-communist 
Russian regional ruling elite to maintain positions of power in the provinces in the 
1990s. Using the shifting use of capital to suit specific demands at particular times, the 
thesis uses the above statement to demonstrate how Rossel’s use of different forms of 
capital served to create the elements of boundary control, proposed by Edward Gibson 
as the strategy used by sub-national elites under conditions of national regime 
transition to protect power. Discussed in more detail in chapter three, Gibson uses 
examples of authoritarian sub-national regimes in democratising Latin American 
countries to articulate the idea that three main ‘boundaries’ are used to protect these 
regimes from political threats – the parochialization of power (the hegemony of the 
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governor over the subnational territorial system), the nationalisation of influence (the 
pursuit of strategies to influence national decisions that affect the subnational unit), and 
the monopolisation of national-subnational linkages (the ties between all levels of 
territorial organization).43 Within this thesis, the argument is proposed that the effective 
implementation of the boundary control strategy is located in Rossel’’s ability to adjust 
his portfolio of capital to suit the different demands of the era. This ability to use 
different resources to support his own personal political position had its foundations in 
the multiple elite networks that he could call upon at any one time. The research 
presented in the subsequent chapters considers who these elites were and how they 
facilitated Rossel’’s strategy, building upon Easter’s finding noted above that it was the 
presence of a coherent regional elite that allowed for Rossel’’s regional domination. 
 
The elite under Soviet rule developed out of a ‘system of appointments that enabled 
the Party to maintain hegemony’, which became regarded as a wider political class, the 
‘nomenklatura’.44 Bohdan Harasymiw’s assessment of the ‘nomenklatura’ highlighted 
its composition of persons ‘[included] in the CPSU patronage list of ‘eligibles’.45 
Harasymiw had previously noted that the system of nomenklatura made it possible for 
individuals with sufficient influence over entry into the larger elite to control and use it to 
‘build a power base in the party or elsewhere’.46 He went on later to note that ‘the 
organizational features of the selection system, and the personalities of both candidate 
and selectors, move into first place in determining induction into, as well as promotion 
within, the nomenklatura. [This is] because, in the first place, in order to be selected for 
a political career one must catch the eye of someone – a party instructor or cadres 
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secretary.’47 In his study of the Soviet ‘ruling class’ in a supposedly class-less society, 
Mikhail Voslenskii demonstrated it to be in operation at different levels of the hierarchy, 
encompassing the decision making group as well as those who had no powers to affect 
decisions.48  
 
During Russia’s transition, discussion of elites has looked at the rotation that occurred 
at the end of Soviet rule. Despite central elites changing at the USSR level as the 
system collapsed there was continuity in the Union republic level state institutions and 
their leaders; at the regional level in Russia, a large number of former Chairmen of the 
Regional Executive Committees (Oblispolkoms) were appointed Head of Regional 
Administration by El’tsin providing some continuity in skills required to run large 
administrative territories. Retaining political actors who had worked within the Soviet 
system prompted existing elite networks to be carried over into the post-Soviet regime. 
The position and frequency of former Soviet era elites in the ruling class of the new 
Russian Federation has been discussed by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, 
James Hughes, David Lane and Cameron Ross, and Vladimir Gel'man.49 These 
studies all consider whether ‘elite circulation’, in which a ‘substantial variation in the 
character of the political leadership’ must take place with a different set of political 
actors emerging from outside of the former ruling class, or ‘elite reproduction’, whereby 
the previous communist political elite ‘reconstituted’ themselves into a new form, took 
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place at the regional level.50 Central appointment of regional governors has been 
argued by both Kryshtanovskaya and White, and Hughes as being a core reason for 
the successful reproduction of the former Soviet elite at the regional level in the 
transition period. When looking specifically at the gubernatorial corpus, due to El'tsin’s 
reliance on appointing regional leaders and the lack of available cadres to run the 
regions it is noted that despite there being turnover in the physical identity of the 
governors, by the end of the 1990s their ‘structural characteristics’ (including 
biographical characteristics such as Party membership and length of office in higher 
Party roles) remained largely unchanged.51 According to James Hughes, prior to the 
system of appointment of regional governors, elite colonisation of legislative bodies 
occurred as members of the elite sought election to the regional soviets during the 
elections that occurred in 1990 (they were seen to potentially offer elites more power 
than Party and administrative positions as the state changed). Analysis of the results of 
the 1990 regional soviet elections by Kryshtanovskaya and White show that almost half 
of the new deputies came from administrative and economic management positions, 
with the overwhelming majority of deputies coming from within the nomenklatura elite.52 
Research into the elite during the El’tsin decade further questioned what constitutes the 
‘old’ or ‘new’ ruling elite.53 According to the different positions taken in the study of elite 
renewal, Rossel’ falls into either category depending on the initial standpoint taken; as 
a member of the ‘old’ elite, Rossel’ held a position of authority in the Communist Party 
structure prior to August 1991, whereas viewing him as a part of a new elite stems from 
the position that he was first appointed to a position of political power as Chairman of 
the Sverdlovsk regional Soviet’s executive committee (Oblispolkom) in April 1990, i.e. 
after elections to the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies which introduced a new 
cohort of actors into positions that had previously been closed off and is argued as 
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being the initial point of elite renewal. While both approaches have their merits, the 
conditions on the ground at the time almost by default required the continuing role of 
networks, meaning that even where individual actors were from the new elite there was 
the likelihood that they retained connections to members of the old elite. Whatever the 
standpoint taken, a policy of lustration was deemed by the central government to be 
impossible, as it would exclude too many individuals who had the key experience the 
El’tsin regime required for them to stave off the total collapse of regional political, 
economic and social conditions, and the result was that the political biography of an 
actor’s participation within the Soviet nomenklatura could be overlooked by the centre 
and the population under the critical circumstances of the early 1990s. This was seen 
in the case of former Regional Party First Secretary Egor Stroev who continued in 
power in Orel Oblast, and the Presidents of the titular ethnic republics, such as 
Shaimiev, or Rakhimov in Bashkortostan, who were not forcibly removed due to having 
been communist-era leaders of their territories. For Rossel’, despite having been a 
long-term party member and part of the nomenklatura, even in such a pro-democratic 
region as Sverdlovsk Oblast, his relatively short time in a position of power in the 
Soviet regional political structure meant that he emerged relatively free from 
association with the communist regime.  
 
Associated with the statement above that successful actors are those who are able to 
adapt and adjust according to the conditions, Ol’ga Kryshtanovskaya’s assessment of 
the political actors in Russia was that they sought ‘to control [their political capital] and 
consolidate their power.’54 It is the source and continuous development of this political 
capital that provides the grounds for continued political power. Eyal, Szelényi and 
Townsley address this in their research on the development of a propertied middle 
class in Central and Eastern Europe after communism; they argue that those members 
of the elite that successfully sustained positions within the higher echelons of society 
were those that were able to exhibit the ability to ‘learn how to dispose of devalued 
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types of capital and acquire those types of capital that had increased in value.’55 In 
these countries, political capital drastically decreased in value to members of the elite 
seeking to maintain their positions, due to the obvious heavy connotations to the past, 
whereas economic capital and education level rose to more prominent positions over 
former Party connections. In Russia, the opposite was true as old forms of political 
capital and the contacts and networks that they provided were carried over into the 
post-Communist era.56 
 
The continuing role played by nomenklatura ties in the post-Soviet political space has 
placed them as the basis of existing networks, particularly in the regions. Political 
support for regional leaders in the early post-Communist system in Russia was heavily 
influenced by the legacy of the nomenklatura practice due to the experience, 
connections and resources that these members of the elite brought to the table. It is 
noted by Geoffrey Hosking that patronage in the imperial Russian, Soviet and post-
communist Russian state can be defined as ‘a hierarchical relationship under which a 
client offers goods, services or support to a patron in return for protection and perhaps 
promotion of the clients’ interests or other benefits.’57 The Soviet nomenklatura, and 
later El’tsin-era networks, relied heavily on patronage ties developed according to 
specific political economic or social needs, where all participants required some form of 
capital or resource. Early regional power in El’tsin’s Russia was built on a system that 
placed a value on loyalty to the president, yet unlike the Soviet system whereby 
regional leaders represented the interests of their Moscow patrons, in post-communist 
Russia regional leaders themselves became the patrons for the representation of 
regional (and their own) interests to Moscow. 
 
                                                 
55
 Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1998), p.22 
56
 Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1998), p.6-7 
57
 Geoffrey Hosking, (2000), ‘Patronage and the Russian state’, Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 
78 No. 2, p.301.  
 29 
Within the regions, ‘selective patronage’ (as termed by Alla Chirikova and Natalya 
Lapina), denotes the administrative support provided by regional administrations to 
political and social movements. This support could be of a private nature, rather than 
public, and through this ‘soft’ display of patronage regional executives were able to 
‘[occupy] almost all of the public sphere’, including exerting influence over social 
organisations and the mass media.58 This created a nexus between regional governors 
and their bureaucracies (as the approver and distributor of resources respectively), 
which Chirikova later highlighted as requiring the loyalty of these interest groups. Such 
‘selective patronage’ connected regional leaders’ with new local business and 
economic interests, sustaining their territories when faced by the inability of the centre 
to provide financial security.59  
 
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss introduced the idea that regional administrations were captured 
by interest groups, suggesting a direct relationship between the level of business 
influence on the regional government and non-compliance with federal law. She argues 
that the ‘business-government nexus’ in the regions was stronger than federal 
government influence.60 In many cases the political-business nexus was vital to the 
regions in order for them to compensate for lack of attention from the centre to their 
needs, and criticism of provincial ambition forgets that this stemmed initially from the 
breakdown of central control over the economic structure of the Soviet Union. In 
accusing regional leaders of simply acting to protect their gains in early post-Soviet 
Russia, Stoner-Weiss excuses the lack of central policy towards the regions under 
El'tsin and disregards the specific nature of conditions in each territory, created by the 
Soviet system and its subsequent disintegration. This study of Rossel' and Sverdlovsk 
Oblast considers the relationship between governor and business interests through the 
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context of the industrial structure of the region and the consensus held within the 
region that the regional administration should protect local interests.  
 
Between regions, inter-elite networks extended horizontally between larger geographic 
areas. The cross-regional lobbying groups of the 1990s are neglected in studies of the 
period, mentioned largely in passing. These bodies should not be disregarded as 
insignificant, in particular with regard to the role of the promotion of regional interests 
and the attempt to influence national policy. The exception is James Hughes’ study of 
the Siberian Agreement, made up of a number of Siberian regions and republics, which 
demonstrated the potential benefits territories found through inter-regional bargaining. 
Most relevant to this study is the centre’s response to inter-regional horizontal 
integration as it initiated direct negotiation with individual territories to prevent the 
development of coordinated action and disrupt any potential cooperation between 
governors.61 Inter-regional cooperation was primarily due to the need for exchanging 
resources to replace the command economy. The literature on federal relations 
touches upon this by connecting a region’s financial value to the central state with 
favourable outcomes. Donor regions, those that submitted more to the federal budget 
than they received as subsidies, and the ethnic republics in which titular ethnic 
nationalism threatened the integrity of the state, were considered by Pascal as an elite 
category of units of the federation. Daniel Treisman made a connection between the 
gains made by units of the federation through confrontational action taken by their 
leaders towards the centre, while Peter Soderlund has looked at how structural 
approaches link the influence of geopolitical and geostructural factors with 
improvement of an individual territory’s federal position.62 While these approaches add 
value to the debate on centre-regional relations under El’tsin, they overestimate the 
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presence of a coherent central policy towards the regions and pay too little attention to 
the ad hoc nature of elite bargaining.  
Establishing the new rules of networks 
Networks are considered here as the formal or informal grouping of actors who are 
linked together in structures which complete functions that its members would find 
difficult to fulfil on an individual basis. This is done through the provision of access to 
resources and benefits to participants that they would not otherwise have access to 
outside of the network. Alena Ledeneva uses the term ‘network’ to refer to such a unit, 
with the resources which are brought by its members and made available labelled as 
the ‘capital’ brought by members to the group.63 Political capital is viewed as a ‘special 
case’ of social capital, institutionalised through the decision-making parts of society 
(the elite); for political networks, as opposed to social networks, the nature of these 
networks is one of function rather than sociability. These political networks arise in 
political systems and societies where some aspects of life require additional support 
mechanisms to supplement existing institutional functions and social norms. In the 
case of the Soviet Union, political networks were located within the wider Communist 
Party structure, whereas in the first decade of the post-Soviet era, at the regional level 
the heads of regional administration were in command of overwhelming political capital 
when faced with their rivals.  
 
Networks provide an exclusive form of organization with specific relations to other 
members of a group and with specific purposes; they give benefits to members that 
others do not have access to. The nature of regional power is suggested by David 
Knoke as a series of compromises between the desire for unitary control over the 
political space and the acceptance of complex, multi-layered control over a political 
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structure that supports and protects political power with the potential for increasing it. 
Knoke’s study on political networks places them as the location of ‘asymmetrical actual 
or potential interactions in which one social actor exerts greater control over another’s 
behaviour.’64 Through influence and domination strategies, the most influential figures 
form patronage bonds and are able to get their clients to act according to their wishes. 
A variety of complex approaches have been developed for the study of networks, which 
can be applied to social movements, organizations, international relations and 
domestic political structures amongst others. Through examining the role of networks 
patterns of interaction among individual members, webs of interaction, consideration of 
resource exchange and institutional networks can be revealed. 
 
Understanding the function and role played by networks in Russia is an essential part 
of understanding the processes that have occurred alongside the drastic social change 
that has been seen as former communist institutions and ways of life were broken 
down at rapid speed. In the more recent past, research has looked at networks more 
closely, particularly focusing on the role they have played at the national level. 
According to Vadim Kononenko, with specific reference to Putin’s Russia, the presence 
of networks as a practice within the state does not have to be perceived as derogatory 
to the way in which the state functions. Instead, he argues that the ‘actual qualities of 
the governmentality of the state, its logic and rationality, have merged with elite 
networks’.65 Research into the personalised networks of leadership has featured more 
prominently in research into Putin’s Russia than it did the previous decade of post-
Soviet Russia. Andrew Monaghan has noted the importance of the informal network 
that surrounds President Putin and Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev, which includes 
political actors, business leaders and the security services. He notes that an inner 
network of individuals radiates into the formal structures of the state, overlapping 
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through patronising broader areas while retaining the role of shaping the decision 
making of the state.66 Studies of the role of networks frequently focus on the nature of 
interaction, such as Alena Ledeneva’s study on the political sistema under President 
Medvedev. This study suggested that the most important feature of present-day 
networks is loyalty, which under the Putin system of power (although no less important 
under El’tsin) is argued to be the essential operating principle of the state system.67 
Membership and participation in networks is fluid, and resources from one network can 
be distributed to a different network to resolve particular situations. One of the aspects 
of 1990s networks in the regions was the ability of regional leaders to ‘capture’ federal 
actors present in their territories and incorporate them in their networks (this is 
discussed in chapter eight on the introduction of presidential representatives). Nikolay 
Petrov has noted that the El’tsin-era position of strong regional networks was 
deliberately diluted under Putin through the increase of parachuting the regime’s own 
actors into regions. The result has been the ‘digestion’ of formerly autonomous regional 
networks into a unified central-regional network of which the governors are no longer 
the sole representative of the regional elite to the federation. 68  
 
The composition of Russian elite networks has been deconstructed by 
Kryshtanovskaya into numerous different informal sub-groups internal to the network, 
such as clans, cliques, strategic and interest groups and an inner circle (oboima). Of 
these, for example, it is suggested that the inner circle operates as an exclusively 
informal and personalised group, whereas strategic and interest groups can 
encompass both formal and informal aspects.69 In the case of Sverdlovsk Oblast, 
where the regional bureaucracy was controlled by a small inner circle of loyal 
members, it can be likened to the construction of clan, described by Kryshtanovskaya 
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as a grouping that gathers around a powerful leader in order to achieve a monopoly 
over leadership positions.70 Mendras argued that regional political actors, and 
specifically Rossel’, used informal hierarchies and clienteles as a personalised 
bureaucracy to implement policies while remaining above the fray.71  
 
The effectiveness of a network is influenced by its purpose, whether political, social, 
institutionalised, informal or interest- or time-specific. Membership in networks is 
understood by Luis Roniger as a functional process, prompted out of a specific need 
for supplementary trust, particularly in cases where this is lacking (although it doesn’t 
necessarily imply friendship ties). Most often, they arise and operate informally and 
without any institutional boundaries that regulate them or any participatory process that 
officially appoints a patron.  
 
Clientelist bonds involve the exchange of instrumental, economic, and political resources 
interwoven with expectations and promises of loyalty and support in a type of package 
deal. No resources are exchanged separately at their market value; rather they are 
exchanged in a combined deal that imbues them with broader social and political 
meaning.
72
 
 
Andrew Buck’s study on patronage in Putin’s Russia found that the power that patrons 
develop over their client relations is derived through the development of these bonds, 
but further through preventing the clients from moving into positions of power within the 
network. He argues that a critical factor of the patron-client relationship is the 
reputation that patrons earn through building clientelist associations and that the 
success of networks relies on the participation of ordinary members of the group.73  
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To this understanding, we should add the role of society as an interested participant in 
network relations, as a force that can legitimise power structures through electoral 
support. The interaction between political, economic and social life and networks is 
seen in Alena Ledeneva’s earlier research into the role of favours (blat) and exchange 
in everyday Soviet life and how this carried over into post-Soviet political life. She found 
that in 1990s Russia, the operational foundation of networks continued to rely upon the 
informal exchange and distribution of resources, impacting on the political level due to 
the fact that control over resources became associated with hegemony, subordination 
and influence over political, economic and social actors, in some way preventing 
institutional development.74  
 
The emphasis is placed on the personal ties that networks promote and their shifting 
nature that means that new networks can be created if there is a requirement for one to 
address a particular problem. Networks as a wider phenomenon in present-day Russia 
have been further investigated into their systemic function as part of the regime, and 
the change that this has brought upon regional networks. In the post-Soviet period, and 
particularly in the Putin era, personal ties characterise networks rather than the location 
(institution) in which the network is focused.  
Summary and Research Questions 
The literature described above shows the conditions and the requirement for regional 
leaders to be able to adapt, change and react accordingly to the political and economic 
conditions within their territory, and beyond. In order to make best use of the capital 
(political, economic, and social) available to them required the management and 
effective manipulation of different elite interests. With regional leaders constructing 
their own ‘nomenklatura’ systems of favoured and selected actors, the cultivation of 
loyalty became essential, requiring the establishment of mutual benefit and, 
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importantly, choking off alternative sources of resource allocation and distribution. The 
process of exchange and distribution of capital and resources, and the ability to judge 
where capital could be most effective defines the success or failure of a regional leader 
in El’tsin’s Russia, as those that could not manage their resources to the benefit of 
themselves and the President found themselves falling out of power.     
 
The research questions being asked by this thesis arise from the review of the current 
body of literature on regional leadership, federalism and networks. The central question 
of the thesis asks what was the nature of Rossel’’s regional power during the time 
period studied? To answer this, the following subsidiary questions are asked; how did 
Rossel’ construct and manage his political networks (vertically and horizontally to 
sustain his leadership over Sverdlovsk Oblast during the 1990s), and what were the 
strategies used to ensure loyalty from his clients and prevent competing networks from 
threatening his position? Finally, the answers to the above questions contribute to 
examining the longevity of Rossel’’s leadership, allowing to suggest why he remained 
in power for so long. 
 
This study contributes to existing research in several ways: firstly, while supporting 
existing literature on the institutional development of centre-regional relations during 
El’tsin’s presidency, it places greater importance on the development of personal 
networks by Rossel’ both before and after the introduction of gubernatorial elections as 
part of a clear strategy to make himself irreplaceable to the regional political and 
economic elite as well as to society. It offers the vew that the use of networks became 
a systematised method of working, substituting for institutions that the centre could not 
effectively establish in the provinces. The focus on the individuality of regional regimes 
as a critical aspect of the complex relationship between regional leaders and the 
centre, vertically and horizontally, is noted as countering force to the uncertainty of 
regional political life. While, as noted above, some researchers have noted that El’tsin’s 
response to regional regime struggles was to dismiss regional leaders, the argument 
 37 
proposed here is that the ability to retain loyalty from his networks meant that Rossel’ 
preserved his place at the centre of Sverdlovsk political life beyond El’tsin’s (and other 
central actors’) ability to remove him from such a position.  Examining regional power 
through looking at the extent to which networks penetrated all aspects of regional 
political life presents a within-region perspective that looks outward, rather than trying 
to look at the regions from outside, as more institutional approaches have perhaps 
done. Secondly, it introduces the boundary control idea to the post-Soviet space from 
its previous location within Latin American studies, as suggested by Gibson (see 
chapter three), and provides a richer understanding of El’tsin’s relations with the 
regions by telling us more about the relationship the first Russian president held with 
his regional appointees (and later elected officials). Finally, in considering the changes 
of the Putin era, where research has largely focused on the top-down implementation 
of change and its consequences for state structure, this thesis considers the impact on 
networks and personal power that the recentralisation of the state had, offering a 
localised perspective of the forced changes to the system of regional power that had 
embedded itself by the end of Elt’sin’s rule and that were thought to be non-negotiable 
as Putin took over.  
Methodology 
In order to examine the questions posed above, I have relied on numerous primary and 
secondary sources taken from the regional press and regional archives to complement 
the existing secondary literature that was available. Primary documents from Soviet 
and post-Soviet sources were obtained from research conducted at different archives 
in Ekaterinburg. The empirical chapters, (chapters two, four, five, six and seven) use 
these sources and regional media sources from three competing Sverdlovsk Oblast 
and Ekaterinburg newspapers – Ural’skii rabochii, Vechernyi Sverdlovsk (which was 
renamed Vechernii Ekaterinburg in 1991) and Oblastnaia gazeta - to provide the 
information herein. These sources of information are supported by elite interviews 
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conducted with members of the Sverdlovsk elite who were active at various periods 
during Rossel’’s leadership. The semi-structured interviews, conducted in Russian, 
asked specific questions that were intended to elaborate further detail on areas of 
interest and to support (or not) information gathered from other primary and secondary 
sources. Secondary literature from published sources (monographs and journal 
articles) have been used to provide the information for the comparative chapter on the 
regional regimes in Moscow, Tatarstan and Saint Petersburg (chapter three) as well as 
for the chapter on Putin’s reforms to the federal system. These are a variety of English-
language and Russian-language sources, published in monographs and journal 
articles. Further secondary sources, that would otherwise be unavailable, were 
obtained from libraries in Ekaterinburg and Moscow.  
 
A qualitative approach has been taken in gathering these sources together to highlight 
information relating to the role of networks in Rossel’’s leadership. The use of primary 
documentary sources and newspaper articles allows the questions raised to be 
examined through the context of the times. While it can be argued that the focus on a 
single political actor may limit any wider the scope of the research and inferences that 
can be drawn from it, it is argued that instead it offers the chance to obtain a richly 
detailed understanding of the dynamics of network relations at the source of regional 
leadership. It takes heed of Gerring’s note that ‘it is difficult to write a study of a single 
case that does not also function as a case study, and vice versa… One wishes to know 
both what is particular to that unit and what is general about it, and these elements are 
often unclear.’75 The discussion held in the comparative chapter offers a cross-regional 
understanding of network utilisation, without detracting from the focus on Rossel’ as 
one of the most-important regional leaders in 1990s Russian regional politics. Within 
the study, multiple observations are present of different sections of the elite that 
overlapped with Rossel’, allowing for natural comparison with themselves, resulting in 
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natural within-case analysis.76 It allows us to reach final conclusions as to the specific 
role of the supporting and competing elites in the successful construction of a dominant 
form of regional leadership. 
 
The limitations and issues posed by the combination of these sources is accounted for 
through the ‘triangulation’ of the information they yielded, in particular with regards the 
elite interview materials, through cross-referencing against the archive and secondary 
sources gathered.77 Newspaper sources, particularly in Russia during the 1990s, where 
influence and financial sponsorship of the press was able to exert an influence on the 
editorial perspective provide a permanent and unchanging record to the essential 
facts.78 Particular attention was paid when interpreting the information collected to take 
into consideration the underlying circumstances of the time. The importance of seeing 
the processes and events in Sverdlovsk Oblast as a product of the times is 
emphasised throughout and forms a key part of the theoretical approach to the thesis.79 
 
Primary archive documents were accessed from the Urals El’tsin Centre (Uralskii 
Tsentr B.N. El’tsina), which has collated an archive from numerous sources relating to 
Boris El’tsin’s ties to Sverdlovsk Oblast, both from his days as Regional First Party 
Secretary of the region (1976-1985) and as Russia’s first President. The archive here 
also contains material relating to the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet’s relations with Rossel’ 
and the movement behind the Urals Republic. The State Archive of Sverdlovsk Oblast 
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti – GASO) was a source of documentary 
information relating to the development of Sverdlovsk Oblast’s foreign economic and 
political relations in the late Soviet period and the 1990s, while at the Centre for Public 
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Organisation Documentation of Sverdlovsk Oblast (Tsentr Dokumentatsii 
Obshchestvennykh Organizatsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti) I was able to locate 
supplementary archive materials from the Regional Party Committee and Sverdlovsk 
Regional Soviet. Access to almost a decade’s worth of regional newspaper sources 
was obtained through the regional studies centre of the V.G. Belinskii public library in 
Ekaterinburg, and numerous Russian-language secondary sources were found in the 
holdings of the library of the Urals State University (a part of the Urals Federal 
University). The final source of information was gathered through a series of elite 
interviews taken from selected members of Sverdlovsk political society during the 
1990s. The interviewees included members of Rossel’’s administration in the 2000s, 
his 1995 and 1999 gubernatorial electoral campaigns, members of the gubernatorial 
administration that succeeded Rossel’ between late 1993 and 1995, regional election 
candidates and members of El’tsin’s government. 
Chapter structure 
Rather than consider the events of the El’tsin decade through a chronological approach 
to the chapters, the thesis has been separated into themes encompassing the vertical 
and horizontal network structures that were present in Rossel’’s power structure.  
 
The theoretical approach taken to the thesis is presented in chapter one. The 
framework for the study underlines the importance of causal mechanisms and the 
significant role that the context of political and economic conditions played on the 
development of regional power during these years. It emphasises the role of the 
‘boundary control’ strategy followed by the Sverdlovsk political leadership, originally 
proposed by Edward Gibson to explain the existence of authoritarian subnational 
regimes in democratising Latin American countries, and applies this to a model of 
regional regime development (without the implication of authoritarianism) in the post-
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communist world, providing an example of how this strategy was applied under 
conditions of national and subnational regime uncertainty.  
 
To be able to suitably contextualise the period of the study within the location of 
political power in Sverdlovsk Oblast, chapter two considers the value of networks that 
were carried over from the Soviet period, charting the rise of Rossel’ to the position of 
Regional Head of Administration. Here, we consider the ties between Rossel’ and 
El’tsin that set the tone for vertical relations between Sverdlovsk and Moscow that are 
considered in subsequent chapters. It looks at the deterioration of political and 
economic conditions under the final years of the Soviet Union, and argues that 
Rossel’’s appointment as governor was a result of the tension between the rise of pro-
reform political forces and the immediate need for socioeconomic recovery, which 
resulted in the imposition of a third type of political leader, who was more manager 
(khoziain) than politician.  
 
Chapter three takes a comparative look at the regimes and leadership of other regional 
leaders – Iurii Luzhkov of Moscow, Mintimir Shaimiev in Tatarstan and Anatolii 
Sobchak in Saint Petersburg, in order to highlight the wider role that personal power 
and networks played in shaping regional regimes. It gives an indication as to why some 
of the most successful regional regimes in El’tsin’s Russia had these two factors at 
their heart, while also noting the differences between these regimes, which will allow us 
to consider Rossel’ as a separate case of Russian regional leadership, with features 
common to other regimes. The study notes the distinctive leadership styles of each of 
these figures, comparing the manner in which they ruled their territories and managed 
the networks that they had inherited and developed. These leaders have been picked 
to demonstrate the successes and failures of other regional leaders in the use of 
networks. In the case of Luzhkov and Shaimiev, the longevity of their power in their 
respective territories was based on their controlled patronage over networks. In the 
case of Sobchak, the chapter discusses the failures of the Saint Petersburg Mayor to 
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develop lasting networks resulting in his attempt to dominate by force. This chapter 
highlights the similarities and differences between subnational regimes, considering the 
aspects that will help to develop the discussion of the case of Rossel’. 
 
The subsequent four chapters (chapters four to seven) contain the empirical research 
of the thesis, focusing on Rossel’ during the 1990s. They break the time period into 
different themes considering the positive networks that were assets to Rossel’’s power, 
consolidating it vertically, horizontally (inter-regionally) and vertically downwards (intra- 
regionally) against those competing networks that offered a threat to his leadership at 
the same levels. Discussion of these networks is proposed making suitable reference 
to the context of the times and the events occurring parallel to the network relations. It 
frames all of the actions taken by Rossel’ with regards to patronage and clientelism 
within the boundary control strategy of preserving power. 
 
 Central power Regional power 
Asset Networks Chapter 4 (El’tsin and 
Rossel’)  
Chapter 6 (Sverdlovsk 
political elites) 
Competing Networks Chapter 5 (Central elites) Chapter 7 (Governor-Mayor 
conflict in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast’) 
 
Chapter four examines Rossel'’s relationship with the first Russian President through 
evaluating the factors that prevented other regional actors from within Sverdlovsk 
Oblast from developing close ties to El’tsin, while also considering the difficulties that 
political actors faced when constructing new networks. It notes the highly personal 
patron-client relationship between president and governor that held the key to many of 
the successes that Rossel’ enjoyed in converting his own regional vision of power into 
a national policy towards the regions, promoting him from simply being a regional 
leader to having a degree of national presence. The following chapter looks at political 
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rivalries at the centre as actors competed for influence in the absence of a formal 
delineation of power, constructing new networks that were able to resonate at the 
centre, and hence influence national policy making affecting the regions. It considers 
how these brought Rossel’ into conflict with central elites reluctant to relinquish the 
traditional control over the provinces that had always existed previously, and the cross-
regional strategy that Rossel’ pursued with the aim of promoting the interests of the 
Oblasts and Krai of the Urals as a single, coordinated unit. This aspect is also shown to 
have served as a vehicle for him to portray himself as the spokesperson for the wider 
Urals and play the role of mediator of relations with the centre for other regions outside 
his own. Chapters six and seven bring the focus to the regional level. Chapter six looks 
at how Rossel’ developed the perception that he was the only political actor capable of 
representing the Sverdlovsk region, constructing a loyal and stable political following 
through the development of a regional political movement to contest power in 
democratic elections. Although this offered a degree of stability within the region, it 
parochialised power, fuelled by, and fuelling, the perception that no alternative political 
force could manage the territory. Finally, chapter seven considers the threat to this 
stability that the Mayor of Ekaterinburg Arkadii Chernetskii posed. This chapter 
demonstrates the cumulative effect of the boundary control strategy and offers a vivid 
demonstration of how it stifled competition to the Rossel’ regime from Chernetskii.  
 
Chapter eight discusses the post-El’tsin decade, and the effects of Vladimir Putin’s 
recentralisation strategy, beginning in May 2000 with the creation of presidential 
representatives to act as intermediaries between regional governors and the President. 
Effectively breaking the direct access to the very top that had been enjoyed by Rossel’ 
beforehand, the chapter highlights the degree of influence that the El’tsin-Rossel’ 
connection provided through discussion of how Putin’s reforms chipped away at 
Rossel’’s domination of the region, offering networks alternative routes to resources 
and their distribution where previously these had been controlled by Rossel’. Finally, 
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the conclusions of the study are presented to summarise the findings of the research 
and answer the research questions of the thesis.  
Eduard Rossel’ and the critical junctures of the 1990s 
As a final note to the introduction, a short biographical note about Eduard Rossel’ is 
required. Born in 1937 in Gorkii Oblast to a family of ethnic Germans, Eduard Rossel' 
studied in Sverdlovsk, and became the director of the Nizhny Tagil construction 
enterprise “Tagilstroi” in 1981. Two years’ later, he was transferred by Boris El'tsin, 
then Regional First Party Secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast, to the post of deputy director 
of the Sverdlovsk-based construction enterprise Glavsreduralstroi, of which he became 
director in 1988 when it was reorganised into the enterprise ‘Sreduralstroi’. In April 
1990, Rossel' was elected as Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom, and following 
his support for El'tsin during the August 1991 coup was later appointed Head of 
Regional Administration.80 During his leadership of the region in the 1990s, the range 
of actions that Rossel' took to try to increase the powers allocated to the region has 
made Sverdlovsk Oblast stand out over other non-ethnicised regions. As a response to 
the inherent inequality between regions and republics in the immediate post-Soviet 
state structure, Rossel’ worked with the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet to unilaterally declare 
the upgrading of Sverdlovsk Oblast to that of the Urals Republic in 1993. The Urals 
Republic lasted only a few days before Rossel’ was dismissed by El’tsin. He went on to 
compete in the elections to become a Senator from the region to the new Federation 
Council, and was elected to the new Regional Duma in 1994, becoming its Chairman. 
From this position, he worked on the development of the first Regional Charter to be 
agreed as per the 1993 Russian Constitution, a clause of which entailed the holding of 
a gubernatorial election, which eventually took place in 1995. Having returned to the 
gubernatorial chair as a result of these elections, Rossel’ agreed the first bilateral treaty 
to be signed between a region and the federal centre in 1996, following on from similar 
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agreements between republics and the centre. He stood for re-election in 1999, and 
won, and was again elected in 2003. With the return to appointed governors, Rossel’ 
was reappointed to his role for another term in 2007, before being removed from the 
Governorship by President Medvedev in 2009 and replaced by Aleksandr Misharin.  
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Chapter 1 
Exercising power through networks in the Russian regions 
This chapter establishes the theoretical framework through which we can examine the 
nature of Eduard Rossel’’s regional power in Sverdlovsk Oblast’ in the 1990s. It 
outlines how the Sverdlovsk leader used access to and control of networks to sustain 
his political power, through exercising ‘boundary control’ to protect his power from 
external challenges. At the foundation of this explanation we use the ideas elaborated 
in Falletti’s and Lynch’s study on the role of causal mechanisms to provide the 
structure that is to be applied to examine the questions posed in the research.81 
Factors that enabled this mechanism, elites, the structure and function of networks and 
a brief examination of the power of individuals within leadership are discussed with the 
purpose of presenting them as inputs applied to this strategy that provide a wider view 
on the conditions of the key elements of the study during the period under review. The 
questions of how and why Rossel’ was able to dominate political activity within the 
region making use of these factors are developed within the boundaries of the outlined 
model and supporting theories. 
 
The chapter will first consider the idea of causal mechanisms and ‘boundary control’ 
and their application to this particular case, discussing the interaction between agency 
and structure and the influence this plays on examining how Rossel’’s political power 
relied on networks. A brief discussion will set the context of what constitutes the elite, 
followed by a discussion on networks, which are described as the channels through 
which the elite exercise power and implement decisions. This section considers how 
and why networks are constructed, their maintenance and issues surrounding their 
breakdown. It highlights the contrast between personal and institutional capital and how 
network theories allow for the use of both aspects in power. Finally, the chapter will 
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attempt to incorporate the idea of charismatic leadership developed by the German 
sociologist, Max Weber, to give background to the construction of Rossel’’s political 
identity. These three themes, elites, networks, and the role of leadership, constitute the 
factors that are the inputs to the mechanism of ‘boundary control’, which enabled the 
outcome of dominant political power in the region.  
‘Boundary control’ as a strategy for controlling the regional political space  
One of the major questions surrounding what happened in the Sverdlovsk region of 
Russia during the 1990s is that of how Rossel’ was able to obtain the outcomes to 
major events that he did, and why did he enjoy such longevity of leadership? This is 
answered through the explanation of how the use of networks resulted in the 
development of sustained, predictable regional power in the immediate post-communist 
period despite the wider instability that symbolises this period in recent Russian 
political history. While the role of networks in Sverdlovsk Oblast is no way unique in the 
case of Russia, the durability of Rossel’’s political authority is of great interest due to 
the lack of some of the other underlying tendencies, such as nationalism, kinship, 
political ideology or capital status, that were present in other regions and republics of 
Russia with similarly long-term leaders. Using the conditions of Rossel’’s leadership 
and placing it within the context of wider centre-regional relations, the argument is 
made that it was the networks that already existed or were constructed by the 
Sverdlovsk leader that lie at the heart of a system of power that emphasised Rossel’ as 
an individual, rather than as the incumbent of the institution of regional leader, and the 
use of these networks that allowed him to dominate the region and the wider Urals 
territory, even allowing for a degree of competition from rival actors.  
 
The theoretical approach starts with that taken by Falleti and Lynch, which emphasises 
the importance of combining causal mechanisms along with the context in which they 
occurred to credibly explain questions posed in political analysis. For many 
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researchers, causal mechanisms have fallen into the wider category of variables that 
are observed in attempts to find reasons for certain actions resulting in certain 
outcomes. Falleti and Lynch made the argument that specific variables, when placed in 
close conjunction with the context in which they are present, require further recognition 
and separation. From these variables, causal mechanisms can be identified that 
‘explain how and why a hypothesised cause, in a given context, creates a particular 
outcome [in the given context]’.82 Such causal mechanisms are described as “relational 
concepts [… which] reside above and outside the units in question, and they explain 
the link between inputs and outputs [by explaining how things happen].”83 The 
argument is made that independent variables cannot be disconnected from the wider 
context that is used to explain the event in which they occur. This approach makes the 
study of small-N case studies more meaningful, in that the study of specific inputs and 
outcomes seen in the context within which they occurred can contribute as much to the 
study of phenomenon as larger-N studies that look at numerous variables, with the 
advantage of deeper analysis of the link between factor and context allowing the 
researcher to reach rich conclusions. We can simplify the definition of causal 
mechanisms to mean the method of facilitating factors (inputs) that convert an intended 
action into a desired outcome (output).  
 
Two of the causal mechanisms that are identified by Falletti and Lynch that can be 
applied to Russia are rational choice (where individuals act to maximize gains) and 
power reproduction (where the elites preserve their power by only allowing entrants 
that hold the same beliefs into their political spheres of activity).  Power reproduction is 
concerned with the ability of a regional political system to ensure that it is succeeded 
by actors with similar mindsets, and whose aim is not to break down the structures and 
achievements of its predecessor. The idea of ‘boundary control’ as proposed by 
Edward Gibson’s research on sub-national authoritarian regimes in Latin America, is 
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centred around the strategies taken by sub-national leaders to preserve their power 
before (or instead of) concern over any successors.84 Boundary control is considered 
here as a strategy pursued with the purpose of protecting actors (and actions) from 
outsiders entering their territory (political rather than geographic) through the exercise 
of hegemonic control over centre-regional relations and regional-local relations.  
 
In looking at the manner in which subnational regimes in his case studies held on to 
power, Gibson noted the importance of the territorial space that conflicts play out in. Of 
particular interest is the finding that the outcomes depend not only on the processes 
inside the territory, but also on the interconnections that arise external to the territory in 
question. The location of impact of actions taken by subnational leaders is of 
importance in assessing the scope of such action.85 Taking this into consideration, 
Gibson identified three strategies taken by subnational leaders in the United States and 
Latin America in order to consolidate and preserve their authority through the 
development of specific boundaries: the parochialization of power (seen as the ability 
of the regional leader to ensure hegemony over the subnational territorial system, 
making the elite and the wider general public in the region absolutely reliant on his 
goodwill), the nationalisation of influence (attaining the position of being the only actor 
from the region capable of pursuing strategies at the national level that can affect or 
promote regional interests), and the monopolisation of national-sub-national linkages 
(ensuring control over networks and contacts with the centre, so as to force elites to go 
through the regional leader to advance their causes nationally).86 Where it was possible 
for subnational leaders to keep any conflicts local to their territories and avoid federal 
escalation, these boundaries were found to shelter the incumbents from threats to their 
leadership. Highlighting the importance of strategically interacting with the national 
political system, Gibson suggested that if the sub-national regime lost the confidence of 
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extra-regional actors resulting in national intervention in local matters, where this 
intervention became allied with internal opposition actors the possibility of ‘opening’ 
these boundaries to remove the incumbent increased. 
 
In Gibson’s study, the idea of boundaries can be applied to either individuals or to 
groups of actors, with the emphasis being dependent on the context they are being 
applied to. He explores the individual use of boundary control as a strategy used by 
regional leaders in Argentina in the 1990s and Mexico in the 2000s to maintain their 
power under conditions of democratization and the strategy as a method for blocs to 
protect their interests using the case of the Southern Democrats of the United States in 
the late 19th century following the American Civil War. Here, the sub-national regimes 
were already in place and long-standing at the point at which the national political 
arena began its democratization process explaining the continuation of authoritarian 
practices even under conditions of national regime change, and closely examined how 
these regimes utilised the resources available to the incumbent leaders. 
 
In the case of the United States, Gibson examined the role of the Democratic Party and 
its regional leaders in the southern states following the American Civil War. He looked 
specifically at the manner in which they acted as a bloc, to counter attempts to allow 
access to the electoral system to sectors of society, including former African-American 
slaves, the poor and illiterate through various means of coordination between the 
states and their federal political party structures. In this case, he found that the ideology 
of the Democratic Party at the time sustained the notion that each individual state’s 
laws and traditions were different, allowing for the inequalities of the subnational 
regimes to not contradict the more egalitarian stance of the northen states approach to 
enfranchisement. Within the states themselves, the Democratic Party governors were 
hegemonic, using legal and extra-legal methods to prevent the Republican Party from 
contesting the political state. By offering stability to those with a vested interest in 
maintaining the system, there was no opportunity for opposition forces to contest these 
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regions. This internal state was emboldened by the disproportionality of representation 
that the southern states gave to the federal Democratic Party, with strength in 
combination as a bloc of delegates in the Senate supporting the national party, allowing 
them to resist reformist pressure from above.  
 
In Argentina, Gibson looked at the role of individual regional leaders’ attempts to 
maintain their hegemony against challenges from factions within their own parties and 
rival political parties as a two party system emerged in the 1980s. The combination of 
the ability to provide the regional vote in federal elections, the manipulation of regional 
electoral systems to combat factionalism within the Peronist Party to ensure hegemony 
and the apportionment of federal resources all combined to allow incumbents to 
marginalise competing forces. Here, Gibson’s focus was on individual leaders and their 
boundary control actions rather than on the creation of coordinated cross-regional 
actions. In Argentina, regional governors found themselves in control of regional 
branches of the leading political party and controlling financial transfers from the 
centre, allocating them as they saw fit. The lack of will of federal actors to involve 
themselves in regional affairs, unless absolutely required due to reasons of civil unrest, 
allowed for the entrenchment of clientelism, which only gave way to boundary opening 
when it threatened the national regime requiring federal intervention in cases where 
sub-national leaders’ actions threatened the standing of the federal government and 
head of state. Whereas long periods of institutional stability gave security to sub-
national regimes in America and Argentina, in Mexico, regional leaders were subject to 
greater competition particularly from local municipalities. The federal government 
exerted greater federal influence over regional political systems than in the previous 
two cases, and control over local government influenced the stability of regional 
regimes. Similar to Boris El’tsin’s position towards the Russian regions, as President 
Vicente Fox focused on national democratisation in Mexico in the 2000s sub-national 
authoritarian regimes consolidated due to the lack of will for federal intervention. 
Mexico had had a single-party system for more than 70 years previously, and it was a 
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loose coalition of opposition parties, that were not united by ideology but rather by a 
sense of wanting to change the political state, that overcame the existing structure. The 
federal system there exerted greater control over regional government, limiting the 
amount of autonomy they had in developing regional regimes, and placing greater 
importance on local government, so unlike the cases of the United States and 
Argentina, where national crisis and federal intervention opened the boundaries, in 
Mexico the major threat to leaders came from below as regional cities sought to 
develop wide-ranging coalitions of opposition forces to oust authoritarian leaders.  
 
It is helpful to highlight some of the common factors that the case studies presented by 
Gibson and the possibility and difficulties of applying this model to other geographies, 
particularly to the case of sub-national power in Russia. In all three of Gibson’s case 
studies, we can note the presence of entrenched federal political parties. In the case of 
the USA, the Republican and Democratic parties’ prior contestation of the political state 
had established a stable two-party system through which federal representation was 
exercised. In contrast, the cases of Argentina and Mexico demonstrated the breakdown 
of authoritarian federal regimes based on single political parties, with opposing forces 
emerging to contest the political space. Here, we can see that the primary aim of sub-
national regimes under the strain of federal political democratisation was based on 
taking measures to counter opposing political parties intent on unseating them in order 
to overturn the existing regime. In the southern states of the USA by contrast, the main 
threat to the Democratic Party governors was through the extension of political 
participation to the disenfranchised. The inability of the Republican Party to overcome 
ingrained practices of racism and discrimination among society and the lack of will from 
the federal branches of power to enforce enfranchisement on the US south allowed 
these regional leaders to ally amongst themselves and maintain their hegemony over 
the region, supported by an electorate that wasn’t seeking change. This is starkly in 
contrast to the conditions of Russia following the end of the Communist Party’s 
domination and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of the only previously 
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existing political party did not result in its replacement with alternative dominant federal 
parties. Where political parties did emerge, they were fragmented in terms of regional 
influence, with little integration with regional governors. Secondly, the degree of 
asymmetry in the cases of Argentina and the United States both carry echoes of 
Russia’s condition in the 1990s. Here, the federal system of power allowed regional 
regimes to create their own instututions and political systems, as long as the agreed 
separation of powers was observed. This spilled over into electoral systems, fiscal 
policies and the allocation and distribution of resources; in the case of Russia, the 
decentralisation of the state following the end of Communist Party rule resulted in wide 
differentiation of region-types and regimes.  Finally, Russia diverges from these cases 
through the system of initial appointment of sub-national leaders, with the exception of 
ethnic republic presidents, by the President. The lack of elections presented each 
regional regime in the new Russia with a different starting point, resulting in wildly 
different figures being vertically imposed on the majority of sub-national units. This 
approach, combined with the lack of an organised and consistent policy from the 
federal centre, gave space to the newly appointed regional leaders to shape their own 
regional political systems in return for the expression of loyalty to El’tsin, and resulted 
in the emergence of individual regional leaderships that took a variety of forms. Using 
the example of Eduard Rossel’ offers an opportunity to test how the boundary control 
strategy can be applied on the case of Russia, and whether this worked for his own 
system of power, although it is not to say that this is how all regions in Russia 
developed (see the comparison of three different types of regional regime discussed in 
chapter three).     
 
The idea of boundary control is taken here and tested on the Russian sub-national 
case by suggesting that this causal mechanism occurred under conditions of a 
simultaneous national and sub-national transition (although that is not to say that 
national and sub-national transition were always in the same direction heading towards 
democratization). Whether the sub-national regime is authoritarian or not, in the 
 54 
absence of enforceable rules for subnational government applied by the national 
government, boundary control offers a strategic method of operation whereby a 
‘controlling area’ is established that allows regional leaders to “[monopolise] power in 
the local political arena, but also [manipulate] levers of power in other arenas as well. It 
requires controlling linkages between levels of territorial organization as well as 
exercising influence in national political arenas.”87 Boundary control is, therefore, 
considered here as the mechanism applied by Rossel’ to convert the inputs (elites, 
resources and networks) to an outcome of long-term, unthreatened, regional political 
dominance. The arguments put forward in the analysis of Rossel’’s actions are 
intended to show that this behaviour was intentional and, importantly, fulfilled the aims 
that it set out to achieve. Chapters four to seven demonstrate this strategy as a method 
of ensuring Rossel’ dominated the Sverdlovsk region, preventing opposition (both local 
and national) from finding political space to threaten his position. This helps us to 
understand Rossel’ as both an individual and as an institutional actor (as part of a 
collective political system that he was at the heart of), insulating himself from rivals. 
Examining the development of and participation in numerous, distinct and overlapping 
networks made up of the federal and regional elite (political and economic) and as 
influenced by Rossel’’s character provides the inputs which resulted in consolidation 
and sustainability of strong political leadership.  
 
All three elements of boundary control as elaborated by Gibson’s study of Latin 
America are proposed as being in evidence in Rossel’’s leadership in the following 
way: 
- the parochialization of power (whereby Rossel’ was able to ensure hegemony 
over the subnational territorial system, controlling the key institutions and 
making the elite and the wider general public in the region absolutely reliant on 
his goodwill); 
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- the nationalisation of influence (where Rossel’ was able to present himself 
regionally and cross-regionally to the political and economic elite as the only 
actor from Sverdlovsk Oblast capable of pursuing strategies at the national level 
that would influence regional interests, particularly in the absence of a 
hegemonic federal political party); 
 
- the monopolisation of national-sub-national linkages (ensuring that only Rossel’ 
had control over networks and contacts with the centre, so as to force elites to 
go through him to advance their causes nationally).88   
The factors that contributed to this strategy explain Rossel’’s powerful leadership as a 
reflection of himself as an individual, but more significantly as a result of making use of 
the conditions that the elites within the Sverdlovsk region found themselves in under 
the immediate post-communist transition. Having lost their previous patron in the guise 
of the Communist Party (and individuals within this), elites still required networks and 
patronage in order to adjust to the new realities of political life in transition Russia.  
 
While agency (the ability of actors and/or institutions to act, and the actions that were 
taken) is the most important factor in the processes that are under review, it was 
underpinned by the role played by the circumstances in which they occurred, which is 
to say, the pre-existing social structure or the context of the political, economic and 
social conditions. Understanding the temporal and contextual conditions that events 
are situated in helps to reveal explanations of why decision and actions are taken by 
actors, even though these conditions may only influence, rather than directly 
determine, the actions taken by the actors.    
 
[S]ocial actors produce their actions out of pre-existing social structure. […] pre-existing 
social structure lacks the capacity to initiate activity and to make things happen of its own 
                                                 
88
 Gibson (2012), pp. 26-29 
 56 
accord, [but it] does affect the course of events in the social world by influencing the 
actions that people choose to undertake.
89 
 
Thus, while agency (viewed here through the actions and role taken by Rossel’) is an 
active factor in explaining the ‘boundary control’ theory, the structures that this agency 
occurs within are seen as its passive counterpart, played by context providing 
knowledge of the historical setting and the circumstances at a specific moment in time. 
 
As this study has its roots in a historical perspective, it is placed within a fixed period of 
review, starting at a point where there is a radical change to the previous 
circumstances (a critical juncture). There is some debate as to whether critical 
junctures are a suitable tool for analysing processes, and the presence of such 
moments in time brings the approach into the area of historical institutionalism. The 
concern here is whether specific, single moments of time really signify change in wider 
circumstances and structures or whether they need to be further developed to be seen 
within the context that they occurred within. For the purposes of this study, the collapse 
of the communist regime marks a natural starting point and emphatically marks a point 
of significant change from previous practice. However, so as not to simply place this as 
the point of Rossel’’s political birth as regional leader, deeper context to this juncture is 
provided by examining the emergence of Rossel’ prior to the collapse of communism 
and his role in the regional political space at this time. The end-point chosen for the 
analysis is set as the end of El’tsin’s presidency arising out of his resignation on 31st 
December 1999, although once again this requires further contextualization in order to 
give greater meaning to the study, achieved by examining the direct effect of the 
emergence of Putin as Russia’s President on Rossel’’s position. Within the chosen time 
frame specific critical moments present themselves within the discussion; in particular, 
the development of the idea of the Urals Republic and the first gubernatorial elections 
in the region. By adding contextualising descriptions, these conditions of the time and 
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the structures that existed (both historically and at key moments) are connected with 
the actions taken by the agent, thus conforming to the theoretical outline given above. 
Importantly for any wider inferences to be drawn from this study, these contextual 
moments not only affected Sverdlovsk Oblast (as the geographical location that they 
occurred in), but also other sub-national regimes as well as national (federal) 
conditions.  
 
Having established the outline of the mechanism of boundary control and the argument 
that this was the strategy taken by Rossel’ to sustain and protect his leadership 
position, it is necessary to outline the factors involved that made this causal 
mechanism possible. It is put forward that two essential criteria, the condition of the 
regional elite and the individual personality of Rossel’, provided the foundations for the 
continuation and creation of networks that made ‘boundary control’ possible. Starting 
with a discussion of the role and scope of the elite, followed by introducing the idea of 
charismatic leadership, it is suggested that these features provide the basis of the 
patronage networks that Rossel’ participated in (as both patron and client), which 
allowed him to establish borders of power that he would not permit rivals to cross.   
Elite theory and its application to Russian regions 
In order to understand the actions of the Sverdlovsk leader we have to look at how he 
interacted with the structure of the political and economic elite at the regional and 
federal level. The study of elites at different levels has developed into a key area for 
understanding modern Russian life, with specific interest being paid to questions of the 
circulation and reproduction of the layer of society that holds the levers of power.90 
Here we take a brief look at the fundamental definition of the ‘elite’ that divides this 
layer from the rest of society. 
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The emergence of elite theory as a field of study arose from the theories of Gaetano 
Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto in the early 20th century. These scholars developed their 
theories with some fundamental differences in the definition of what constitutes the 
elite. Pareto described the term ‘elite’ to mean a group of actors with a certain set of 
values and qualities that enabled them to make decisions and rule over the rest of 
society. He gave the notion of a somewhat meritocratic approach to the separation of 
society between the rulers and the ruled. For Pareto, the elite were those that 
influenced the development of the aspects of life that were shaped by decisions taken 
by leaders, rising to such positions through the possession of qualities that marked 
them out over others. Mosca’s understanding was from an opposite perspective, more 
abruptly placing the notion of the elite as a separation of society into the rulers and the 
ruled that developed over the course of history out of the existing structures of society. 
For Mosca, the ruling group was made up of a small section of society, which 
monopolised power and fulfilled all of its functions,  enjoying benefits and advantages 
of controlling the decision making process that placed them in a position of power over 
the ‘ruled’, perpetuating itself. While both imply a minority ruling over a majority (which 
is the reality of an elite), Pareto’s view of the elite left open the possibility of recruitment 
based upon talent and skill, while Mosca’s approach was rooted in connections 
(networks) and the legacy of history in constructing a closer elite. These differences 
both viewed the elite externally, looking at the way in which the elite see themselves 
with regard to the society that they have influence over.  
 
In the case of the Soviet Union, the elite structure of the state followed the Moscan 
understanding of a layer of society that separated Communist Party leadership from 
the rest of society on the basis that while the state proclaimed itself to be constructed 
on the basis of meritocracy (as theoretically it allowed for the possibility that all 
members of society could in theory become a member of the Communist Party and 
subsequently rise to become part of the elite), in reality, the elite were more akin to a 
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separate grouping that rose that was difficult to break into from outside. Voslenskii 
observed that the Soviet elite, the ‘nomenklatura’, became its own specific class in his 
insider study of the construction of this section of society.91 The upper Soviet elite held 
a distinctively separate position in society and clearly benefitted materially and 
theoretically by monopolising power functions. In post-communist Russian society, 
there has been a continuation of many of the aspects of a closed-off elite, particularly 
amongst the appointed regional leadership, and it has been pointed out in many 
studies that the membership of the post-Soviet elite in the 1990s changed little from the 
nomenklatura of the Soviet period.92 As was most often the case in the Communist era 
when Regional First Party Secretaries were the highest regional positions, in the post-
communist period, the term ‘regional elite’ is most often applied to mean the actors 
holding the highest roles, which at its highest level is the heads of regional 
administration. These actors are in the leading positions of authority and during the 
1990s were largely those that held decision making power in regional political, 
economic and business spheres of life during the El’tsin years.93 Within the internal 
space of a region, the concept of a ‘regional elite’ is delineated further to differentiate 
between regional leaders and other members of the regional decision making hierarchy 
(high-ranking members of the security and law enforcement services, regional leaders 
of federal parties, speakers of regional legislatures, and leading business and 
economic figures). There is further separation of the regional elite when considering the 
role of local-level elites particularly those from regional capital cities. In Table 1.1, the 
overlap between the three main levels of the elite is presented to demonstrate the 
direction of crossover between administrative capacities. 
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Table 1.1: Representation of different levels of Russian elite and the direction of 
interaction under El’tsin 
 
Level of political elite Key members Network interaction with 
other branches of elite 
Federal (Moscow-based 
elite) 
President, Presidential 
Administration, Government, 
State Duma and Federation 
Council. FSB, SVR, MVD, 
Armed Forces. Business 
leaders of federal enterprises 
and industries. 
Vertically downwards with 
regional (oblast, republic, 
krai) 
Regional (oblast, republic, 
krai) 
Republic presidents, Oblast 
and Krai Governors, 
members of their 
governments (where 
applicable), regional 
legislative assemblies. 
Business leaders of regional-
level enterprises and 
industries.  
Vertically upwards to federal 
elite. 
Vertically downwards to local 
elites (where they exist as a 
subgroup) 
Horizontally (cross-
regionally) with other 
members of regional political 
elite 
Local  Mayors of regional capitals, 
other heads of city 
administration (non-regional 
capitals), local legislative 
assemblies. Business 
leaders of local-level 
enterprises and industries 
(more likely to be SME 
leaders) 
Vertically upwards to 
regional and federal elites 
Horizontally amongst 
municipalities and other local 
structures 
 
The regional elite are seen as a sub-set of the national (federal) elite, with significant 
cross-over and competition with them; the local elite are viewed as subset of the 
regional elite but with the opportunity to bypass the regional level and liaise directly 
with the federal elites, in particularly in attempts to weaken regional leaders. Under 
El’tsin, the swift decentralization of power resulted in a dismantling of the vertical 
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integration that the Soviet system enjoyed, with regional government often becoming 
detached from federal structures, and federal and local elites able to pass over the 
regional elite in their contact with one another.94 The spheres of activity that regional 
and local elites operated in are frequently considered as being located within the same 
space, due to the interests of the localities being more closely reliant on the actions 
and policies of the regional level.95  
 
Robert Michels’ ‘iron rule of oligarchy’, argued that it is inevitable that an oligarchy will 
form out of any bureaucratic structure and close off access to outsiders. In the system 
that emerged in Sverdlovsk Oblast, a small number of people, with Rossel’ at the head, 
dominated the political (and economic) space, and worked to prevent non-members of 
the ruling group from having the opportunity to enter this space. In the analysis of 
Rossel’’s power and position, while the Sverdlovsk governor dominated the political 
territory of the region, part of the strategy of boundary control allowed for subsidiary 
elite members to remain interested enough in the chance of entering the upper level of 
the ruling group through participation in Rossel’’s networks to not ally themselves with 
rival actors in an attempt to gain a higher position in the elite. In cases where rival 
groups did emerge, the analysis will develop how the three factors of boundary control 
listed above blocked any threat to countering Rossel’’s political control. Willingness to 
be part of network structures that were built was sustained by a distribution of 
resources that kept participants more or less satisfied with their positions, and the 
analysis raises the treatment given to those that attempted to seize an opportunity to 
break into the upper ranks ahead of their turn. In this way, the study identifies Rossel’’s 
boundary control actions with regard to regulating the clients within his networks and 
non-members of his networks that attempted to rival these networks.  
 
                                                 
94
 Vladimir Gel’man, Sergei Ryzhenkov, Elena Belokurova, Nadezhda Borisova, (2008), Reforma 
mestnoi vlasti v gorodakh Rossii, 1991-2006, Saint Petersburg, Norma. 
95
 Viktor Mokhov, (1997) Transformatsiia regional’noi politicheskoi elity v perekhodnyi period, Moscow, 
MONF, cited in A.E. Chirikova, (2010), Regional’nye elity Rossii, Moscow, Aspekt Press, p.50 
 62 
From the above, the elite aspect of the study of Rossel’’s leadership implies an elite 
firmly based on personal and economic connections to the Sverdlovsk governor. While 
this was largely closed-off to competing and aspirational outsiders, the aim was to exert 
control over entry to the elite and prevent encroachment on areas of regional power 
that were to be protected not by outlawing competition but by closely managing it.  
The emergence of the ‘charismatic’ leader 
The appearance of more readily identifiable individuals in the immediate post-
communist political space in the regions was a clear change from the homogenised 
political system of the Communist Party where only a very limited number of regional 
First Party Secretaries had shown any discernible character that could single them out 
within the wider bureaucracy of the Party. In the post-communist Russian provinces the 
system of appointments to regional heads of administration and the ‘elections’ of 
republic presidents marked a return to a ‘traditional’ system of political authority within 
each region, with the implied idea of the regional governor being seen as the ‘authority 
over the household.’96 By this, we see a return to a personalised power structure with 
the requirement that the ruled had little option but to offer their loyalty to the ruler, who 
was now acting in a largely individual capacity rather than as part of a cohesive larger 
ruling group. With the reversal in the flow of power from the hands of a bureaucracy to 
those of an individual, maintaining appointed leadership positions relied on sustaining 
the support of the president (or those close to him) that appointed them in the first 
instance. In the period under review, many regional leaders should be seen as leading 
territorial entities that can be viewed practically as small kingdoms that joined with 
similar territorial regimes to create the Russian state through the concept of federalism. 
In these regions, it took only a short time for regional leaders to find that through using 
their own individual identity they could shape their institutions. In the case here, 
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Rossel’’s use of his own personality to develop a system of patronage that replaced 
former loyalties to the CPSU is in evidence.  
 
Critical to this form of the regime as a kingdom is the idea of the ‘charismatic’ leader, 
noted by the German sociologist Max Weber, who placed this within his theories of 
overcoming bureaucratic systems. At the turn of the twentieth century, Weber began to 
take a close look at the bureaucratic system of power that existed in the German 
Empire; from his perspective, he defined bureaucracy as the creation of a monopoly 
over expertise in the state and over the way in which the state was administered by a 
professional ruling group. It was noted that the strength of such a system was to be 
found in the order and predictability of the exercise of power, and, in his view, its 
weakness was that this system was effectively making its own policies and decisions, 
becoming unaccountable to the population by acting in its own interests rather than on 
behalf of the national political leaders.97 While Weber was not arguing that the idea of 
bureaucracy was necessarily authoritarian in its nature, he made a clear argument that 
in the form it existed in at the time it was a highly organised and efficient structure that 
was able to decide on policies and their implementation without recourse to elected 
officials that represented society. Weber argued that the decision- and policy-making 
spheres had to be returned to democratically accountable (elected) officials for fear that 
the bureaucracy would become too powerful in controlling the lives of the nation’s 
citizens. Under the surface of this critique of the structures that governed political life, 
Weber gives an insight into how he believed individual political leaders needed to 
approach the bureaucracy. His main concern in this process was to ask how a political 
leader could avoid being undermined by the bureaucracy. Instead of being led in policy 
matters, how could an individual project their own policies onto the bureaucracy and 
cause them to be implemented? Weber’s answer was to focus on the qualities required 
of an individual leader in order to impose themselves. From this question came his 
notion of the ‘charismatic’ leader. Such a leader needed basic characteristics that 
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distinguished them as ‘gifted’ and ‘energetic’, and almost with superhuman qualities.98 
On the basis of such qualities, such a leader would seize the policy making agenda 
and force the implementation of their own will on the political agenda. This required the 
individual not to be passive when promoting views onto the bureaucracy, but instead to 
being able to generate and subsequently use to their own advantage whatever popular 
support outside of the bureaucracy that they enjoyed. Weber intended this support to 
be through electoral legitimacy, but it was not completely defined by this. Much of the 
leader’s ‘charisma’ had to be reflected from the social conditions and the role of the 
public in selecting their leaders.99 Over the course of the 20th century, ‘charismatic’ 
leaders emerged on several occasions and out of different circumstances throughout 
the world, with the result that frequently, forceful individuals subordinated existing 
political structures to dictatorial rule, reversing the trend of bureaucracy influencing 
policy making (the most obvious cases being revolutionary Russia and fascist 
Germany). In the post-authoritarian 20th century landscape, the importance of the 
personality of the political leader retained significance and as the Russian state broke 
down from one run by an organised bureaucracy to a post-bureaucratic system of 
individuals jostling for positions of power, one of the features of the political landscape 
became the rise of numerous individuals from the ashes of the bureaucracy, all 
attempting to impose their individual beliefs on national politics.  
 
The upper levels of Soviet nomenklatura functioned as a bureaucracy in Weber’s 
terms. Quite clearly, the Party functioned as a separate layer of society that created its 
own policies that purported to be in the interests of society without being accountable 
to them or consulting them.100 Elites at various levels of the Party could control and 
influence decision making according to their own interests, with the top-level elite in the 
role of the Party General Secretary and the Politburo able to project their power 
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downwards on the rest of the elite, which followed their orders. The severity of the 
challenge to the Party from 1990 onwards, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
brought about an enforced change to leadership at national, regional and local levels 
with the removal of the Communist Party Regional First Secretaries by President El’tsin 
leaving a gap at the top of the bureaucratic structures of the Party and at the head of 
the regional elite table. In many regions, this gap was not securely filled until Putin 
restored the vertical system of power well into the 2000s, and powerful regional figures 
emerged, either with pre-existing power structures or new, socially-constructed power 
bases.101 Weberian charismatic politicians that emerged in some regions while 
supposed to break the bureaucratic nature of top-down politics, simply replaced 
previous bureaucratic systems with structures that served themselves, and indeed in 
several regions this resulted in powerful political individuals controlling their territories. 
Relating the above to Eduard Rossel’, his emergence from within the bureaucracy of 
the Communist Party system presented him with pre-existing networks that were re-
shaped into becoming responsive to him individually rather than to a wider institution 
through his development into a ‘charismatic’ leader. The connection is made with the 
figure of El’tsin to show how Rossel’ used the experiences of El’tsin’s charismatic 
popularity to win popular support as part of the ascent of personal power at a time 
when allegiances to a wider organization had collapsed. It is argued that the 
relationship between El’tsin and Rossel’ bolstered the latter’s claims to be a 
‘charismatic’ political figure within the region on the basis of El’tsin having blazed a trail 
ahead of him at the national level.   
Networks as the basis of the Russian social and political system  
As noted above, the argument put forward is that the development of patronage in the 
region arose from the need for elite interaction between various levels of society 
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following the breakdown of Soviet regulated structures and the charismatic leadership 
displayed by Rossel’ as the individual capable of managing the cross-over of resources 
between the different branches of the regional elite (both political and economic). The 
networks that emerged out of this are raised here.  
 
How networks are viewed by the observer is important to the examination of networks 
and their role in a causal mechanism, such as boundary control. An ‘internal’ approach 
to viewing networks looks at them from within, taking a depersonalised view of the role 
of the actors and how the dynamics of the network are sustained, looking at how 
changes may affect the structure of the network rather than looking at the effects of 
such changes on spheres of social life outside of the structure being examined.102 This 
approach is most appropriate when focusing on the social workings of members of the 
network, how they interact with each other and the exchange of resources that occurs 
between them. Such an approach has been used to explain social phenomenon and 
the impacts of social change on different layers of society. The opposite approach 
would be to view networks and their actors externally, that is to say, looking less at the 
impact of social relations on the network itself, but instead focusing on what impact the 
network and its actors can have on wider spheres of life, and on the institutions that 
regulate or are affected by networks (Table 1.2 offers a breakdown of some of the 
factors differentiating internal and external views of networks). This provides the scope 
here to look at how the creation of networks were instrumental to regional political 
power in the 1990s and facilitated its maintenance. While many of the internal factors 
are present in the approach taken, such as personal interactions and interpersonal 
relations, these are not offered as the source of political life in Sverdlovsk, but rather as 
the instrument for conducting political life, therefore approaching networks from the 
external viewpoint placing networks as the instrument for exercising boundary control. 
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Table 1.2 Factors of internal vs. external approach to networks 
 
Internal view External view 
Personal interactions, social 
and interpersonal relations; 
networks as the source of 
social life; survival strategy; 
depersonalised look at the 
network as a whole 
Effect on institutions; 
networks as an instrument 
for conducting social life; 
strategy for social promotion; 
may focus on a single 
individual or small group of 
individuals 
 
Core to the structure of a political network is the idea of inequality amongst members 
with regards to the power and standing of individuals within the group. In all networks 
different actors bring different resources and different positions to the group, but in a 
political network these positions are often directly connected to the political power and 
economic/financial potential of those resources. A political network therefore is far 
more likely to be asymmetrical, vertically-structured and frequently has a stand-out 
patron, who holds unequally greater power than the other members and acts to attract 
resources and distribute them in order to implement a particular goal. While in social 
networks, the exchange of resources is frequently a survival strategy at the most basic 
of levels, in a political network with patrons and clients this exchange is a set of 
relations regulated not only by resource and opportunity, but also by ambition and a 
certain ruthlessness in seeking additional resources to propel the actor to a desired 
position within the group’s hierarchy. Throughout the analysis it becomes clear that 
there is a mix of formal and informal networks and the lines between these can quickly 
blur as actors and institutions move fluidly between defining rules of the game and 
subsequently ignoring them.  
 
While quite clearly not unique to Russia, patron-client network structures have existed 
there since at least the 15th century, providing the potential for an exchange of 
resources whereby participants offer their resources to the patron in return for the 
benefits that the powerful individual can supply to them in other branches of life.103 
These resources and benefits are fluid rather than fixed and shift according to the 
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situation or outcome that is trying to be achieved. Both patrons and clients must react 
to frequently multiple, competing demands, and all actors can be participant in 
numerous networks at any one time and with drastically (and often competing) aims. It 
is noted that there can be concurrent participation in different networks. By looking at 
how Rossel’ functioned in different roles (as patron and as client) at the same time, we 
can show how he was able to adapt in both roles to make optimal use of his political 
position and the resources that were provided to him within his networks. This reflects 
the claim made by Eyal et al, that the success of all actors in post-communist societies 
is greatly dependent on the ability to adapt networks and capital according to the 
requirements of the situation.104 To do this requires an ability to build authority within 
different groups, something that became more difficult as competing ideas emerged in 
the new Russia over the future direction of the state and of the regions. Any authority 
that is conferred upon a leading actor within a group can lead to that network becoming 
patrimonialist, whereby a sense of legitimacy is given to that person by the members of 
the network to act as the patron. Further consideration is required to account for the 
conditions of the context in which the network functions; how do the political, economic 
and social conditions shape the nature of networks? The development and change in 
the legitimacy Rossel’ found in his appointment by the President to his position and 
then gained through popular election perhaps drives us towards making the distinction 
that Rossel’’s patronage developed further into neo-patrimonialism as it progressed 
from ‘traditional’ legitimacy conferred on him by the president to electorally accountable 
legitimacy granted through popular (and competitive) elections, which gave exercising 
boundary control greater credibility and political strength.  
 
Returning to the contextual conditions of the times, the immediate post-communist 
period presented Russia with a set of volatile circumstances leaving great uncertainty 
over the future stability of reform. The system of authority that Rossel’ enjoyed, 
connected to the continuous manoeuvres to prevent encroachment on his position, was 
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grounded in the conditions of the Sverdlovsk region and the Russian state during the 
1990s. In the post-El’tsin period, this study of Rossel’’s leadership gives additional 
explanation to the conditions that prompted Putin to return central patronage over the 
state as a whole. While, in hindsight, the argument can be made that Rossel’’s system 
of power may have been damaging to the development of Russian reform as it 
deterred the construction and consolidation of institutions, and stunted the 
development of rule of law to the extent that institutions became dysfunctional and 
reliant firmly on the personality and strength of an individual leader, it must be pointed 
out that his unrivalled authority over the region did not descend into regional 
authoritarianism of the type that was in evidence in similar long-term political regimes 
at the sub-national level, as seen in several of the ethnic republics within Russia at the 
same time or as may be seen in present-day central political power.105  
Summary of the model 
Through examining the network relations in which the Sverdlovsk leader acted as 
either patron or client each chapter attempts to cover the key areas of the boundary 
control strategy. These are the ability to force the regional elite to rely on Rossel’ to 
represent their interests; the development of Rossel as the only agent capable of 
pursuing policies at the national level that would affect the region; and the domination 
of Rossel’’s own networks over those of other actors that forced any interested parties 
to work with the Sverdlovsk leader to achieve their own goals. Within each of these 
areas are the factors developed above – the nature of the elite in the region, the 
importance of Rossel’’s own character, and the system of patronage that kept actors in 
check. Using the theme of centre-regional and intra-regional relations we can explain 
the structural process of using networks that Rossel’ used to exercise power.  
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Chapter 2 
The rise of Rossel' in Sverdlovsk Oblast’, 1989-1991: replacing 
political networks in the final years of Communist rule 
 
Political networks as a form of capital necessary to establish and maintain political 
power and privilege under communism were at the forefront of progression in Soviet 
society, institutionalised through membership of the Communist Party.106 The decline in 
the ability of the Communist Party to ensure control over such networks, as seen from 
the period of the first elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 
onwards, resulted in the end of the Communist Party’s monopoly over support for the 
regime, and allowed competing ideas to emerge into the open. Whereas the collapse of 
communist regimes in Central Europe had promoted other forms of capital to the fore, 
such as social and economic capital, in Russia political networks continued to be the 
prime form of capital.  
 
This chapter explores the changing regional political environment in Sverdlovsk Oblast 
in the period from the first competitive elections to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies (CPD) in March 1989 to the August 1991 coup to consider how the 
Communist Party's monopoly over power in Sverdlovsk Oblast broke down. Focusing 
on the change in the political leadership of the region and the replacement of the old 
Soviet elite it looks to explain the characteristics of Eduard Rossel''s rise to regional 
political power as the Communist Party came under increased pressure from 1990 
onwards and the basis from which he constructed his political regime that allowed him 
to dominate the region’s political space for nearly two decades.  
 
Despite a change in the individual characters involved, with a different set of patrons 
and clients emerging, there was little change in the reliance on political networks for 
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regional power to function effectively. The most significant source of political backing 
for pro-reform forces in the Sverdlovsk region came from the region’s most famous 
son, Boris El’tsin. This chapter notes the linkage between the context of the processes 
occurring in the Soviet Union and the RSFSR during this period and the emergence of 
Rossel’ noting the reliance on El'tsin's own precarious position within the state. This 
contextualises the continuation and construction of networks in the later Soviet period 
that carried over into the new Russia as a response to uncertainty in political society. 
Power relations in the Russian regions 1989-1990 
The system of party control in the Soviet provinces and the relationship between the 
regional party organs and the regional soviets in the RSFSR had been constructed in a 
way so as to give the Party total control over appointments, planning and decision 
making. This served not only to ensure adherence to central policy in the regions, but 
also to control the reproduction of Soviet elites and the associated discipline that it 
demanded from all levels of society. The Communist Party's highest regional 
representative, the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee (Oblastnoi komitet 
KPSS or Obkom) was selected by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and, in El'tsin's 
own words, ruled his territory as 'God, Tsar and Master', with a tight grip over 
subordinates.107 
 
Organisationally, the structure of the Soviet system relied heavily on both ideological 
loyalty to the Party and personal loyalty to the most powerful individual at the 
respective level of society. The formal structure of the regional First Secretary’s power 
consolidated his position with a body of carefully selected officials in the Obkom, and a 
smaller number of other figures appointed to a bureau (buro), who were tasked with the 
full-time management of specific branches of regional political life. Most commonly 
there was an organizational secretary (usually noted as the Second Party Secretary), 
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an ideological secretary, and secretaries for agriculture and industry.108 The Obkom 
was responsible for all aspects of life in its territory, from achieving central planning 
targets to the ideological education of citizens and had day-to-day responsibility for 
implementing central directives. It made all formal policy decisions within a region and 
all of its officials reported to the First Secretary.109 The formal traditions of Party 
discipline and patron-client relations meant that decisions taken by the First Secretary 
were rarely challenged.110 This structure was repeated at all administrative levels 
downwards, so that in large cities there was a City Committee (Gorkom), subordinated 
to the Obkom, city district committees (Raikomy), subordinated to the Gorkom, and 
Party committees of regional administrative districts (also called Raikom), subordinated 
directly to the Obkom. In this way, the complex system of regional Party Committees 
was designed to ensure the vertical chain of authority held by the Party continued from 
the very top level all the way down to the smallest sections of society. 
 
Patronage was a critical factor in appointments as well as in access to resources and 
the exercise of power in the regions. The First Party Secretary would have clients going 
down the Party hierarchy, starting from within the ranks of second secretaries, other 
members of the Obkom or the Oblast soviet executive committee (Oblispolkom).111 
Informally, the entire nomenklatura system relied upon patronage ties connecting 
actors to someone higher up the chain within the Party. Actors worked closely with 
each other to serve the Party interests with the result that connections became an 
essential feature for career progression, often even over competency, as loyalty was 
frequently the most important factor for individual promotion.  
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Although the operation of the Soviet system was that all interests were those of the 
state as defined by the Communist Party, in regions dominated by large state 
enterprises, Regional Party First Secretaries often found their own interests to be 
subordinate to the interests of directors of powerful industrial or military enterprises 
(frequently represented on the Obkom) who had their own support structures that went 
straight to the top of Soviet society, and were significantly more influential than those of 
the First Secretary. These more powerful interests had to be accommodated by the 
First Secretaries when it came to regional planning not least due to the fact that much 
of the social balance within the regions came from the provision of public goods, such 
as housing, child care, medical facilities by these enterprises.112 Within subordinate 
state structures and the political organization of the state there existed rivalry between 
networks and groups of actors seeking resources or progression, particularly in the 
vertically upward direction. 
 
Downwardly, the Obkom held authority over the regional assembly (soviet), which was 
the seat of deputies chosen via the Party nomenklatura to “democratically” represent 
society. A representative body rather than a legislative branch of government, the 
Oblast Soviet was made up of deputies who were elected in single candidate ballots to 
represent the social structure in the region (although not competitively, and to ensure 
that only Communist Party members or its supporters were deputies). Until competitive 
elections to this body were introduced in 1990 it functioned to rubber-stamp decisions 
made by the regional executive committee, the Oblispolkom. The regional soviet was 
not a permanent body, meeting only a handful of times per year in short sessions 
lasting a few days at most with the Oblispolkom acting as its elected, full-time 
representative to act in between sessions. Although subordinated to the soviet, the 
Oblispolkom discussed policy directives from the Obkom or higher up in the Party, 
leaving sessions of the soviet to concentrate on approving decisions taken. It was also 
subordinated to the Council of Ministers at the next level up (for example, in Russia this 
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was to the RSFSR Council of Ministers), with the heads of the various departments in 
the Oblispolkom subordinated both to the Oblast soviet as well as to the territorial 
Ministries and Departments of which they were the regional representatives. The 
Oblispolkom elected its own Chairman (although, again, this in effect meant via 
selection by the Central Committee), who was assisted by a deputy Chairman, the 
Chairman of the regional capital’s executive committee (Gorispolkom) and heads of 
departments of the Oblast soviet.113 While the Oblispolkom Chairman presided over 
Oblast soviet sessions, the soviet itself was entirely restricted to approval in its 
contribution to the actual decision-making process, leaving no doubt to the Party’s 
oversight of the committee.114 For any political actor, the position of Chairman of the 
Oblispolkom was as an important stage in political career development holding a seat 
on the Obkom bureau and considered to be a training ground for the post of First Party 
Secretary.  
 
The introduction of competitive elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies 
began the process of undermining the authority of regional Party figures, not least the 
First Party Secretary. The regional soviets filled with members of the nomenklatura, 
who saw in them a potential alternative seat of power, particularly when organising 
themselves around social movements.115 A large number of Regional First Party 
Secretaries found it difficult to adapt to the threat to the job security that they had 
enjoyed since the Brezhnev era, and the further initiation of elections to a Russian CPD 
and regional soviets in May 1990 reflected the pressures on Party rule. In removing the 
monopoly of power that the Party had previously guaranteed itself under Article 6 of the 
1977 Soviet Constitution, and with the possibility for discussion of policy in the regional 
soviets, they found themselves threatened for the first time in a generation, prompting 
some to turn either to more conservative Party forces or to seek to re-invent 
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themselves as reformers (as many regional leaders did particularly in the autonomous 
republics of the RSFSR on the back of nationalist ideology and calls for sovereignty).116 
As new actors appeared on the political scene, often politically inexperienced and 
coming from within the existing elite, the ability to distance themselves from the 
connotations of existing higher Party officials became a valuable resource. 
Furthermore, political reforms within the USSR transferred control over economic 
aspects of Soviet life to the Oblispolkom, requiring the First Secretaries to devote 
themselves to political leadership and ideological issues.117 Experiments in certain 
regions, including Sverdlovsk Oblast, were permitted in the economic sphere, with the 
regions moving to a new system to self-accounting, or khozraschet, and it was a short 
step from gaining control over economic life to altering the power structures of regional 
political life, as growing popular anti-Party feeling further weakened the power of the 
Obkom in regions such as Sverdlovsk.  
Sverdlovsk Oblast regional authorities in the late-Gorbachev era 
The growing economic crisis facing the industrial enterprises of Sverdlovsk Oblast, 
alongside strong support for El’tsin, played an important role in the breakdown of the 
CPSU’s exclusive control over regional political resources, which to a large degree has 
been overshadowed by the roles taken by Moscow and Leningrad. While the 
discussion groups and Popular Fronts of the two capitals were most influential in 
bringing down Soviet power, the emergence of new political forces were of great 
significance for the wider Urals, and its associated social, economic and political 
structures. 
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The expectation that elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in March 
1989 would underpin the authority of the Party, not least through its regional Party 
officials winning election to the Congress, did not come to fruition, and conversely 
demonstrated the growing lack of satisfaction with the Communist Party at the regional 
level. In a result that took the Communist leadership by surprise, 38 Obkom secretaries 
failed to win election to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies.118 Sverdlovsk First 
Party Secretary, Leonid Bobykin, who had a Party career dating back to the Brezhnev 
period, was among this number. His subsequent resignation in February 1990 was 
officially attributed to him being of retirement age, but it is clear that his electoral failure 
made his position untenable, especially under attempts by Gorbachev to rejuvenate 
Soviet cadres.119A period of extreme instability ensued for the regional Party 
leadership, with two further First Secretaries being appointed and replaced in quick 
succession, before the Party settled on Vladimir Kadochnikov, the former First 
Secretary of the Sverdlovsk City gorkom in June 1990.120 This period saw more than 
25% of Communist Party members in Sverdlovsk Oblast leave the Party, a figure far 
higher than the average for the Urals territory overall.121 One of the major implications 
of regional elections was the removal of reliance on the Party for appointment for 
deputies elected to the soviet and members of the Oblispolkom. It also removed the 
prerequisite of cultivating personal relations with Party members higher up the chain as 
a means of career development for members of the regional soviet. Elections to the 
USSR CPD had allowed a number of non-nomenklatura actors to become involved 
with popular support, and regional soviet elections held in March 1990 similarly brought 
in outsiders to a number of regions. These elections opened access to political debate 
to a wider population and different views on the future role of the Soviet and associated 
executive committee in Soviet regional politics were heard. There were further 
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expectations that the internal balance of power would shift, with the Chairman of the 
Soviet rivalling the Chairman of the Oblispolkom for power. The uncertainty over where 
power lay in the new regional soviets is demonstrated by the actions of Vladimir 
Vlasov, the Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom at the time of the March 1990 
regional soviet elections. Vlasov resigned his post as Chairman of the Oblispolkom 
following his election as Chairman of the competitively elected Sverdlovsk Oblast 
Soviet, in a move that can only be construed as having been due to a belief that the 
regional soviet chairmanship had greater potential for political power now that it had 
become a genuinely elected body. Vlasov’s move to the post of Chair of the Oblast 
soviet proved to be unsuccessful; after an embarrassing series of rejections of his 
candidates for Deputy Chairman and his opposition in the Central Committee of the 
CPSU to El'tsin’s candidacy for the post of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 
he was recalled following a vote of confidence by deputies of the Sverdlovsk Oblast 
Soviet from his post in June 1990. The fact that the Oblast Soviet removed its own 
Chairman (rather than him being removed by higher Party authorities) demonstrates 
the emboldened nature of the representative chamber arising from the first competitive 
soviet elections. The vote of 146 regional soviet deputies out of 217 to remove him was 
noted by local commentators from the newspaper of the Sverdlovsk City Soviet, 
Vechernii Sverdlovsk, that the role of the Chairman was now to represent the views of 
the electorate and of the Soviet, rather than the Party bosses. 122 In April 1990, Eduard 
Rossel’, a member of the Sverdlovsk Oblast soviet but nonetheless a minor figure in 
the upper levels of the regional political structure, was elected as Vlasov’s replacement 
to the post of Chairman of the Oblispolkom. As a senior manager within the 
construction industry he was well positioned within the nomenklatura system that made 
up regional soviet deputies. When considering Rossel’’s appointment to the 
Oblispolkom in a period where Party connections were weakening in importance, his 
lack of ties to the highest level of the regional Party leadership meant that he was not 
                                                 
122
 ‘Lishili doveriia’, Vechernii Sverdlovsk, 27 June 1990, p.1 and ‘Reshenie Sverdlovskii Oblastnoi Sovet 
Narodnykh Deputatov – Vtoraia sessiia dvadtsat’ pervogo sozyva 05.07.90’, UTs BN El'tsina Fond 5, 
Opis 1, Delo 6, List 154 
 78 
constrained by being part of the patron-client network at this level, freeing him 
somewhat from any loyalties towards the former regional masters.  
El'tsin as a source of political support in the period 1990-1991 
In contrast to the republics where he had been able to harness popular support through 
supporting ethno-nationalist demands, in order to build support from the political elites 
of Russia's regions, El’tsin needed closer links within the regional institutions of power. 
At the same time, for many, association with El'tsin was an easy path to being 
perceived as pro-reform. An important facet of this was his use of emerging pro-reform 
movements (for example in the cases of Popov and Sobchak in Moscow and 
Leningrad), which on the surface supported El'tsin, but held to a more ambitious 
ideological platform of democratization than that voiced by him. From potential political 
actors’ perspective, even the most tenuous association with El’tsin could be used 
during electoral campaigns for the RSFSR CPD and regional soviets. In Sverdlovsk 
Oblast, El'tsin’s huge popularity and the presence of a strong local pro-reform 
movement simplified the task of developing a support base. Within his home region, 
Rossel’ was an ideal candidate to fit El’tsin’s requirements; they had previously worked 
well together, they had similar backgrounds, and through his patronage of Rossel’, he 
now had a client in this critical region.123 The conditions of El’tsin’s own struggle with 
the centre demonstrated that this informal relationship worked both ways, and as is 
shown in chapter four, the manner of its initiation lent this patron-client relationship 
more significance (in a positive and negative sense) than the majority of other future 
ties the Russian president had with regional leaders. The result was that their 
relationship became grounded in clearly separated areas of the ‘national’ and the 
‘regional’, with each side controlling their respective domain. Rossel’ could display 
loyalty on issues affecting the future of El’tsin’s regime, but on matters of regional 
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importance he became accustomed to taking his own approach, which would later 
cause tension with the centre. 
 
Additionally, informal groups (neformaly) that sprung up as political and social control 
began to relax under perestroika, are indirectly connected in the influence of El’tsin on 
Rossel’’s rise. Such groups emerged throughout the country as a channel for the wider 
discussion of political and socioeconomic conditions in Soviet society. In Sverdlovsk 
Oblast, the most prominent of the neformaly was the ‘Discussion Tribune’ (Diskussionyi 
Tribunal), formed in 1987 in Sverdlovsk City.124 The group, and particularly its initiator 
Gennadii Burbulis, a lecturer in Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Urals Polytechnic 
University (El’tsin’s alma mater), was highly influential during campaigning for the 1989 
USSR and 1990 RSFSR CPD elections. Channelling the politicisation of the region 
through creating a forum for alternative political conversations to occur, the Discussion 
Tribune quickly became highly popular, bringing together a number of the leading 
intelligentsia of Sverdlovsk to discuss the changes required in the political life of the 
region and the country. Its key protagonists were largely members of the Communist 
Party rather than dissidents and initially had the approval of the city Party organs. In 
the run-up to elections to the 1989 USSR Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) it 
broke from Party supervision and approval and concerted its efforts into campaigning 
for pro-reform candidates, taking the regional Party organs by surprise in the 1989 
USSR CPD elections. The pro-reform sentiment in the region was dubbed by 
journalists as a ‘Sverdlovsk Spring’ (with the intentional nod to events in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and 1960s), and by the time of the RSFSR CPD elections 
in March 1990 Discussion Tribune was a founder member of the “Movement for 
Democratic Choice” (Dvizheniia Demokraticheskogo Vybora - DDV), which itself fell 
                                                 
124
 See for example Judith Devlin, (1995), The rise of the Russian Democrats: the causes and 
consequences of the elite revolution, Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 5 pp.74-105 for a look 
at the spectrum of the neformaly groups in the country. The focus here is centred on their presence in 
Moscow and Leningrad, but, it is worth pointing out that the Discussion Tribune in Sverdlovsk was more 
open than its counterpart in Moscow which restricted its participants. This study gives an indication as to 
the spectrum of interests represented by these groups and their transition into more formal electoral 
campaigning movements. 
 80 
under the umbrella of the Democratic Russia (Demokraticheskaia Rossiia) group at the 
USSR CPD level.125 Of the 32 deputies elected to the Russian CPD from Sverdlovsk 
Oblast (the largest number from any of the Urals regions - Chelyabinsk had 24 
deputies and the Bashkir ASSR sent 27), 12 of them were members of pro-reform 
fractions in the Congress (including Svobodnaia Rossiia and Demokraticheskaia 
Rossiia) and were firmly supportive of El’tsin’s attempt to become chairman of the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet. 126    
 
In the internal politics of Sverdlovsk region, Gennadii Burbulis, who was attending 
Sverdlovsk regional soviet sessions while also fulfilling his role as a deputy in the 
USSR CPD, proposed Rossel’ as a candidate for Chairman of the Oblispolkom  in April 
1990. This offered the regional soviet a quick solution that avoided uncertainty and was 
palatable to both conservatives and reformers.127 With his experience of running 
El’tsin’s office in Sverdlovsk while he was elected to the Russian Congress of People’s 
Deputies, Burbulis was a trusted figure and could well have been considered as a 
candidate for Head of Regional Administration. Instead, Burbulis was focused on 
developing a career at the national political level, and went on to join El’tsin in Moscow, 
running his presidential election campaign in July 1991, before eventually becoming 
Secretary of State in 1991. While the suggestion of Rossel’ might have appeared 
somewhat surprising coming from Burbulis, as Rossel’ had not been a part of the pro-
reform movement, it is clear that El’tsin wanted Rossel’ as Chairman of the 
Oblispolkom.128 Despite a lack of pro-reform credentials, Rossel’ was considered by 
El’tsin as ‘one of his people’ (svoi chelovek). Previous contact between the two dated 
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back to El’tsin’s time as First Party Secretary of the Sverdlovsk region between 1976 
and 1985. Both had been involved in the construction industry and it has been reported 
that El’tsin later offered Rossel’ the role of chairman of the Gorispolkom of the region’s 
second largest city, Nizhnii Tagil,which he turned down citing a lack of preparedness to 
move from construction (and a fear that this would trap him into a local Party role).129 
Rejecting a promotion was not a decision to take lightly in the Soviet system, although 
Rossel’ continued to work effectively under El’tsin. A few years later, El’tsin oversaw 
Rossel’’s promotion to Deputy Director of the construction enterprise Sreduralstroi in 
1983, from where he was later promoted to Director of the Glavsreduralstroi 
construction enterprise (a re-named successor to Sreduralstroi).  
  
The pressure that the Communist Party found itself under nationally in the RSFSR and 
locally in the regions at this time also helps to explain why a non-political actor was 
preferred as Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom in 1990. As the Oblispolkom took 
on more economic responsibility for the region, it became a practical necessity that 
regional economic control should be in the hands of someone who understood the 
realities of the socioeconomic position the region faced rather than those of a Party 
theorist. Appointing a Chairman who had experience of running a large-scale 
enterprise covered both bases, with them having political and management experience 
(although not necessarily Party experience). With the presence of many of the super-
heavy industrial enterprises located in the region, particularly the influential industrial 
powerhouses of Uralmashzavod and Uralvagonzavod, the choice of the director of a 
construction enterprise (El’tsin’s former profession) over directors of these powerful 
branch enterprises further underlines the influence of El’tsin on the suggestion of 
Rossel’. Furthermore, others in the group of ‘Sverdlovskers’ taken by El’tsin with him to 
Moscow in 1985, of which the most enduring was Viktor Iliushin, knew Rossel’ from his 
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earlier days in the Sverdlovsk city of Nizhnii Tagil, and would likely have supported or 
even influenced this choice.130 It is also notable that over the years to come, Iliushin 
and Iurii Petrov, of the State Investment Corporation, (and also from Nizhnii Tagil), 
figured in Rossel’’s new political career and were later accused of having protected him 
from criticism in the centre and of preventing such criticism from reaching El’tsin.131  
Preparing the ground for the future power system: the emergence of 
‘unified power’  
The second part of this chapter looks at how Rossel’ obtained further powers in the 
region and consolidated his position within the Oblast soviet and its Executive 
Committee, culminating in his successfully replacing the First Secretary as the de facto 
leader of the region. The basis for future regional power to remain focused on a single 
figure has its roots in this period, as the regional soviets began to emerge as potential 
alternate seats of political power. 
 
In several regions, conflict as to whether there should be a continued separation of 
powers between the Chairmen of the Soviet and the Oblispolkom led to many 
combining these roles in order to overcome the lack of clarity over where power lay. In 
unifying these two roles a single individual was able to control its proceedings.132 
Termed 'unified power' (edinonachalie), movement towards this began in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast in June 1990, just a few months after Rossel’’s election to the Oblispolkom, 
following the humiliating recall of the newly-elected Oblast Soviet Chairman, Vlasov. 
The position taken by Rossel’ was that unifying these roles would prevent a conflict of 
powers emerging, highlighting the example of Sverdlovsk city, in which the 
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Gorispolkom and the Gorsoviet were both seeking to take control over the Oblast 
capital’s affairs, leading to paralysis in management of the city. In his argument for 
edinonachalie, Rossel’ was forceful in stating that such a combination was absolutely 
necessary, criticising the Soviet for being unable to act quickly enough, holding too 
many personal conflicts between deputies and ineffectiveness in implementing 
decisions.133 The counterargument made against edinonachalie was that it dragged the 
Oblast back to former times when all power was in the hands of one person instead of 
in the hands of the Soviet.134 Some members of the pro-democratic factions of the 
Oblast Soviet went as far as denouncing unified rule as ‘dictatorship, iron rule in the 
hands of one person’ and as a ‘creeping counter-revolution’.135 This process was an 
early indication of Rossel’’s willingness to act as a single figure in charge of the political 
space, with the suggested alternative being the dissolution of the Oblispolkom 
altogether and transferring power into the hands of an Oblast Soviet presidium.136 
Unsurprisingly, the political conditions at the national level were influential in Rossel’ 
obtaining unified rule, as this coincided with El’tsin’s struggle with the Soviet authorities 
and his encouragement of republics and regions to seek their own paths of 
development. El’tsin himself, at a meeting in Sverdlovsk, stressed that although 
different regions were suggesting different solutions for regional power there was a 
need for one solution for all of Russia.137 The weight that El’tsin’s backing for unified 
rule carried was decisive in the Sverdlovsk regional Soviet; the issue was raised by 
Rossel’ during visits by El’tsin to the region and the indicated approval of the Russian 
leader for this system eventually swung the issue within the Soviet, which obeyed the 
leading national figure following several rounds of voting in November 1990.138  As 
already stated, in what should be viewed as an early power grab by Rossel’ under the 
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conditions of wider uncertainty over the future political structure, this not only indicates 
early domination of the national-subnational linkage in regional politics, but also 
Rossel’’s ability to marginalise competing forces (in this case the regional Soviet). 
While this may well have been due to the fact that regional soviets more generally were 
still weak due to their own inexperience in decision making as an elected body, we can 
see his control over the political space through a willingness to override newly 
emerging democratic forces in the region, including closing off attempts by the regional 
Soviet to impose checks and balances on his power.139 With regards to the Communist 
Party, while there was infrequent criticism from the new Regional First Party Secretary, 
Vladimir Kadochnikov, their attentions lay largely elsewhere focusing on national issues 
of deteriorating Party leadership and criticism of Gorbachev.140     
Rossel’ and the role of regional economic crisis in the foundation of his 
regional power 
With Gorbachev’s reforms focusing the Party on ideological matters rather than 
overseeing economic and production concerns, it fell to regional governments to take 
over the roles of central ministries and represent the needs of local enterprises in order 
to stave off total social collapse as the traditional forms of industrial interest 
representation that had previously been under the control of the branch ministries 
started to break down.141 This particularly affected those regions that were heavily 
reliant on the industrial enterprises located in their territories. We now look at how 
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greater economic management by Rossel’ to combat the growing socio-economic crisis 
in the Russian regions brought him directly to take up a position from which he could 
influence national-regional bargaining, develop a position as the origin of the pursuit of 
national decisions that affected the regions, and by extension initiate the process of 
monopolising political influence in the region. 
 
One of the key areas of Rossel’’s rise to assuming the role of regional leader can be 
seen in his public voicing of doubts that the Soviet centre could continue to adequately 
provide for the region. Whereas the majority of regions took a wait-and-see approach 
to the outcome of struggles at the centre in the period from 1990-1991 rather than 
taking new initiatives to resolve issues at the regional level, Rossel’ symbolised the 
emergence of a pragmatic non-Party figure who could pursue economic management 
in a way that was outside of the practices of the Party.142 Using El’tsin’s campaign visits 
to Sverdlovsk to discuss the political problems that the region faced gave rise to taking 
matters of economic management into his own hands in a way that did not rely on an 
external decision-making power. As El’tsin and Gorbachev both sought to gain the 
support of the regions and republics for their respective positions, regional actors such 
as Rossel’ saw the opportunity to play both sides of power against each other to make 
vertical requests for additional resources or assistance, alongside developing 
horizontal relations between regions, something that the Soviet method of planning and 
subordination outlined above had systematically prevented. Amongst the regions of the 
RSFSR, Sverdlovsk Oblast was one that the Soviet authorities could ill-afford to ignore; 
its highly urban, industrialised and politicised society was at high risk of social collapse, 
with low living standards despites its position as one of the most economically 
developed regions in Russia.143 The Soviet authorities, as opposed to the Russian, 
were better suited to resolving problems associated with the breakdown of economic 
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planning, and the advantage of direct approaches to the Soviet centre lay in the 
expediency of decision-making, although it was certainly the case that regional matters 
were secondary to the battle over the future of the regime being fought at the Union 
level. Potential channels of contact between Sverdlovsk Oblast and the Soviet centre 
were supplemented by networks that had arisen from its historical significance as a 
training ground for future senior Soviet political figures (a further example of a member 
of the central elite with experience of the region was the USSR Prime Minister Nikolai 
Ryzhkov, who had been the Director of the Uralmash factory from 1970-1975). These 
contacts, combined with the more explicit threat voiced from within the region that the 
whole complex of issues it faced could lead to major civil unrest propelled the centre 
into responding to immediate demands, notably over the supply of food and consumer 
goods.  
 
Comparatively, other Urals regions such as Cheliabinsk Oblast and Perm Oblast were 
in a similar perilous condition to their neighbour.144 Horizontal contact had previously 
been strictly limited to the supply of raw materials and consumer goods. The prospect 
of coordination between regions, outside of the confines of the planned economy, 
provided the opportunity of a new type of network that both overlapped with existing 
vertical subordination, while at the same time undermining it. The formation of the 
Association of Oblasts and Republics of the Urals Region for Economic Cooperation 
(also known as ‘Bol'shoi Ural’) in September 1990 followed on the heels of the Siberian 
Agreement that brought together a number of Siberian regions, and was prompted by 
the understanding that centralised agreements between regions as part of central 
planning could no longer be relied upon to be fulfilled and could be more effectively re-
negotiated without involvement of the centre. The heads of Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, 
Kurgan, Orenburg, Perm and Tiumen’ Oblasts agreed to coordinate action to prevent 
the break-down of the supply network and consolidate economic relations to give a 
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degree of protectionism and self-sufficiency.145 As part of the process of undermining 
the Soviet leadership, El’tsin officially signed Bol’shoi Ural into existence, as a matter of 
RSFSR importance, in June 1991. The influence of Rossel’ as the driving force in this 
group can be seen in early discussions held by this group over the potential creation of 
a new territorial entity made up of six of its participant regions, Sverdlovsk, Perm, 
Cheliabinsk, Orenburg, Kurgan and Tiumen' Oblasts, although this idea was dropped 
when the leaders of the other participant Urals regions felt that Rossel's rising power 
threatened their own positions.146  
 
Competing forces for influence were still present, and resistance to the regionalization 
of economic control came most significantly from the military-industrial sector, which 
remained loyal to its central ministries. Low Soviet investment in conversion and the 
shift away from a defence-oriented economic structure had weakened the influence of 
this branch in Moscow, although it remained tightly controlled by the ministries who 
were not favourable towards El’tsin. Support in this sector for conservative Party forces 
grew, in particular, for the new Soviet Prime Minister, Valentin Pavlov, who advocated 
a return to the former planning systems and the re-implementation of state support for 
the defence industry. This position had strong resonance in the military-industrial 
complex of Sverdlovsk Oblast, resulting in Aleksandr Tiziakov, Director of the ZiK 
(Zavod im. Kalinina) rocket factory, and member of the Sverdlovsk Obkom, acting as 
one of the leading participants in the August 1991 coup.147  
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The August 1991 attempted coup and the installation of Rossel’ as Head 
of Regional Administration 
Patron-client resources not only contribute resources to a network and receive benefits 
when resources are distributed, but they also lend support to participants at critical 
junctures. While many of Russia’s regions fell silent as the State Committee for 
Emergency Rule (GKChP) declared itself in control of the USSR, waiting to see how 
events played out in Moscow before announcing their support or condemnation, 
confirmation of the ties between Rossel’ and El’tsin was shown in the immediate and 
absolute support that came from the Sverdlovsk leader’s condemnation of the seizure 
of power by the putschists.148 Popular sentiment in Sverdlovsk Oblast had already 
demonstrated itself as against any conservative restoration of power, when in the 
referendum of March 1991 on the future of the Soviet Union it had sensationally been 
the only region of the RSFSR to vote ‘No’ on the question of retaining the Soviet Union 
in a renewed format. It was not simply a protest against perestroika, but a resounding 
vote cast in favour of El’tsin and Russia. Despite the public rejection of the future of the 
Union, on the morning of 19th August 1991 Rossel’ was in Moscow as a guest to 
witness the intended signing of the new Union treaty agreed between some of the 
Soviet republics (including Russia) and Gorbachev. Upon the announcement of the 
coup Rossel’ contacted El’tsin and was surprisingly allowed to return on a flight to 
Sverdlovsk with one of the Russian President’s closest confidants, Oleg Lobov, a 
former member of the Sverdlovsk Obkom and Chairman of the Oblispolkom (1985-
1987), who was given the task of setting up the necessary facilities for the Russian 
government to function in exile from within Sverdlovsk Oblast should it be required. It is 
most likely that the putschists simply did not consider the possibility that regional 
figures would dare oppose their orders (due to misplaced expectations of Party 
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discipline and hierarchy) and so took no steps to ensure that non-consenting figures be 
isolated. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel’ was by this time stronger than the Party in his 
region, and so this expectation of loyalty was misplaced. Support from the Oblast 
soviet, underscored when an emergency session prompted by Rossel’ immediately 
approved all of El'tsin’s decrees rejecting the putsch, affirmed the region’s adherence 
to Russian law and pronounced its full support for the legitimately elected Russian 
government and President, providing El’tsin with the morally important support of his 
home territory.149 The Oblast soviet, Sverdlovsk City soviet and other district soviets set 
up a coordination committee made up of 25 officials to agree further actions against the 
coup in Moscow, and refused to implement a regional representation of the GKChP, 
threatening a general strike and civil disobedience.150 As in a number of other regions, 
the regional soviet and its legitimately elected Oblispolkom declared themselves the 
legitimate source of power in their territory.151 On the 20th August 1991, Rossel’ made 
a television address to the region supporting El’tsin, and the next day huge 
demonstrations were organised in Sverdlovsk, where, according to estimates, 100,000 
demonstrators gathered to support the Russian President.152 
 
The leadership of the regional response displayed by Rossel’ and the support given to 
him by the regional soviet should be contrasted with the inaction of the regional Obkom 
during the GKChP, which only served to demonstrate the end of their authority in the 
region. The failure of the Obkom to provide a coherent position and even comment on 
the coup raised criticism from society, with even its own newspaper, Ural’skii rabochii, 
condemning its inaction, commenting that ‘the position of some of its secretaries and 
members of the bureau can be characterised as passive support for the GKChP.’153 
The desire of the Obkom for the restoration of Party authority was hardly surprising as 
it was losing control over the country; by Summer 1991 a growing tendency to the 
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restoration of conservative forces within the regional town soviets was observed, such 
as in Sukhoi Log, Asbest and Artemovsk. These forces had claimed considerable 
support within the Obkom for anti-Gorbachev views, and repeatedly called for his 
resignation and for the Party to restore itself as the ‘controlling and directing body [of 
society]’.154 The Obkom’s later published claims that not a single Party organisation in 
the Oblast supported the GKChP were so belated as to seemingly strip them of any 
credibility.155 The national transfer of regional power according to decree No. 75 of 22 
August 1991 “On several questions of the powers of organs of executive power in the 
RSFSR”, from the First Party Secretaries to temporary regional leaders appointed by 
El’tsin confirmed the end of Communist Party control over the regions.156  
 
Rossel’’s appointment as Head of Regional Administration was formalised in November 
1991, and he became one of twenty-three Oblispolkom Chairmen appointed Head of 
Regional Administration from the 68 oblasts, krai, federal cities and autonomous units 
by El’tsin following the collapse of the coup. All of the appointed Heads of Regional 
Administration entered into an informal bargain with the president, whereby their 
positions were conditional owing to the leverage held over them in the form of the 
threat to remove them from their posts should they fail to back his leadership. 
Conclusion 
As the development of the three strands of boundary control are discussed in 
subsequent chapters, this period grounds Rossel''s future leadership through his 
monopolisation of networks. His ability to speak to different groups over different issues 
prevented them from seeking alternative representation, allowing for the 
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monopolization of internal political power, relations with the centre and influence over 
regional regime development. 
 
The rise of Rossel’ from Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblispolkom to Head of Regional 
Administration in the post-Coup reality of Russia offers a particular demonstration of 
the survival of Soviet networks among the El’tsin-era political elite. While Rossel’ had 
not been part of the upper nomenklatura elite, the connections that he was able to draw 
upon promoted his own status within the internally, cross-regionally, and most 
importantly, nationally. The multi-directional nature of Rossel’’s network relations that 
provide the foundation of his rise to power are drawn on as a consistent theme 
throughout the discussion of his boundary control strategy for retaining power and 
organising networks during the El’tsin decade. This strategy of drawing on a multitude 
of networks allowed him a significant degree of independent action in developing his 
own political regime subsequently. Support for El’tsin, even during periods when his 
independent policy approach brought into conflict with the centre, will be demonstrated 
as important in providing him greater sticking power than a large number of other 
regional leaders, certainly until gubernatorial elections became the norm. 
 
By the end of August 1991, Rossel’ boasted a strong level of regional political capital 
that leaves no doubt as to his position as the dominant regional political force in 
Sverdlovsk Oblast. What is interesting to note is that his own ideological leanings do 
not appear to have played a strong role in this, offering support to the idea that the 
ability to skilfully manage different group interests and relating these to economic 
recovery was critically important in constructing his political power. In what was a 
strongly pro-reform region, he had managed to achieve political control without ever 
having to outline his own democratic credentials. 
 
Quite opposite to the rigid Party leadership, Rossel’ demonstrated himself to be 
pragmatic, and frequently opportunistic, using all available resources to negotiate the 
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circumstances facing the region as the former regime imploded. It was significant that 
Rossel' successfully built relations with the existing nomenklatura pulling their 
allegiances away from ties to the Party, rather than attempting to remove them from 
their posts to strengthen his position as regional leader.157 
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Chapter 3 
The value of network relations in Moscow, Saint Petersburg 
and Tatarstan 
Having looked at how Rossel’ emerged as leader of Sverdlovsk Oblast, this chapter 
takes a comparative look at three other regional leaders to provide comparative 
examples of how other executive leaders in post-communist Russia used networks to 
construct personalised regimes in the 1990s: Iurii Luzhkov of Moscow, Mintimir 
Shaimiev of Tatarstan and Anatolii Sobchak of Saint Petersburg. These three leaders 
have been chosen from amongst the other regional heads of administration in the 
1990s due to their relative successes and failures in the use of networks to conduct 
regional leadership during the El’tsin decade. All three of these regions are considered 
within the group of ‘donor regions’ (regions and republics that sent more money to the 
federal centre than they received in federal transfers), as was Sverdlovsk Oblast. The 
long-term control over a territory as displayed by Luzhkov and Shaimiev (spanning 
nearly two decades) is contrasted here with the difficulty experienced by Sobchak in 
establishing his authority. The duration of Luzhkov’s and Shaimiev’s tenures from the 
El’tsin period to the Dmitrii Medvedev presidency (2008-2012), only marginally 
surpasses that of Rossel’, and the manner in which they governed their territories had 
far-reaching consequences for the development of Russian regional politics. Sobchak 
provides a contrasting case, losing his position in the gubernatorial elections held in the 
mid-1990s. His inability to construct functional relations with the Saint Petersburg elite 
meant that even as one of the key regional opposition actors, he faced an 
insurmountable challenge to assert himself in regional politics. In Sobchak, we can also 
see the difference in his approach as a regional leader attempting to take on the 
established elites as a new politician rather than as a regional manager (khoziain), and 
as such found regional administration tougher than those who were able to continue 
existing administrative patronage networks.  
 
 94 
Outlining the nature and structure of their respective regimes, this chapter discusses 
the similarities and differences of these subnational regimes in the 1990s, and 
considers the aspects that are to be addressed in detail with regards to Rossel’; the 
type of political power systems that these individuals developed in their territories, the 
involvement of these actors in patron-client relations and their relations with the federal 
centre, and El’tsin in particular. The chapter begins with a short biography of each actor 
describing their route to power and the key events that marked their tenures during the 
El’tsin decade, before then drawing out the abovementioned themes.  
Continuity or change: Luzhkov’s, Shaimiev’s and Sobchak’s rise to power  
The city of Moscow and Iurii Luzhkov were inseparable for nearly two decades and it is 
easy to forget that Luzhkov was not the city’s first Mayor. His appointment in 1992 was 
due to the resignation of Gavriil Popov, who had been elected to the position in the 
city’s first mayoral elections in 1991. Elected on the same ticket as Deputy Mayor, 
Luzhkov was the natural choice to succeed Popov, but no fresh elections to the post 
were held and he was instead appointed by El’tsin on the basis that the electorate had 
chosen him alongside Popov in 1991. Similar to Rossel’, a connection between 
Luzhkov and El’tsin already existed prior to Luzhkov’s appointment as Mayor. El’tsin 
had first come across him during his time as the Moscow City First Secretary in the late 
1980s, appointing him from his position as deputy to the Chairman of the Moscow City 
Executive Committee (Gorispolkom) to take charge of fixing the city’s food supply 
problems as part of the changes in cadres undertaken to reduce the influence of 
El’tsin’s predecessor as Moscow First Party Secretary, V. Grishin.158 By the time of the 
June 1991 Mayoral elections, Luzhkov was seen as a capable manager and his 
selection as Popov’s deputy was reportedly upon the recommendation of El’tsin, to 
compensate for the fact that the new Mayor himself had little knowledge of the 
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problems facing the city and the figures in prominent positions that he would have to 
work with.159 Throughout the 1990s, Luzhkov was a constant figure both in Moscow 
and in national political life; he was a strong supporter of El’tsin up to and including the 
president’s re-election, although there were clear differences of opinion between 
Luzhkov and members of El’tsin’s government and close circle. Due to the national 
significance of the territory he governed, Luzhkov was increasingly viewed as a 
potential future Russian leader, but it was only in 1999, when his ‘Fatherland’ political 
party joined with Mintimir Shaimiev’s ‘All-Russia’ that he attempted to make a move 
into a national position, contesting the 1999 State Duma elections, with an eye on a 
presidential bid.160  
 
In the Volga republic of Tatarstan, Mintimir Shaimiev had risen to power in the final 
years of the Soviet Union; from being the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom of the 
CPSU he became the Chairman of the Tatar Council of Ministers and was appointed 
Chairman of the Tatar Supreme Soviet in 1990. As the final Soviet-era Chairman of the 
Tatar Supreme Soviet (the highest political position in the Tatar ASSR), Shaimiev 
became the republic’s president before the dissolution of the USSR and played a role 
throughout the 1990s that shaped outcomes not only for Tatarstan, but also in the 
surrounding Volga-region ethnic republics and strongly influenced the shape of 
Russian federalism in the first half of the decade.161 His leadership coincided with 
increasing nationalism in the republic, during a period when nationalities issues 
became increasingly tense. As a counterweight to growing calls from the Baltic States 
for secession, Gorbachev planned to increase Tatarstan’s status from ASSR to full 
Union status in order to strengthen his own support for renewing the state, and when 
El’tsin declared Russia’s sovereignty in June 1990 without mentioning the status of 
Tatarstan, Shaimiev seized the opportunity to declare Tatarstan’s own sovereignty from 
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Russia. This indicated the beginning of a process that placed Tatarstan at the heart of 
future Russian centre-regional relations. Holding elections for a republican president on 
the same day as presidential elections were held in the RSFSR was seen as a way of 
underlining Tatar statehood to Russia, and Shaimiev was unchallenged in his election 
as Tatar President.162 Motivated by the desire to ensure increased status of the Tatar 
ASSR, and owing to a fear of Gorbachev’s cooling intention to raise Tatarstan’s status 
within a renewed Union, Shaimiev supported the August 1991 putsch, hoping that his 
support for the GKChP would continue this process.163 With Tatar claims to sovereignty 
in mind, Shaimiev had already rejected Tatarstan’s participation in referendum on the 
creation of a Russian presidency in March 1991 and would do so again in the April 
1993 and December 1993 referenda in Russia, arguing that they affected a different 
country. It was only upon the signing of the Bilateral Treaty between Russia and 
Tatarstan in April 1994 did Tatarstan’s participation in Russian politics become the 
model for El’tsin’s new system of electoral support for the Russian president in return 
for the centre allowing the regions increased decentralization. Shaimiev’s style of 
leadership, particularly it seems with regards to the centre, has been described as 
more restrained and discreet than that of leaders of Russian regions, such as Luzhkov 
and Rossel’, who actively attempted to promote themselves onto the national stage.164 
Similar to many sub-national leaders of the era, he promoted himself as a manager 
(khoziain) rather than an ideologist, demanding the loyalty of the regional elite. His 
skills as a politician were expertly demonstrated in the use of the threat of nationalism 
from within the republic along in order to extract concessions from Moscow that 
allowed Tatarstan to operate in its own interests.165 As the El’tsin era drew to a close, 
Shaimiev allied himself with Luzhkov in the Fatherland-All Russia political party to 
contest the 1999 state parliamentary elections.  
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Fundamental differences in background and experience played their part in Anatolii 
Sobchak’s term in office as Mayor of Saint Petersburg. A popular deputy from 
Leningrad to the first USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, Sobchak was also an 
elected deputy of the pro-democracy Leningrad City Soviet (Lensovet) in April 1990. 
He was elected as Chairman of the Soviet, in which the democratic bloc held a majority 
(240 deputies out of 400), and presided over efforts to reverse the tendency of the 
soviets’ role being that of simply authorising the decisions of the executive committee, 
trying to bring the executive committee under the control of the representative branch 
and establish a real legislature that would make decisions for the executive committee 
to implement.166 When relations between the Soviet and the Executive Committee 
finally broke down, the Chairman of the City Executive Committee (Gorispolkom) 
proposed the creation of a mayor to run the city as an executive leader.167 In the 
subsequent elections in July 1991, Sobchak was elected Mayor of the city. In an about-
face of his previous position, Sobchak found it difficult to use the fresh start of the 
Mayoral system to create a working executive-legislative relationship to change 
embedded methods of working, and instead sought to subordinate the City soviet to his 
executive power despite the common ground that both branches held through 
participation in the Democratic Front. It has been suggested that Sobchak’s 
presidential-style approach to decision making and desire to rule without being subject 
to checks from the City soviet put him on collision course with its deputies.168 In the 
months running up to El’tsin’s assault on the Russian parliament, which Sobchak firmly 
supported, the City soviet unsuccessfully attempted to remove him from his position, 
and found itself dissolved following El’tsin’s defeat of the Russian parliament in October 
1993.169 Sobchak became an influential participant in the writing of the new Russian 
Constitution, and participated in the 1993 State Duma elections as the leader of the 
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Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RDDR), which contributed to the 
fragmentation of the democratic vote that meant that reformist parties performed 
poorly. By the point of the 1996 gubernatorial elections, Sobchak was increasingly 
isolated in city politics and one of his own deputies, Vladimir Iakovlev, stood against 
and defeated him.170 
The development of personalised regimes as a response to the end of the 
unitary state 
The idea of a regional ‘boss’ lying at the heart of successful regional regimes in Russia 
is a recurring theme in the literature on long-term leaders of subnational government. 
As Russia moved away from being a unitary state and as the weakness of the central 
government towards the regions became increasingly evident, the emergence of 
regionally (and in cases, locally) dominant individuals transposed the myth that Russia 
requires a strong hand at the top to the subnational level as the disruption of the 
vertical chain of power transferred the monopoly over power from the centre to the 
republics, oblasts and krai. As long as subnational leaders could combine support for 
El’tsin with fulfilling the terms of the social contract of providing housing, heat, 
education, and food supplies they could expect to be given almost a free hand to 
manage their territories as they saw fit, without the threat of widespread interference 
from the centre. As a result, various degrees of machine politics emerged, whereby the 
regional executives concentrated as much power as they possibly could into their own 
individual persons, to the detriment of the institution of the regional executive.  
 
As a backdrop to the study of Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the three leaders being 
considered here all stand out with regards to the degree of personalisation that 
distinguished the regimes that they constructed or attempted to build. Luzhkov’s and 
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Shaimiev’s longevity was facilitated by the fact that they led their territories 
unchallenged from within and in a fashion that suited the federal authorities. Both of 
these leaders used top-down domination over all aspects of political life in their areas, 
and both had gained significant experience of political operation under the Soviet 
system, with the associated critical knowledge of the importance of networks for 
governance. While Shaimiev managed a large territory with several layers of sub-
regional governance and inherent tensions surrounding the rights of the Tatars, 
Luzhkov and Sobchak faced considerable challenges with regards to the maintaining 
the status of their respective cities as something apart from the rest of the country. 
While initial opposition to Luzhkov from the Moscow City Soviet (Mossovet) fell away 
within a short period, Sobchak was faced with considerable and growing opposition 
from a legislative branch that he was not able to dominate, and with no previous 
experience of managing and retaining the loyalties of the administrative cadres needed 
to govern the territory, his Mayoralty lasted only until 1996.  
 
As noted in the literature review, historical parallels and institutional structures have 
been presented in previous studies to describe the types of regional regimes that 
developed in 1990s Russia. In studies of Moscow and Tatarstan, the ability of Luzhkov 
and Shaimiev to command absolute loyalty is a common denominator. With sub-
national leaders considered to be the third most-important actors in Russian political 
authority, after the president and the Prime Minister and his government, a trajectory of 
increasing power over their territories was an important part of their role in Russia’s 
departure from top-down control in the 1990s. Whether seen through the prism of a 
return of the Boyars, Bonapartism or the implementation of South American 
Caciquismo, in the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev we see much that indicates their 
positions were that of rulers of states within the state.171 The case of Sobchak 
demonstrates that far from all regions reached this position within the new federation. 
While Luzhkov and Shaimiev used their authority to dominate the elites, Sobchak 
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attempted to rule using the mandate given to him by the electorate, believing that the 
fact that he had received the voters’ consent to lead permitted him to lead in the 
manner of his own choosing (delegative democracy), even where other branches 
existed within the division of powers.172 In no small part due to the existence of 
competing groups, his attempts at domination were consistently undermined, as he 
entered into conflict with the city legislative/representative branch of power, attempting 
to bring them to his subordination. The suggestion is that his leadership was not suited 
to allowing Saint Petersburg to function independently of the state. 
 
We can break down the comparison of the three regimes following the system of 
networks that are to be used to study the case of Rossel’ – at the nature of relations 
with President El’tsin, the construction of power with regards to their respective 
regional and republic legislative branches and districts, and the development of 
patronage relations.  
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Table 3.1. Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Sobchak background history, electoral success and 
areas of conflict 
 
 
Iurii Mikhailovich 
Luzhkov 
Mintimir 
Sharipovich 
Shaimiev 
Anatolii Sobchak 
Period in Office June 1992-
September 2010 
June 1991-March 
2010 
June 1991-June 
1996 
Soviet-era 
Background 
Deputy Chairman of 
Moscow City 
Executive 
Committee; 
Manager in 
Chemical industry 
First Secretary 
Tatar ASSR Obkom 
CPSU (from 1989), 
President of 
Tatarstan ASSR 
(from June 1991) 
Academic; 
Lensovet Chair 
from mid-1990s, 
Electoral successes 3 Mayoral elections 3 presidential 
elections 
Won the Mayoral 
elections in 1991, 
but was defeated in 
Mayoral election in 
1996 
Major grounds of 
conflict  
Conflict with 
individuals close to 
El’tsin, including 
with Chubais over 
privatization 
Conflict with centre 
over increased 
status of Tatarstan. 
Internal threat of 
ethnic tension 
(Tatar and pro-
Russian).  
Conflict with own 
legislature.  
Relations with El’tsin – the influence of vertical ties 
For most regional leaders, their ties with the president in the immediate post-Soviet 
years were of considerable importance to their job security and how they developed 
their regional regimes. Under the system of appointing regional heads of 
administration, El’tsin had the power to remove leaders from their positions, although 
republic leaders were elected and, thus, not directly under the president’s influence. A 
commonality of all three of the leaders considered here is that all were elected to their 
post (albeit under considerably different circumstances), with the effect that the ties that 
they had with El’tsin were less reliant on maintaining the president’s confidence, 
although in the cases of Luzhkov and Sobchak, it is likely that had El’tsin wanted to 
replace either of them he could have done so. 
 
Sobchak was elected as Mayor of Leningrad on the same day as El’tsin was elected as 
the first Russian president. The fact that he was elected and did not owe his position to 
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El’tsin’s benevolence can be seen as both positive and negative for his regime; while 
not relying on El’tsin for his position, he also could not cite presidential backing through 
being appointed to the position as the head of the city (despite the fact that they had 
been close allies in the run up to the elections). Coinciding with Sobchak’s election as 
Mayor was the referendum on renaming the city as Saint Petersburg, as Russian cities 
went through the phase of restoring their pre-Soviet names (including the renaming of 
Sverdlovsk city to Ekaterinburg, although this was not extended to renaming 
Sverdlovsk Oblast to move away from its Soviet past). The relationship between El’tsin 
and Sobchak between 1991 and 1993 was considered to be close, and Sobchak was 
one of a number of regional leaders enjoying a ‘confidential relationship’ with the 
president. Despite good relations, and an underlying degree of respect that the 
president held for Sobchak, by the time of the 1996 Mayoral election in Saint 
Petersburg,  El’tsin found himself caught between investigations into Sobchak initiated 
by the federal power ministries, who accused the Saint Petersburg Mayor of being 
involved in large-scale corruption. In his memoirs, El’tsin admits that he doubted the 
veracity of the accusations but allowed the investigations to continue.173 With the 
introduction of regional elections (Moscow and Saint Petersburg constitute units of the 
federation and the Mayoral elections are equivalent to gubernatorial elections in these 
cities), El’tsin’s low stock left him unable to influence their outcome, with the result that 
Sobchak lost the election to a member of his own team, Vladimir Iakovlev.174 
 
From a position of initial antagonism towards El’tsin, whose declaration of Russian 
independence threatened the attempts that Tatarstan had made in the later years of 
the Soviet Union to increase their status, Mintimir Shaimiev developed good relations 
with the Russian leader. Having backed the August 1991 putsch, Shaimiev could 
reasonably have expected himself to be removed from his position as President of the 
Republic of Tatarstan, to which he had also been elected on the same day as El’tsin. In 
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the period after the putsch, issues of Tatar sovereignty presented Shaimiev with a 
strong hand in his relations with El’tsin, particularly with reference to El’tsin’s earlier 
words that regions should ‘take as much sovereignty as [they could] swallow’.175 
Tatarstan’s refusal to sign the Federal Treaty in 1992 and further refusal to stage 
referendums important to El’tsin (both in April 1993 and the later Constitutional 
referendum in December 1993) were significant diplomatic weapons deployed in the 
negotiation of a bilateral treaty between Tatarstan and Russia in April 1994. While not 
advocating a violent attempt at secession similar to that occurring in Chechnya, the 
lack of participation in referenda and in national presidential and parliamentary 
elections became the primary source of Shaimiev’s strength with regards to El’tsin and 
the federal centre. The effective non-turnout of the vote in this republic was glaring in 
the final count and one which could no longer be ignored by the centre.176 Although 
nationalist sentiments were a potential flash-point for trouble in Tatarstan, the series of 
agreements that made up the bilateral treaty allocated greater rights to the republic 
(which was followed by other republics, including Bashkortostan and Sakha), largely 
taking the sting out of this threat not only in Tatarstan, but in the rest of the mid-Volga 
region.177 In return for increased rights, Shaimiev offered full participation (and co-
operation) in the politics of the state – a critical resource for El’tsin for the reason that 
Shaimiev’s close control over his subordinates meant that he could all but guarantee 
the return of votes from the republic’s population in favour of El’tsin. A period of close 
cooperation followed, which only began to deteriorate as the 1990s drew to a close, 
when the Tatarstan president grew concerned that the gains made by him would be 
threatened in the post-El’tsin period. To counter this Shaimiev aligned himself with the 
group of regional leaders that united to form the Fatherland-All Russia (Otechestvo-
Vsia Rossiia) movement to contest the 1999 parliamentary elections. 
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The relations between Luzhkov and El’tsin show the pendulum swinging in an opposite 
direction to the ties between Shaimiev and the president – from support to opposition. 
No regional leader throughout the 1990s was closer to the president (geographically 
and in terms of support up to El’tsin’s re-election in 1996). At all of the President’s 
critical moments (during the Putsch of August 1991, the shelling of the White House in 
1993, parliamentary elections in 1995 and presidential elections in 1996), Luzhkov 
unconditionally supported El’tsin, and it was inevitable that the closeness of their ties 
would cause concern to those surrounding the president, such as the head of El’tsin’s 
security team, Aleksandr Korzhakov, (who attempted to convince El’tsin to open 
corruption investigations against the Moscow Mayor), and Anatolii Chubais, with whom 
Luzhkov disagreed ideologically over the conduct of privatization.178 El’tsin offered a 
great deal of protection to Luzhkov, including going against his close advisors, for 
example, overruling the advice of Chubais not to grant Moscow special privileges with 
regards to privatization and allowing the city to conduct its own processes that ensured 
that at least a 20% stake in all privatised enterprises was given to the Mayor’s office.179 
The personal El’tsin-Luzhkov relationship was similar to that with Shaimiev, where 
support at the cost of concessions went hand in hand. It is claimed that following the 
‘Davos Pact’ made in February 1996 by the leading federal oligarchs to support 
El’tsin’s re-election, Luzhkov’s attitude towards the president and the direction of the 
country began to change, with the Mayor rejecting the form of oligarch capitalism that 
had emerged in Russia in favour of his advocated form of ‘municipal social democracy’ 
that respected private property and the demands of the market while at the same time 
giving provision to other sectors of society in the city.180 Such a claim should be viewed 
sceptically as we can consider that, by this time, Luzhkov dominated the city as much 
as any oligarch dominated their specific sector and he operated as though he was the 
ruler of his own state within the state. While still supporting El’tsin as the leader of 
Russia, El’tsin’s increasingly erratic behaviour, dismissing a series of prime ministers, 
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and the August 1998 financial crisis prompted Luzhkov to begin to position himself as a 
potential candidate for the presidency.181 The creation of the Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia 
political party to contest the 1999 parliamentary elections linked Luzhkov with other 
like-minded regional leaders, such as Shaimiev and Sobchak’s successor, Iakovlev, on 
the basis of a party of the regions that would create a new system that strengthened 
parliament with Luzhkov at its core, rather than the federally-central based top-down 
parties of power that had subserviently sustained El’tsin’s presidential rule. The 
creation of this political bloc, and specifically, the threat of Luzhkov becoming Prime 
Minister and Evgenii Primakov potentially becoming president is said to have prompted 
El’tsin into creating the rival Unity party that swept Putin to power in 2000.182 Even with 
the change in president, Luzhkov’s position in Moscow was under no threat, allowing 
him to safely transfer his allegiance to the new president over time, eventually resulting 
in the alliance of his Otechestvo movement with Unity to form the United Russia party.  
The construction of power systems 
Common to all three of these leaders is the aim of concentrating personal power in 
their own hands, although each of them took a different approach to regime-building. 
Luzhkov and Shaimiev expected total obedience from their networks through different 
strategies of resource distribution, whereas Sobchak found that the legislative branch 
did not agree with his view that a popular mandate allowed him free reign. As a result, 
he attempted to circumvent them by developing his own patronage networks that would 
give him administrative levers to exercise control.  
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Turning initially to the regime constructed by Luzhkov, his role as leader of the capital 
city placed him apart from other regional figures. Geographically closest to the 
President and financially stronger and with more potential than any other part of 
Russia, the system of power that Luzhkov built around himself was focused on the 
control and distribution of financial resources. By connecting his leadership to the 
operations of property, banking and commerce, Luzhkov promoted himself as an 
economic manager rather than a politician. In the day-to-day running of the city, 
economic reconstruction was at the centre of policy, and he constructed a strategy 
based on improving city finances, surrounding himself with economic advisors and 
having close ties to the financial industrial groups that made Moscow their 
headquarters. The city’s politics was totally subordinated to Luzhkov’s authority, he 
appointed all prefects, heads of district and public services to their posts, effectively 
creating a city bureaucracy that entirely depended on the Mayor for its existence. At the 
time of elections to the Moscow city Duma, due to the tight control he held over the 
allocation of resources, Luzhkov faced no opposition from any factions within the city 
legislature and as such, there was no conflict between the two branches.183 Without 
any competition from the city Duma, nor any significant cleavages in the local districts 
of the city, Luzhkov was unchallenged throughout the 1990s. His strategy of 
maintaining the city’s stake in privatised enterprises ensured steadily increasing 
finance for administration of the city, although this was coupled with the perception that 
the city was his empire. With regards to the electorate, Luzhkov advocated ‘municipal 
capitalism’, supporting the market but with a high degree of social responsibility for 
citizens, which made him popular and resulted in his winning nearly 90% of the vote in 
the 1996 Mayoral elections. The only competition that Luzhkov experienced with other 
political actors was, therefore, vertically, by placing himself among and comparing 
himself with national figures. 
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Bearing in mind that Shaimiev had been forced to transform himself from a Communist 
Party official to the representative of the Tatar quest for sovereignty (or at the very least 
greater status), it should be noted that the Tatar president ran his region in a restrained 
way, having to balance the forces of Tatar and Russian nationalism, without presenting 
himself as an ideologue.184 Ruling the republic on the basis of tight control over cadres 
and the potential threat to the centre of flaring ethnic nationalism, Shaimiev also 
positioned himself as a manager. The political system that emerged has been labelled 
as similar to the Caciquismo systems that emerged in Latin America under Spanish 
colonialism and Sultanism, whereby all offices were instruments of Shaimiev’s 
power.185 The executive branches of the sub-republican areas were filled with the 
district bosses from the communist era, who were, in the majority, ethnic Tatars (with 
ethnic Russians having been more urbanised in the communist period).186 Through 
using local bosses, the ‘caciques’, to control local territories and distribute resources, 
Shaimiev was seen as answering the calls of Tatar nationalism to re-Tatarise the 
republic after long periods of Russification as they acted as brokers between the local 
community and the republic centre.187 Appointing heads of districts and municipalities, 
Shaimiev made it a condition that members of executive administrative organs had to 
be popularly elected to their respective legislative organs, or else face dismissal. This 
effectively packed the republican and sub-republican legislative branch with his own 
appointees, and tightly enforcing their loyalty by holding the threat of dismissal (with the 
forced subsequent resignation from the legislative branch) over them. In this way, 
Shaimiev avoided the potential cleavages and rivalries that could emerge out of 
nationalist sentiments. As long as he was seen to be increasing the prestige and rights 
of the region this satisfied pro-Russian nationalists also as they benefitted materially 
from the gains made by Tatarstan.188 Where competition did occur, Shaimiev’s 
networks allowed him to be in control of the flow of information coming to him and he 
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was able to react quickly to counter any threats; for example, in 1998 when a group of 
deputies began to press for greater autonomy of municipalities, Shaimiev learnt quickly 
about the move and was able to supress any dissent amongst his appointees.189 
Shaimiev’s uncontested position in the republic, including three unopposed presidential 
election runs, demonstrated his system in its entirety. Local bosses were appointed to 
return an overwhelming election result in favour of Shaimiev, in which case they would 
get to keep their positions and the resources that followed from this. As noted above, 
the issue of sovereignty for Tatarstan went hand in hand with the republic’s non-
participation in state referenda, denying El’tsin a large proportion of the votes of 
republic with a population of 4 million citizens. Shaimiev had made support from the 
electorate, as delivered by his local appointees, the foundation of his political system, 
which has been argued to have been later exported by Moscow to the regions, starting 
with the Sverdlovsk Oblast gubernatorial elections in which Rossel’ returned to power 
in 1995, to establish treaties based on votes for El’tsin being used as currency to obtain 
better terms in the Russian federal bargain.190 
 
If Luzhkov and Shaimiev are to be regarded as managers, Sobchak should instead be 
viewed as a politician. With a background in academia rather than in party 
administration, Sobchak was on the front lines of the pro-democracy movement in 
Leningrad in the late 1980s. His lack of experience in political administration, combined 
with the fragility of the pro-democracy network, meant that the biggest challenge facing 
him as Mayor of Saint Petersburg was managing the competing interests of different 
groups through the different branches of power. His response was to seek to build his 
own personalised system, so that the Mayor’s office determined the policy process with 
the legislative branch acting in support. Unable to subordinate them to his aims, 
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Sobchak promoted his own executive decision-making power over the legislative 
process. In particular, during the privatization process, he promoted a lobbying system 
that directed interested parties to himself rather than conducting the privatization of 
enterprises and property through the legislative process. At the same time, the 
legislative branch did not rely on the Mayor, its deputies had its own contacts in the 
capital through which they could pursue their own agenda and undermine the mayor. 
Although the dismissal of the city Soviet in 1993 ameliorated Sobchak’s position, new 
elections to the City Duma failed to return an improvement by means of a majority that 
would back him and he continued to prefer a system that placed him in total control. As 
a leader, Sobchak chose a force strategy rather than cooperation to obtain results. 
Whereas the administrative control that Luzhkov and Shaimiev held over subordinates 
prevented any competition from within, the method of attempting to force subordination 
resulted in not just threats to Sobchak’s leadership from the legislative branch, but also 
a perceived decline in the conditions of the city.191 As a management style, top-down 
authority failed to work in the city, and the resulting challenge that emerged to 
Sobchak’s leadership in the 1996 mayoral elections came from a collaboration between 
members of the legislative (and executive) elite that were excluded from bargaining 
over the outcome of the elections.192  
Horizontal and vertically downward networks – the value of local 
patronage 
The legacy of experience and the continuation of networks from the Soviet 
administrative system demonstrated its importance in the models of patronage 
displayed by each of these three leaders. In the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev, this 
gave them considerable authority to wield control over large administrative structures 
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and to adapt their patronage of networks as post-Soviet society developed, specifically 
with regards to industry and the private economic sector. For Luzhkov, patronage over 
business elites came via his control over the distribution of municipal property and the 
lack of political competition meant that the Moscow City Duma submitted to his 
leadership. For Shaimiev, the system of dual control over executive and legislative 
positions in the republic ensured loyalty to himself from the political elite, and by further 
filling management positions in enterprises with clan members (family and figures from 
his native region), particularly in the oil industry, resulted in a system of patronage that 
provided no alternative sources of resource distribution.193 At the other end of the 
scale, the competitive nature of Saint Petersburg meant that rival patrons existed, 
preventing any domination over the city by Sobchak. The attempt to construct 
individualised, personal relations with the business elites through the process of 
privatization left Sobchak open to accusations of corruption and to undermining from 
opposing actors, eventually resulting in his electoral defeat. Looking at the role of each 
of these as patrons requires looking at the political and economic elites as well as the 
role of patronage over society.  
 
In Moscow, as in Tatarstan, patronage of the political elite was exercised through 
control over appointments. With the resignation of his predecessor, Popov, a stable 
administrative bureaucracy was created by Luzhkov that was responsive to his 
leadership, an area in which the former Mayor had struggled, perhaps due to his more 
academic and theoretical approach to the city’s problems. The city had a high 
concentration of former members of the nomenklatura in positions of power, and 
Luzhkov’s experience in being part of the ruling network assisted him in gaining the 
loyalties of these officials. With almost all posts in the executive branch appointed, 
officials returned to hierarchical patronage and in return enjoyed significant stability in 
their positions. It was Luzhkov’s involved and personalistic management over 
economic and business aspects in the city, putting economic and business priorities at 
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the forefront of the capital’s politics, that was more significant in terms of his patronage 
of the city uniting a powerful team of business leaders that around his Mayoralty.194 
Through control over the distribution of the city’s resources, including conducting 
privatization differently to the rest of the state, where the city retained a significant 
stake in all privatised property and enterprises, Luzhkov controlled the flow of income 
into and out of the city. In certain sectors, privatization of enterprises entailed the city 
taking a sizeable (sometimes majority) stake. While this added financial might to the 
city’s budgets, the results were accusations of mafia and dictatorial powers taken by 
the Mayor, which it is claimed he did not object to.195 The value of Luzhkov to the 
emerging Russian oligarchs cemented his authority amongst his appointees, as he 
quickly became the most important regional-national political figure in the country. 
Embracing federal oligarchs placed Luzhkov in a unique position amongst regional and 
republican leaders as other heads of administration either sought to prevent the 
incursion of federal business entities during the 1990s, or relied on them to prop up 
their regimes. In Moscow, the nature of the Mayor-Oligarch relationship was more of 
mutual reinforcement than one of patronage; the Mayor could enable favourable terms 
for business and in return received much-valued support in fulfilling the needs of 
Moscow’s inhabitants, through improving housing, providing employment, and funding 
for health care and education. Furthermore, the mayor was part of the delicate balance 
of interests that existed in the capital, and as such, a countering force to opponents 
close to the president, particularly members of the government and the Presidential 
Administration, who were attempting to advance their own interests. While the 
oligarchs famously came to the rescue of El’tsin in the 1996 presidential elections, in 
the period immediately prior to this, some were observed to have built ties with 
Luzhkov as a way of protecting themselves from sinking with a declining El’tsin in the 
years from 1993-1995.196 Luzhkov’s closest ties to an oligarch were with the media 
magnate, Vladimir Gusinskii, which caused a cleavage between him and members of 
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El’tsin’s team.197 Gusinskii’s MOST media group provided a healthy dose of pro-
Luzhkov propaganda at the federal level, while in return Luzhkov’s patronage provided 
a long list of business opportunities. As the third most-important figure in the state, 
behind President and Prime Minister, Luzhkov could realistically enter into conflict with 
federal networks operating in the same location and through administrative methods 
squeeze enough to obtain concessions. The perceived threat to the presidential circle 
became such that El’tsin’s Head of Security, Korzhakov, who viewed Luzhkov as a 
rising threat for the 1996 presidential elections, resorted to blunt intimidation against 
Gusinskii in late 1994, as a way of warning the media oligarch against criticising 
El’tsin’s war in Chechnya through his NTV television channel, and hence turning 
people against the president.198 Public support for Luzhkov stemmed from the 
perception that he had restored order to the city both during and after the difficulties of 
perestroika and the immediate post-Soviet reforms. Patronage over society was 
constructed through a carefully cultivated process that substituted for a perceived dour 
personality. His social patronage is primarily seen in his support for the Russian 
Orthodox Church, at a time when El’tsin in particular was equivocal about its emerging 
role in society. Sponsoring the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in 
Moscow, and breaking the ground for its construction, Luzhkov quickly identified 
himself with the resurgent wave of religiosity that has been seen in Russia since the 
collapse of communism using it as a way of bringing himself closer to the people.199 
Secondly, through fostering a public identity of himself as a worker first and an official 
second (his flat leather cap became symbolic among the population as he toured 
construction sites and spent his leisure time playing football and participating in social 
actions), he made himself identifiable with the people, tricks that El’tsin had used when 
he was regional Party First Secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast and, later, head of the 
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Moscow Gorkom. Further strengthened by his espousing ‘municipal capitalism’ and 
social justice, Luzhkov clearly became a popular figure with whom the city’s residents 
could identify and feel close to. 
 
Shaimiev’s patronage of the political elite was different to that exercised by Luzhkov, in 
that he devolved a high measure of control over resource distribution to his clients. The 
system of dual participation in the executive and legislative branches, allowed 
Shaimiev to maintain a constant threat over actors who would lose their entire political 
standing if they failed to serve the regime in Kazan appropriately.200 In return, 
Shaimiev’s patronage was ruthless in that although he devolved a great deal of trust 
onto his clients, who acted in the name of their leader at the local level, in return an 
almost one hundred percent level of public electoral support was expected. As a result 
of this tough management it was difficult for actors to countenance moving against him. 
Valuing political coercion more than patronage over economic matters, Shaimiev 
‘Tatarised’ the republic, bringing in ethnic Tatars from his own native region and 
reversing Soviet history that had squeezed ethnic Tatars out of the cities and into rural 
areas and the agricultural sector.201 Any participation of ethnic Russians in the 
presidential regime was reliant on them showing loyalty towards Shaimiev and placing 
Tatarstan’s interests ahead of any loyalty to Russia, to the extent that the Tatar leader 
dismissed actors for participating in federal organs where this competed with Tatar 
impressions of sovereignty.202 Economically, Shaimiev secured control over the natural 
resource sector and the leading industrial and agricultural enterprises of the territory 
through the installation of a clan-based system based on his own relatives to replace 
Soviet-era directors (who were also more likely to have been ethnic Russians). 
Privatization in the republic was constructed to prevent non-residents of the republic 
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from acquiring shares and was manipulated to result in the creation of leading 
economic actors coming from within the Shaimiev clan.203  
 
With Luzhkov’s close personal control, based on accumulating increasing financial 
control and stakes at one end of the scale, and Shaimiev’s patronage through 
delegation the other, the attempt taken by Sobchak to forcibly install himself as a 
patron in a situation where there was an existence of competing groups resulted in his 
failure to become neither an authoritative leader, a broker between competing groups, 
nor a democratic executive that implemented laws developed by a complementary 
legislative branch. Without inheriting any pre-existing client groups, or more 
importantly, being unable to construct a new elite with a strong allegiance to him, 
particularly in a politically refreshed environment such as Saint Petersburg, Sobchak 
faced significant problems that he was unable to overcome as he struggled to gather 
support around himself from the political and economic elite. The role of the Soviet 
nomenklatura in city life following the March 1990 city soviet elections, demonstrated 
the drastic change in composition of the city’s administrative staff as members of the 
Soviet elite began to depart from political positions quickly upon the victory of the pro-
democracy group. In contrast to political changes, directors of enterprises retained their 
positions without needing to align themselves with the pro-democracy movements.204 
Upon election as Mayor in 1991, this presented Sobchak with a two-fold problem in that 
not only had the city’s administration lost experienced functionaries (albeit ideologically 
opposed to the new forces in the city), the continuation of the former elite in enterprises 
and industry made it increasingly difficult for Sobchak to become a useful patron to 
them, due to the fact that they had their own contacts and patrons elsewhere. Those 
actors carried over from the former regime had little interest in supporting any attempts 
of the new Mayor by fulfilling the traditional terms of the social contract that had now 
become the Mayor’s responsibility. Where Sobchak did make new appointments, he 
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recruited from amongst his own personal contacts and networks, which constructed a 
relationship that was not that of traditional patronage, as past personal (as opposed to 
administrative) associations placed the clients outside any hierarchical structure and on 
a more equal footing to the Mayor.205 The creation of a political party to try to 
compensate for the lack of an administrative network also proved to be a failure. The 
Russian Movement for Democratic Reform failed to perform in the 1993 State Duma 
elections, despite, or perhaps in spite of, Sobchak’s role in the writing of the new 
Constitution. The effect was to reduce his authority in the city, which deteriorated 
further following the 1994 city election, which failed to result in any greater support for 
his Mayoralty. Without the willingness of city industry to support the Mayor, the city 
administration had few levers to ensure that he could overcome an obstinate 
legislature. Unlike the situation in Tatarstan or in Moscow, Sobchak could not coerce 
these sectors into assisting him, and instead attempted to force them into his 
patronage, and his struggles were further deepened by his autocratic tendencies and 
the unpredictability of his decision making. Encouraging personal representations to 
him from business leaders was an unstable strategy that only held in as far as each 
side saw immediate returns from negotiations but with short-term arrangements 
replacing the creation of a longer-term clientele. 
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Table 3.2 – Key elements of comparison of the Moscow, Tatar and Saint Petersburg 
leadership regimes 
 
 Luzhkov Shaimiev Sobchak 
Regime description Personalised and 
centralised power 
Personalised, 
decentralised power 
Failed personalised 
power 
Threats to power No opposition 
political movements 
No opposition 
political movements 
Political challenges 
from legislative 
branch  
Support base Loyal clients Loyal clients Failed in attempt to 
build client network 
Vertical relations Initially close 
relations with El’tsin, 
deteriorating after 
1996 elections 
Initially poor 
relations with 
El’tsin, improving 
after 1994 Bilateral 
Treaty 
Good relations with 
El’tsin, but El’tsin 
unwilling to become 
patron to Sobchak 
Horizontal relations Vladimir Iakovlev, 
and later with 
Shaimiev and 
Rakhimov 
(Bashkortostan 
President) 
Rakhimov and other 
republic presidents; 
later with Luzhkov 
Initially with liberals 
from within Saint 
Petersburg and 
federally, but 
influence  declining 
over time 
Strategy employed Monetaristic control 
in return for 
resources 
Control over 
political elite 
through delegation 
and economic elite 
through kinship 
Alliance with 
economic elite to 
counter competing 
political elite 
Conclusions 
The importance of networks in the Russian regions and the part that they played in the 
conduct and longevity of individual regional regimes is presented here and used as a 
basis to relate to the manner in which Rossel’ constructed his regime in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast. Table 3.2 above shows the approaches taken by these three regional leaders 
to their regional regimes, with the more authoritative leaders clearly demonstrating the 
support of those beneath them. The nature of their respective relations with El’tsin is 
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telling; whereas Shaimiev and Luzhkov used their resources initially to force 
concessions from the centre, before consolidating and deepening ties with the 
president to counter the influence of those close to him, the case of Sobchak shows the 
opposite in that there was no stimulus to El’tsin to intervene favourably to alleviate 
Sobchak’s difficulties as the Saint Petersburg Mayor showed no signs of accumulating 
resources that he could use to bargain with the president (and because Sobchak’s 
political backers, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, opposed El’tsin). In 
the cases examined here, strength within the territory appears to equate to strength 
with regards to the state.  
 
The existence of political competition also influenced the shape of the regimes in 
practice. Where personal power was rivalled or unrivalled shaped the ability of a 
regional leader to become a totally dominant patron to the key groups in the respective 
territories. Prior experience of administrative practices and management served 
Luzhkov and Shaimiev well in establishing their patronage positions. Control over 
mechanisms that kept the distribution of resources embedded in their own regimes 
(even where delegated to local actors) was the strategy pursued by both, and ensured 
close control over actors in their territories. In the case of Sobchak, the lack of a client 
base resulted in him attempting to break competition through forcing the development 
of networks, which failed to secure the boundaries to his leadership. Thus, prior 
administrative experience is also suggested as a valuable form of capital (political, 
economic and social) that allowed regional leaders to ‘manage’ rather than be 
‘political’, which suited the two long-serving leaders in their presentation to all sectors 
of society.  
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Chapter 4  
Building vertical networks without vertical integration: the 
monopoly of the El’tsin-Rossel’ relationship 
The vertical system of power in Russia has been an enduring element in the history of 
the country and the main structure through which the centre has been able to maintain 
control over its vast periphery. It has allowed the regulation of networks and 
maintaining the monopoly over the distribution of resources from the centre to 
plenipotentiaries in the provinces. The rush to decentralize power in late 1991 was 
aimed at dismantling the vertical structures that had been the basis of the Soviet and 
Imperial unitary state for many centuries, albeit in an uncontrolled manner in which the 
centre needed to break the habits of the old regime while at the same time retaining 
some element of stability that would prevent citizens from freezing in their homes and 
going hungry.206 The system of presidential appointment of regional executives brought 
a large number of new political actors into a changing state structure, without any of the 
official controls that the Communist Party had previously provided.207 In dismantling the 
institutions that had been responsible for central planning and allocating goods and 
resources to the regions, Moscow left a void in its day-to-day dealings with its 
provinces, and as a result, personal contacts grew in status and became an essential 
part of life for regional Heads of Administration seeking to stabilise the declining 
conditions in their territories. 
 
The uncertain nature of the system of presidential appointment resulted in the high 
turnover of appointed regional heads of administration between 1991 and 1996, yet, 
while the centre had issues with appointees, in the view of regional leaders, the centre 
was often seen to be unresponsive to the problems facing individual territories as the 
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country underwent political and economic reform. Once in the post, the primary task 
facing all regional leaders was to seek resources (financial and political) from 
elsewhere to ensure the survival of their territory as the ever deepening political, 
economic and social crisis gripped. Through action taken to stabilise their own 
territories, regional heads of administration were playing their role as clients of a larger 
network as this stability was their contribution to the patron. The central focus of this 
chapter is to look at the actions taken by Rossel’ as a client to El’tsin’s patron. By 
following his policy of seeking increased federal status for the Sverdlovsk Region, it is  
suggested that Rossel’ proceeded along a learning curve that, in time, lead to a 
strategy of actively using the patron-client relationship with the President to acquire 
additional resources. In a relationship where it became evident how fragile the position 
of regional Head of Administration was, we can see how the notion of a ‘special’ 
relationship between El’tsin and Rossel’ was cultivated in Sverdlovsk Oblast, becoming 
beneficial to both parties in the pursuit of power stability. It proposes that the El’tsin-
Rossel’ relationship was substantively different to the President’s relationship with the 
majorty of other regional leaders, on the basis of Rossel’ actively seeking to agree 
privileges or advantages on a personal level with the president. The change in 
approach to vertical communication that Rossel’ took from the second half of the 
decade onwards was a major contributing factor to the boundary control strategy 
through the construction of the notion, to be expressed to the political and economic 
elite as well as to the general public, that rival figures in the region were not capable of 
the kind of direct communication with the Russian president that would result in 
significant benefits for regions.  
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The Rossel’-El’tsin interpersonal network as a form of learning how to 
deal with Moscow 
The degree of knowledge that El’tsin had of his regional leaders varied heavily from 
region to region, and in many cases, appointments were made upon the 
recommendation of those close to the president or by prominent pro-reform actors 
within the regions.208 As a result, the head of state often had little prior knowledge of, 
and certainly no personal relationship with, a number of his appointees. With the 
development of Russia’s regions far down the list of the centre’s priorities, regional 
leaders were presented with little in the way of regular formal contact with El’tsin, who 
passed the responsibility for everyday contact with the provinces to his government 
and newly created Presidential representatives (his supposed eyes and ears in the 
regions).209 The result was that channels of communication from region to centre were 
subject to influence and distortion according to the interests of bridging actors; while 
the president was occupied by matters of state and international relations, figures 
within the Presidential Administration, the circle of close advisors which later became 
known as the ‘family’, and various others were able to control and manage the flow of 
information received by the President according to their own interests. Anything that 
offered the possibility of attracting El’tsin’s personal attention offered a distinct 
advantage to sub-state actors to lobby directly for resources (for example, the most 
powerful republic leaders had the threat of ethnic nationalism and secession to use as 
a tool for getting straight to El’tsin).210 It is the mobilisation of the ‘El’tsin card’ by 
Rossel’ in the mid-1990s, using a more personalised approach in order to convince the 
centre to allocate additional resources that changed the dynamic of the patron-client 
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relationship between these two figures, with the result of turning around Sverdlovsk 
Oblast’s attempts at greater decentralization and economic independence. By 
becoming a closer participant in the president-regional leader network, Rossel’ 
consolidated his position within his home territory (Sverdlovsk Oblast), macro-region 
(the Urals) and emerged as one of a small number of regional figures of national 
repute. 
 
The context in which we can most clearly demonstrate the relationship between El’tsin 
and Rossel’ is in the development of federal relations. As the reform of the political and 
economic system began in the early 1990s, the introduction of federal relations was 
fraught with early tensions. In its attempt to prevent state fragmentation along the lines 
of what happened in Yugoslavia, the three-tiered federal arrangement of republics, 
autonomous regions, regions, krais and cities of federal importance under a Federation 
Treaty was designed to hold Russia together until a new constitution could be ratified. 
From the perspective of the regions and krais, which comprised the third tier of the 
hierarchy, the Federation Treaty didn’t treat them as equal members of a renewed 
federal system for a new Russia. Even with the clause in the 1993 constitution that all 
republics, krais, regions, and federal cities were equal in rights, the asymmetric nature 
of the system remained.211 On the surface, the early 1990s demonstrates the most 
significant period of administrative decentralization in Russia’s history. Comparatively, 
the oblasts and krais had de facto gained a significant number of new responsibilities 
that the centre could simply no longer fulfil. Nevertheless, shortly after the Federation 
Treaty was agreed a number of oblasts and krais argued that they were deserving of 
greater rights and authority, making the argument that they were unable to stabilise the 
situation in their territories and develop due to the onerous burden being placed on 
them to support less well-managed regions through federal transfers.212 With the centre 
failing so vividly to come to terms with the mounting socioeconomic crisis, there was a 
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sense of opportunity in a number of regions that they could redefine the structure of the 
state and seek to build a new federal system with significant powers devolved to the 
regions and projecting upwards, reversing the unitary state that had existed 
previously.213 Of a number of regions that followed a strategy of greater independence 
of action on regional matters in order to resolve their declining socioeconomic position, 
Sverdlovsk Oblast took this route further than any other. Its attempt to unilaterally raise 
its status to that of republic was unsuccessful, but, it provoked Rossel’ into activating 
the personal capital that he had with the federal centre, making use of the value of 
El’tsin as a source of political capital. Taking advantage of El’tsin’s tendency to make 
decisions above and beyond the advice he received from those around him (and often 
directly in contradiction of such advice), Rossel’ successfully adjusted the source of his 
own capital from regional support to direct presidential intervention and laid the 
foundation for a powerfully active patron-client relationship that consolidated his 
regional and national political standing.  
 
As discussed previously, the connection between El’tsin and Rossel’ was due to their 
experience of working in the construction sector of the region (the most influential lobby 
within the region in Soviet times that had a focus on the internal conditions of the 
region), learning the structure of the region, the economic potential and the boundaries 
in which it was possible to work under the Soviet system.214 In their political relationship 
during the Soviet period, Rossel’’s rejection of El’tsin’s patronage in return for career 
progression led to threats from El’tsin that he would end Rossel’’s political career.215 
The power relationships between centre and regions in the first decade of post-Soviet 
Russia were continuously under adjustment according to the conditions at the centre 
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and, accordingly, we can identify three distinct phases of the El’tsin-Rossel’ 
relationship. Firstly, we can see the attempt by Rossel’ for independent political action, 
within his role as an appointed head of regional administration where there was no 
attempt to appeal to any personal connection with the President, whose patronage 
existed in its barest form. In this period we can see the entire cycle of development, 
declaration and dissolution of the Urals Republic ending in the dismissal of Rossel’ as 
regional leader. The second phase, arising from the failure of the first, is signified by 
Rossel’’s expulsion from the group of regional leaders that were active at the national 
level and the consequential total withdrawal of access to the President. The third phase 
is marked by a return to the top level of regional political life and a strident return onto 
the national level, which was made possible through the restoration and use of El’tsin 
as a form of political capital. The outcome of this third phase, which included the 
implementation of the Sverdlovsk regional charter and gubernatorial elections, was the 
perception that Rossel’ was the only Sverdlovsk actor able to fight the region’s corner 
and a critical contribution to the monopolisation of the further notion that his rivals did 
not have the capital (nor the potential to grow such capital through participation in 
networks) to represent the needs of the regional elite. Significant importance is 
attached to the nature of this dyadic relationship, where Rossel’ was the instigator but 
not the main resource-holder and yet was still able to shape a favourable outcome for 
his own personal power. 
Independently seeking resources – 1991-1993 
Deterioration in socioeconomic conditions as market reforms gripped led to a rising 
sense of disappointment from the Sverdlovsk elite that El’tsin was not doing enough to 
protect the interests of his home region.216 Lobbying Moscow for much-needed 
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resources gave extremely limited results as the weakness of the central state grew and 
at this time direct appeals and requests to the president were used sparingly by 
Rossel’. Instead of the president, tactical questions regarding the day-to-day survival of 
the region, such as requests for food aid from central reserves, were directed to the 
new Russian government. Despite the reforms aiming to break down the former 
command economy supply chains, the Sverdlovsk regional leadership (both Rossel’ 
and the elected soviet) pursued the policy of restoring former supply chains for its 
heavy industry and attracting new resources internationally, cross-regionally with other 
regional leaders and internally among local industries.217  
 
Institutionalising the independent approach to resolving its own socioeconomic 
problems became the key political issue for the region. The idea for the creation of the 
Urals Republic was not original to Sverdlovsk Oblast, having originally been raised by 
the then Chair of the Mossovet, Gavriil Popov, in 1990 as part of a wider scheme for 
increasing the influence of the RSFSR within the context of reforms to the Soviet 
Council of Ministers.218 The idea was developed into the suggestion of a pan-Urals 
entity, promoted by the Sverdlovsk political elite to other Urals regions (with the 
suggested name of the ‘Trans-Ural Krai’).219 After initial support, the five other 
proposed constituent Oblasts of this new subnational entity distanced themselves from 
the project, leaving Sverdlovsk Oblast to pursue the idea on its own. The Sverdlovsk 
regional executive and legislative branches worked closely together and public 
approval ran high for upgrading the region’s status. An inner circle of figures from the 
regional administration and Soviet built a strategy based upon unilateral action, 
influenced by the political identity of the Sverdlovsk region as a stronghold of post-
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Soviet democratization and support for El’tsin. Upon its unilateral declaration in July 
1993, its primary aims were to bring certain aspects of economic authority that it felt 
that the federal centre was neglecting or misusing under its own direct jurisdiction, 
adding clarity to the Federation Treaty which had left vague many of the spheres of 
federal, regional and joint responsibility. Particularly, this concerned the right to retain 
tax revenue transfers, increased rights over the formation of the regional budget, and 
greater freedom to adapt market reforms outside of state regulation, including land 
reform, privatization and the use of natural resources extracted in the region.220 One 
further item of significance was that among the stated political aims was the transfer 
away from presidential appointment of the regional executive to a popularly elected 
‘president’ as was the case in the republics. Both the regional executive and legislative 
branches appear to have expected the President’s support almost by default for a 
variety of reasons, including the connection between the President and the region and 
the fact that the president himself had called on regions to increase their powers back 
in 1990. In order to make clear its proposed status within the new Russia, political 
actors from the region made repeated denials that it was separatist in nature, with 
clearly outlined references in the Urals Republic’s draft constitution used to underline 
the region’s commitment to the Russian Federation. As El’tsin remained relatively quiet 
over the issue, limiting himself to wider generalisations on the development of Russian 
federalism, there was mounting suspicion amongst the Sverdlovsk regional political 
actors that the president and Rossel’ had reached a private agreement prior to the 
declaration of the Urals Republic.221 However, there is no indication that Rossel’ sought 
prior Presidential agreement, instead relying on presenting the fact as the next step in 
the natural development of Russian federalism. In the days following the declaration of 
the Urals Republic in July 1993, El’stin commented on the upgrading of status from 
Oblast to Republic made by Sverdlovsk and Vologda Oblast (who were taking a similar 
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approach in unilaterally upgrading their status) in a report made to the Constitutional 
Commission noting the failure of the centre to build a mechanism to allow the 
Federation Treaty to function, while underlining the equality of all subjects of the 
Federation in the draft Constitution. Appealing to Sverdlovsk and other regions 
considering such action to raise their issues with the Constitutional Commission and 
wait for the constitutional process to be completed, the President mildly rebuked his 
home region without offering a strong condemnation of the action.222  
 
The entry into force of the Urals Republic came immediately after El’tsin’s action 
against the Russian Parliament in October 1993, and when he did speak about the 
Urals Republic on its fourth day of existence, he stated on live television that he could 
perfectly well understand why some regions were taking unilateral action to increase 
their status in the Federation. 
 
There is nothing surprising in the fact that subjects of the Federation are taking unilateral 
action to resolve [the regional question], including through increasing their status. It would 
be naive to only see personal ambition of local leaders and the regional elite in this 
tendency. In Moscow, there is a huge will [among the bureaucracy] to keep hold of power 
over the regions. But the time has come to finally understand that maintaining the 
previous system is impossible – the demands of the time require a well thought out 
division of functions and responsibilities. There’s no alternative to this and there cannot 
be an alternative.
223 
 
On the basis of El’tsin’s public statement, Rossel’ returned to the region triumphant and 
preparing for the ‘presidential’ elections that were, according to the Constitution of the 
Urals Republic, to be held by mid-December. At the above cited meeting of the Council 
of Ministers on 3rd November 1993, which Rossel’ had personally attended, he had not 
spoken with the President (although perhaps it was that El’tsin had chosen not to 
speak with him), and handed over documents on the Urals Republic to the Presidential 
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Administration to arrange for their publication.224 Yet as the draft of the new constitution 
neared completion, El’tsin took action that demonstrated his unwillingness to allow 
Rossel’’s regional ambitions to interfere with or set this back further, dismissing the 
regional soviet and removing Rossel’ from his post.225 Noting the danger of the 
asymmetric federal structure, there was an article within the constitution concerning the 
equal rights for regions and republics and the opportunity for regions to negotiate 
additional areas of sole- or shared- powers within the federal structure, which was 
claimed to have been a result of the attempt to create the Urals Republic.226 It has 
further been suggested that republic leaders were so incensed by Rossel’’s actions to 
upgrade Sverdlovsk Oblast’s status that they had threatened to prevent the 
Constitution from being endorsed in their territories, thus throwing Russia back into the 
‘parade of sovereignties’.227  
 
The Urals Republic experience gives a clear demonstration of the uncertainty 
surrounding centre-regional relations, while further noting the breakdown in centre-
regional elite networks. A combination of the early post-communist conditions of a 
chaotic system of governance, a lack of a clearly defined regional policy from the 
federal centre and broken communication channels disrupted and corrupted the flow of 
information to the centre, contributing to the failure of the Urals Republic.228 Under the 
system of presidential appointment, regional heads of administration formally met face-
to-face with the president just once per year, although El’tsin had a number of 
structures available to him to receive information on the developments in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast (such as the presidential representative to the region, a number of 
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Sverdlovchane alongside him in Moscow, and his own contacts in the region).229 
Furthermore, in April 1993, three months before the initial declaration of the Urals 
Republic, El’tsin met with all of his regional leaders to discuss the results of the recently 
held referendum on the future of the Russian presidential and parliamentary systems in 
which Sverdlovsk Oblast had added a fifth question to the four national questions, 
asking society whether they supported Sverdlovsk Oblast’s right to equal status with 
the republics.230 So, while El’tsin could not have been taken by surprise by the actions 
of the region to increase its status, there was a significant delay between the Urals 
Republic coming into force at the beginning of November 1993 and El’tsin taking action 
against Rossel’. By absenting himself from the process, El’tsin had allowed his home 
region the space to experiment with regional development while also sidestepping 
further criticism from the Russian legislature on the erosion of state structure.231  
Severed ties – 1993-1994 
The dissolution of the regional soviet for exceeding its authority by declaring the Urals 
Republic and the subsequent dismissal of Rossel’ was viewed within the region as a 
harsh (zhestkii) punishment, and equally interpreted by other regions that there were to 
be no ‘special relationships’ in centre-regional relations.232 Nonetheless, El’tsin did not 
entirely sever his patronage role with regards to Rossel’ and did not exile him 
completely from the political system. The forthcoming 1993 parliamentary elections, the 
danger of creating an opposition movement within his home region and Rossel’’s 
standing among his fellow regional leaders, all contributed to El’tsin allowing the 
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dismissed former leader of the region to continue to play a role in regional politics. The 
day after his dismissal,, the leaders of the regions and republics that made up the Urals 
Economic Association (Bol’shoi Ural), the second largest regional association in 
Russia, were reported to have sought El’tsin’s permission to appoint Rossel’ as the 
organisation’s ‘President’ (Rossel’ was already its Chairman).233 Within Sverdlovsk 
Oblast, the appointment of Rossel’ as President of Bol’shoi Ural was portrayed as an 
act of solidarity and protest by his colleagues; in giving Rossel’ his title they were 
defying the centre in a risky act, that if misjudged could jeopardise their own 
positions.234 Secondly, the Central Electoral Committee agreed to bend its own rules 
for elections to the Federation Council in December 1993, extending the closing date 
for the registration of candidates beyond the deadline in order to give Rossel’ time to 
register as a candidate. Until his decision to stand, three days before the closing date 
for registration, only one candidate, Galina Karelova, had been registered - a single 
candidate would have prevented Federation Council elections from proceeding leaving 
Sverdlovsk Oblast without representation in the newly structured upper chamber. 
Having allowed Rossel’ to register, the electoral committee prolonged registration 
further so that a ‘dummy’ third candidate could be found to stand to ensure the 
elections could be held, and once these necessary conditions were met, Rossel’ was 
essentially gifted a federal political position to compensate for his loss of regional 
position.235  
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The loss of regional power affected Rossel’’s tone towards the president, and for a time 
he became more openly critical of the reform process and the shape of federal 
relations (whereas as recently as the events of October 1993, he had been 
wholehearted in his support for El’tsin).236 From his new position as a senator to the 
new Federation Council, Rossel’ continued to pursue the Urals Republic, and was 
granted an inquest to examine the legality of his dismissal (with the implication that 
El’tsin had acted outside of the law) and a hearing into the ideas of the Urals Republic 
in the State Duma.237 Criticism of the centre and the president reached a peak during 
the elections to the new Sverdlovsk Regional Duma in 1994, as Rossel’ hurriedly 
constructed a political movement, Preobrazhenie Urala (Transformation of the Urals) to 
contest seats in the new regional legislature, on the basis of attacking the centre for a 
lack of trust towards the regions. The recent political culture of Sverdlovsk Oblast, 
whereby a figure perceived to have been wronged by the state was elevated to near 
hero status (in the way that El’tsin had been once the region’s public learnt about the 
proceedings of the infamous October 1987 Politburo meeting), meant that Rossel’ and 
his political association was able to battle regional branches of federal parties to win a 
majority in the new regional Duma, presenting him with a third concurrently high-
ranking regional position as he was unanimously elected as Chairman of the new 
regional Duma. Having achieved this quick return to regional political life, securing the 
second most important position in the region, Rossel’ was able to use his political 
movement to apply pressure on the new regional head of administration and attempt to 
restore himself to the national-subnational capital network that was now clearly a 
necessity in centre-regional life. 
                                                 
236
 As he had done as chairman of the Oblispolkom in August 1991, Rossel’ immediately published a 
telegram sent to El’tsin in support of action against the parliament in the regional press. ‘Volna nasiliia’, 
Ural’skii rabochii, 5 October 1993, p.1  
237
 ‘Ne nastupaite dvazhdy na grabli’, Ural’skii rabochii, 2 March 1994, p.1; ‘Esli noty ne zabyvat’, pesni 
budet’, Ural’skii rabochii, 5 April 1994, p.1  
 131 
Changing course: patronage relations between the federal centre and 
Governor Aleksei Strakhov 
To underline the importance of patron-client ties with El’tsin in this period it is useful to 
contrast Rossel’’s position with that of his replacement, Aleksei Strakhov, who was 
appointed Governor of the region in November 1993. Strakhov had been a deputy 
mayor of Ekaterinburg and was something of a surprise choice for appointment, 
proposed by El’tsin’s advisor and former Sverdlovchanin, Viktor Iliushin.238 A former 
supporter of the Urals Republic who had later criticised the whole process following its 
overturning, Strakhov was faced with a problem of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, 
not only as Rossel’’s replacement and an appointee, but also in reconciling his position 
of ending tension with Moscow with the mood of the region. The tendency of Strakhov’s 
administration was unambiguously in favour of top-down central authority and he 
disavowed the regionalist stance of his predecessor, portraying the region-first 
approach as being against the interests of the region and Russia in the wider picture.239 
Such a position was pleasing to the centre as it promoted regional stability and 
subordination to Moscow against the backdrop of the October 1993 crisis, problems in 
the North Caucasus and the deepening socio-economic decline of the state. 
 
As an individual, Strakhov was known to El’tsin. Under the Soviet regime he had 
worked for the regional division of Glavsnab, the department that organised the supply 
of materials to enterprises and industry, and which would have invariably brought him 
into contact with leading figures from the construction sector.240 His most important 
personal connection with Moscow was with the Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
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who was also the leader of the federal branch of the Nash Dom Rossiia (NDR) party. 
This is perhaps not so surprising considering the decline in the president’s popularity 
and the increasing influence of Chernomyrdin. To counter Rossel’’s regional political 
movement, Strakhov was the head of the Sverdlovsk regional branch of NDR, within 
the paradigm of regional Heads of Administration being expected to represent the 
government’s party in the upcoming State Duma electoral cycle in 1995. Involvement in 
NDR was useful to Strakhov as it offered him access to contacts in the centre that he 
otherwise didn’t have, particularly in light of the fact that, as an appointee, he had no 
strong regional support base to speak of.241 Within the region, NDR was expected to 
assist Strakhov with administrative resources to counter Rossel’’s political movement 
and continued regionalism, but such administrative resources were in limited supply; 
Chernomyrdin didn’t appear at regional conferences of NDR (failing to give the boost to 
regional support that his presence was expected to provide among representatives of 
industry) and Strakhov had to rely on district administrators who were involved in the 
regional branch of NDR and Moscow-based financial structures and enterprises 
present in Sverdlovsk Oblast that supported Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister.242 
 
The lack of involvement that El’tsin took in NDR limited any reason for contact between 
the president and Strakhov, and it was claimed by one of Strakhov’s close colleagues 
that there were no meetings between the two and little in the way of contact between 
them.243 The weakness of Strakhov’s position with regards to federal patronage was 
demonstrated when El’tsin agreed the Regional Charter should be signed against 
Strakhov’s wishes, and when allowing gubernatorial elections to proceed before the 
national parliamentary elections, despite protest from the regional governor, members 
of the Presidential Administration and the federal Government, who all preferred them 
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to be held after the Presidential elections. As a result, although Strakhov’s defeat in the 
August 1995 gubernatorial elections was largely due to his inability to counter the 
grass-roots support Rossel’ had constructed in the region, the lack of visible support 
shown by the centre, and certainly the lack of a powerful central patron undoubtedly 
added to his lack of success.  
Putting political capital to work -1994-1999 
The events of the Urals Republic founded the identity of Rossel’ as a ‘charismatic 
leader’ who fought for the interests of his region. In becoming Chairman of the 
Regional Duma, Rossel’ had converted the sense of injustice from the region over his 
removal as governor into votes not only for himself, but for his strongly regionalist 
movement, presenting the central leadership with something of a political headache. 
With his return to regional political life, Rossel’ began the transition of shifting the 
perception of a collision between the two into one of a return to cooperation in the 
interests of the region. The ‘appointed’ governor, Aleksei Strakhov, was now directly 
competing with his predecessor over the future development of the region with this 
competition initially manifesting itself around the proposed regional Charter, the 
founding document outlining the basic laws for the political structure of each region, 
permitted under the 1993 Constitution.  
 
The Charter proposed by the Regional Duma (under the leadership of Rossel’ and very 
openly based on the Constitution of the Urals Republic) stated that the governorship 
was to be an elected position and was repeatedly rejected by Strakhov, who 
recognised the threat that this posed to him. To break the impasse between legislative 
and executive branches, Rossel’ turned to the horizontal networks that he had formed 
previously with other regional leaders (discussed in chapter five) and to act as a 
conduit and open the door to a meeting with El’tsin. Complaining to Shaimiev, the 
Tatarstan President, about being denied access to El’tsin by the Presidential 
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Administration, it was suggested that Shaimiev would broker a meeting, eventually 
gaining El’tsin’s agreement to meet.244 Under the system of centre-regional relations, 
the head of the regional Duma was far removed from the patronage of the president; 
they were accountable to the regional electorate and any federal networks were on the 
basis of federal political parties. Clearly, the case of Rossel’ was an exception, both 
due to a shared history with El’tsin and the importance of Sverdlovsk Oblast to El’tsin’s 
popular support. The resulting meeting that Rossel’ held with El’tsin had significant 
influence on the political role of the region throughout the second half of the 1990s. 
Primarily, it allowed Rossel’ to make personal representation to be allowed back into 
direct contact with El’tsin. Secondly, it allowed him not only to present information 
surrounding the regional charter to the President without any disruption or 
misinformation but also to clear the air surrounding the events of Urals Republic (El’tsin 
was well known to bear grudges until suddenly all was forgotten).245 At this meeting, 
El’tsin stated that his sources had informed him that the Charter conflicted with the 
Constitution in many areas, but he allowed Rossel’ to go through the proposed Charter 
point by point in conjunction with the Constitution, eventually conceding that it should 
be allowed to be signed into effect.246 In his public account of the meeting, Rossel’ 
couched it heavily in the language of a ‘meeting of friends’ and ‘trusting dialogue’, 
claiming to have convinced El’tsin not to sign a pre-prepared decree from the 
Presidential Administration overruling the regional Charter and removing him as 
Chairman of the Regional Duma.247 The implication was that Rossel’ had righted the 
wrong done to him two years earlier. Clearly, this meeting undermined Strakhov’s 
authority in the region and confirmed Rossel’ as an alternate source of power in the 
region as viewed from the centre. A shift in the political strategy taken by Rossel’ 
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ensued, with emphatically more active participation as a client to El’tsin’s patron. Direct 
request of the president forced the holding of a gubernatorial election (as had been a 
key clause of the Charter) in summer 1995, and following Rossel’’s election as 
governor, he subsequently negotiated and signed a series of bilateral agreements with 
the centre on the redistribution of powers to the region in 1996.  In both of these cases 
El’tsin stood to gain in terms of securing favourable voting in the forthcoming 
presidential elections. Exporting the scenario that had been used in Tatarstan, whereby 
treaties formalised the increased rights of federal subjects in return for support for his 
presidential re-election, El’tsin significantly increased the potential for receiving the 
majority of Sverdlovsk Oblast’s votes through support from Rossel’’s electorate.248 It 
was of critical importance that he ensured the support of his home region for the 
forthcoming presidential elections in 1996, and the perception of experts within 
Sverdlovsk Oblast was that Moscow had lost nothing in signing the Treaty.249 El’tsin’s 
personal involvement in granting gubernatorial elections and the bilateral treaty played 
a decisive role, overruling members of his government in allowing them to be held 
before the 1996 presidential elections and in setting priorities, timetables and deadlines 
on his government during the negotiation of the bilateral agreements.250 The success of 
this strategy not only provided the opportunity for Rossel’ to return to the governor’s 
chair, but also changed the dynamic of this network, facilitating frequent meetings 
between the president and the governor, that eventually developed into pre-arranged 
monthly meetings offering unhindered access to El’tsin to discuss regional conditions 
and policies. More importantly, these meetings were initiated at El’tsin’s own request, 
having reproached his administration for failing to organise regular contact between 
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himself and the most important regions.251 The complaints of the early 1990s that El’tsin 
was not doing enough to assist his home region were now a thing of the past. While the 
anecdotal evidence from interviews taken in the Sverdlovsk region suggests it would be 
difficult to describe the two as friends, the closer communication that became practice 
resulted in a high level of mutual trust between the two by the time of El’tsin’s 
resignation, resulting in the claim that El’tsin continued to exercise his patronage over 
Rossel’ into the Putin regime, supporting Rossel’’s re-election in 2003 and influencing 
the centre not to oppose his candidacy. 252  
Conclusions 
The significance of the El’tsin-Rossel’ relationship lies in two critical aspects connecting 
the exercise of power in the Sverdlovsk region on power networks. Firstly, it 
demonstrates that despite the wish of the centre for the regions to survive by 
themselves, it quickly became clear that the centre itself was not prepared to sever 
patronage ties entirely. The case of the Urals Republic underlines the fact that without 
direct permission from the most powerful decision-maker in the land, policy initiatives 
from below that threatened the fragile balance of emerging federal relations were not 
allowed to proceed, thus, it was only through the restoration of full patron-client 
relations between the president and the former regional governor, in this case, that any 
further devolution of powers to the post of regional governor could proceed. This leads 
us to the second aspect highlighted by this chapter, seen in the introduction of the idea 
to the elites and the general population of the region that only Rossel’ was capable of 
creating such links with El’tsin that would ensure greater rights to the region. The 
perception was constructed that El’tsin and Rossel’ could personally agree on terms, 
whereas other actors (demonstrated in the case of Strakhov) enjoyed neither a direct 
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route to communicate with the president nor the shared history and confidence of the 
president to persuade him to allow Sverdlovsk Oblast any requested concessions. This 
perception of El’tsin’s patronage was a key element of the boundary control strategy 
employed by Rossel’ to prevent competitor encroachment into his own political territory 
and prevent the outflow of support from the critical elites that provided dependable 
electoral and regime support.   
 
Through activating the most important line of political capital available to him, Rossel’ 
gained something that was not available to other actors. The contrast in relations 
between Rossel’ and Strakhov demonstrates that even under the conditions of 
presidential appointment, implying support from the top of the power pyramid, the 
ability to reach personal agreement appears to have been more significant than the 
development of institutional factors regulating the centre-regional power relationship. 
Through close ties to the president, Rossel was able to shape outcomes that returned 
him to regional executive power and a stronger position than before. The achievement 
of the regional charter, gubernatorial elections, and the bilateral treaty all created the 
perception of a ‘special relationship’ and established the popular perception that El’tsin 
trusted Rossel’ to experiment with regional structures (ignoring the very real interest he 
had in preserving his own position through granting concessions to regions in 
exchange for support).  
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Chapter 5 
Diversifying national-subnational linkages: Rossel’’s approach 
to competing networks and constructing cross-regional 
relations  
The previous chapter acknowledges the ties between Rossel’ and El’tsin, noting 
specifically the changing relationship that occurred once the informal aspects of 
political capital were mobilised by the Sverdlovsk leader. In the new Russia, the 
breakdown of vertical relations left power structures subject to a high degree of 
interference from rival groups, particularly from those present in the Moscow 
bureaucracy and those in circles close to the president. Rivalries over the pursuit of 
political capital were a feature of early Russian politics as actors attempted to 
consolidate and further their reach and influence. The competing networks that Rossel’ 
faced at the national (federal) level, primarily made up of government actors, were also 
involved in centre-regional relations and attempted to impose their influence over 
regional leaders.  
 
This chapter examines how the Sverdlovsk governor worked within this changing 
system of power relations across numerous network domains developing the boundary 
control strategy that ensured that the region’s vertical relations with the centre were 
reliant on his participation and that the federal-Sverdlovsk connection could not bypass 
him. It considers the potential obstructing role played by existing networks at the 
federal centre and the resulting attempts to construct new networks aimed at building 
links outside of his home region and expanding his political reach into the wider 
Russian political system. Finally, it looks at Rossel’’s construction of new national and 
international networks based on personal interaction that placed his voice on factors 
affecting regional, macro-regional and federal development to build and enhance his 
reputation as a regional actor of national significance.  
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Network competition 
With drastic political change, the new political elite and the networks that they 
established amongst themselves became more fluid, constantly adapting and adjusting 
as they struggled to replace the institutionalised structure of vertical relations that the 
Communist Party had instilled. This emerging flexibility is seen in the speed at which 
networks formed and the frequency that participants joined and exited networks.253 The 
new system of values brought an almost relentless struggle for political and economic 
resources that all branches of the elite entered into, competing against one another to 
ensure that resources flowed to their own networks rather than to rivals. The position of 
actors in networks, including movement within and across networks, involved 
countering rival forces from all sides as actors competed throughout the El’tsin decade 
to protect and improve their personal position in the political and/or economic space in 
which they functioned.   
 
It has been suggested that there are two distinct elements in political power relations, 
influence (which we can summarise as the control over the flow of information), and 
domination (control over the behaviour of subjects of the network).254 With the collapse 
of the hierarchical network discipline that the Communist Party had projected 
downwards previously, those previously in positions at the top of such structures (and 
particularly those networks that had carried over from communist to post-communist 
Russia) found themselves losing their control over ideas (influence), the ability to 
impose implementation of these ideas and the loyalty of members lower down the 
network chain (domination). One group particularly affected by this was the Moscow 
ministerial elite in its dealings with heads of regional administration up to the 
introduction of competitive gubernatorial elections in the mid-1990s. While the central 
bureaucracy continued to expect the unconditional obedience of the periphery to 
Moscow’s command, relying on the ‘prestige’ of its central status, conflicting signals 
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were being transmitted to the regions with regards to the development of the post-
communist state as republics and regions began to act in their own interests and resist 
the previous domination of the centre, receiving information from other sources, and 
withholding it from their previous patrons. The titular ethnic republics were at the 
forefront of such change, and with confident regional leaders unwilling to be left behind, 
the result was the breakdown of the centre-regional vertical structure, and the 
beginnings of a total overhaul of such relations.  
 
Simultaneous membership of multiple networks broadened the scope of actors’ 
interests. With the removal of the unifying ideology that had bound the elite (in the 
formal sense), networks became more influenced by personal interests, frequently 
based on interpersonal relations and emerging economic interests, and less so on an 
overriding value structure or set of politically motivated rules. The temporary nature of 
the constant push and pull of inter-elite relations, who could provide what resource, 
what was required in return, and how actors could be used to achieve certain ends, 
gave rise to suspicion and a loss of trust between all branches of the elite. This 
increased rather than diminished the necessity for multiple networks as interpersonal 
disputes and preferences were aired in the open, freed from the secretive nature of the 
nomenklatura network that had existed in Soviet times leaving actors requiring support 
for their actions among their fellow members of the elite. The increased competition 
within these structures entailed a far more complex series of relationships, which 
required careful management in order to progress up the power chain.255  The constant 
push and pull of networks gave ample opportunity for actors to move up (or down) the 
hierarchical scale and with frequent exchanges in roles as former clients became 
patrons and former patrons found themselves cast aside as new networks formed to 
pursue the same (or alternative) resources. Many factors influenced the development 
of networks, and the benefit of proximity to decision makers meant that the level at 
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which a network sought to participate in politics was frequently limited to the scope of 
their geographical reach. At the level of regional leaders, for example, those heading 
industrially weaker regions frequently looked to leaders of industrial regions that were 
more influential federally, latching on to their stronger counterparts’ ability to lobby for 
extra resources from the state (aside from geography, the hierarchy of regional 
cooperation was often based on the legacy of the interconnected nature of the Soviet 
planned economy as one factory in one region would manufacture parts required by 
another factory in another region to build final products). Despite their proliferation, the 
aim of networks continued to be monopolising links to resources and preventing 
competitors from accessing these. The chapter now focuses on three areas of 
networks that Rossel’ attempted to place himself at the centre of and looks at the 
impact they had on furthering his political aura as the only figure from Sverdlovsk 
Oblast capable of bringing extra resources to this territory. 
The Presidential Administration – rivalry for influence and domination 
The manner in which Rossel’ operated within the system of federal power relations 
furthered the reach of his networks is of interest, and this section looks at the key areas 
of struggle against rivals and the methods used to enter into existing networks or 
construct new ones. As the ability of the central bureaucracy to influence the direction 
of decision making under perestroika deteriorated swiftly, under El’tsin, it resulted in 
open competition amongst actors occupying the same space.256 In the previous chapter 
it was noted that El’tsin was prone to taking decisions that caught those around him off 
guard, although the close circle of advisers surrounding the president and the 
bureaucratic Presidential Administration still managed to retain some degree of 
influence. These supporting actors promoted their own views and interests in the 
development of the new political system, and under the appointment system and 
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beyond, playing the role of bridging structures (and in some cases, gate keepers) 
between the president and the wider elite.257 Taking the example of two specific actors, 
Viktor Iliushin, the head of El’tsin’s Secretariat from 1992 to 1996, and Sergei Filatov, 
Head of the Presidential Administration from January 1993 until January 1996, who 
were both close to the president and held a stake in the system of vertical-downward 
relations from centre to region, we can examine their attempts to control the vertical 
nature of sub-presidential relations between Rossel’ and the centre. In these terms, 
Iliushin’s and Filatov’s ability to work behind the scenes, within and across networks 
amongst the Moscow bureaucracy was at its peak during the period when Rossel’ did 
not activate the capital of his own personal relationship with the President as seen in 
the previous chapter. The actions of these two figures demonstrate the conflicting 
interests held by different networks and the ‘interfering’ role that could be played by 
rivals to influence patron-client relations, which created uncertainty in the outcome of 
representations to actors in different networks. Further, on the basis of whoever 
controlled access to the president could present themselves as controlling the flow of 
information to president, Iliushin and Filatov found themselves to be rivalling each 
other.258 One of the important differences between the two was the depth and scope of 
the formal and informal networks that they were involved in and the interests that they 
represented. Iliushin was an outsider whose political capital was inextricably tied to 
El’tsin (to whom he owed his position in the capital city as a member of the former 
Sverdlovsk elite that El’tsin had brought to Moscow in the mid-1980s), while Filatov 
was a Muscovite who had been elected to the first Russian Congress of People’s 
Deputies from the Democratic Russia bloc and had been the Secretary of the RFSFR 
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Supreme Soviet throughout 1991.259 The difference in their formal roles influenced the 
relationship that they could develop with regional actors, and in the case of Rossel’, 
any impact they had on centre-regional relations between the Kremlin and Sverdlovsk 
was nullified once the Sverdlovsk leader activated the patron-client relationship with the 
president as outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
The role of bridging actors in attempts to communicate with actors outside of a 
particular network enhances the risk of distortion and manipulation of any message 
being delivered, therefore, the ‘bridge’ takes on additional importance. At the informal 
level, as one of El’tsin’s close inner circle, Iliushin was able to act as a conduit to 
transmit information without the formal implications of a presidential meeting. Trust in 
Iliushin’s ability to deliver any message in its intended form was underscored by 
Rossel’’s familiarity with him from their crossing in Nizhnii Tagil Party structures during 
the 1970s, and also took into account that Iliushin had almost constant access to El’tsin 
and could choose the correct time to deliver such information.260 In the case of 
transmitting Sverdovsk Oblast’s intentions to develop the Urals Republic, Iliushin, 
whose role was to manage the president’s diary, acted as a counterbalance to the 
Presidential Administration, based on the likelihood of information reaching the 
president without being distorted or corrupted, particularly as he had little to gain in not 
transmitting the information to the president. In contrast, the Presidential Administration 
was a formal network that replaced the Communist Party Secretariat, and was 
responsible for working with the regional administrations, with Filatov as its head. The 
Presidential Administration had been tasked with organising the flow of information to 
El’tsin, and ensuring the implementation of presidential decrees throughout the country, 
with a particular remit to play a supervisory role over the presidential representatives to 
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the regions that had been appointed by El’tsin to monitor regional leaders.261 Early 
relations between regions and the Presidential Administration saw both sides trying to 
gain the upper hand, although it has been stated that El’tsin and his Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, were generally supportive of regional leaders’ attempts to resolve 
local problems themselves.262 As head of the Presidential Administration, Filatov took 
an aggressive stance against Rossel’’s attempts to unilaterally reorganise the state 
structure, and it was the Presidential Administration that acted to terminate the Urals 
Republic project.263 
 
The delicate nature of Rossel’’s vertically-upward relations was displayed in the 
reaction of Filatov and Iliushin to the Urals Republic. Accounts from the time indicate 
that, as Rossel’ met with both to speak about the region’s plans to increase its federal 
status, Iliushin took this information to El’tsin (without significant public comment), while 
Filatov openly rejected the Urals Republic project along with the Vice Prime-Minister 
Sergei Shakhrai, who went further to speculate in the national media, that Rossel’ had 
overstepped his authority and would be dismissed by the president.264 It can be 
suggested that previous ties and the lack of personal gain meant that Iliushin was likely 
to have transmitted the information to its intended audience, while Filatov, on the other 
hand, held a greater interest in the institutionalisation of the Presidential Administration, 
including in its perceived authority over regional leaders; with support from republic and 
other regional leaders worried by Rossel’’s attempts to increase his own power, by 
dismissing the idea and keeping it off the agenda with the president he could be viewed 
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by these leaders as asserting his authority with regards to the development of federal 
relations.265 Upon his eventual dismissal, while El’tsin allowed Rossel’ to continue to 
play a role in the region, the central elite was wary of allowing him to return to political 
activity should he become a focal point for regional lobbying and have undue influence 
on the formation of regional institutions. The influence of figures from Sverdlovsk 
(Sverdlovchane) upon the president was a sore point for the Presidential 
Administration, and Rossel’’s removal was viewed positively in the centre as further 
diminishing the influence of this group, leaving only Viktor Iliushin remaining out of a 
group that had counted Gennadii Burbulis, Iurii Petrov, Oleg Lobov and now Rossel’ 
among its numbers.266 With the Urals seen as a powerful lobby and influencer over the 
President, the national press painted Rossel’ as a modern day Nikita Demidov, ruling 
the Urals region as he pleased.267 Nevertheless, following Rossel’s dismissal, it was 
Iliushin, rather than Filatov, who was trusted with the role of identifying a new governor 
for the region, based on his knowledge of Sverdlovsk Oblast and recent events 
there.268 In fulfilling his role as gatekeeper to access to the president, Iliushin protected 
his own nomination for the role by blocking attempts by the dismissed governor to 
obtain an audience with the president, forcing Rossel’ to eventually resort to his inter-
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regional ties (with Shaimiev) to bypass the President’s secretary and gain an audience 
with El’tsin (see previous chapter). 
  
Prior to this episode it was already becoming clearer that as central institutional 
controls over the regions were eroded and regions were encouraged to choose their 
own paths, the only way central actors could retain any semblance of authority over 
regional leaders was by exerting informal pressure on them, resulting in a clear 
distinction between those regional leaders that could stimulate action from the ground 
up and those that were forced to rely on benefits from central policies trickling 
downwards. 269 From a wider perspective, even such an institutional ‘razborka’ (brawl) 
as the one that had taken place between the centre and Sverdlovsk Oblast over the 
Urals Republic could be put behind the actors involved as soon as the next set of 
resources and interests appeared for distribution, even where these concerned the 
same or similar actors. Filatov perceived Rossel’ to be challenging for power in the 
same political space as occupied by the Presidential Administration (and by inference 
for the same resources). The unwritten understanding of centre-regional relations 
under the appointment system was that regional appointees were supposed to be 
given as much room for manoeuvre to operate within their territories free of 
interference from Moscow.270 Yet, once Rossel’ had been given the green light to return 
to political activity by El’tsin (as suggested in the previous chapter), Filatov, and the 
Presidential Administration, ended their action against him in the knowledge that 
El’tsin’s permission counted for more than any action they could take against the 
former Sverdlovsk leader, and furthermore, avoiding the risk of generating a figure 
excluded from the process around whom new opposition forces could gather 
(particularly in light of the dissolution of the Russian parliament and the shelling of the 
White House in October 1993). 
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The forum that was created to allow regional leaders to formally interact with the centre 
was the Federation Council. It had been designed to soothe the regions’ sense of 
inequality in the new political system and to represent their interests, but the nature of 
the selection of its speaker demonstrated the unwillingness to truly allow regional 
leaders to encroach on central political territory. Having easily won a seat to the 
Federation Council in December 1993 as one of two Senators from Sverdlovsk Oblast, 
Rossel’ emerged as a potential candidate for the Speaker’s position. His nomination 
originated from outside of the central elite, and with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
overseeing the process of allocating roles, was viewed as a threat to the plans for 
control of the institution that had been made in Moscow. The speaker’s role had been 
earmarked for Vladimir Shumeiko, the former first deputy Prime Minister, as 
compensation for losing his position in a government reshuffle in 1994 (keeping the 
leading position of the body in the hands of Moscow rather than allowing a regional 
figure to be in charge of it). However, when it came to the selection of the speaker by 
the senators themselves, Rossel’ was one of four nominations to contest for the post, 
and was viewed as a serious contender.271 It took four rounds of voting, but more 
tellingly the use of administrative resources such as Rossel’’s German ethnicity, 
allowing senators to vote by telegram and direct pressure on 30 dissenting governors 
(in the form of a breakfast meeting with Chernomyrdin to convince them to make the 
‘correct’ choice), to get Shumeiko confirmed in the post. 272 In an act of appeasement 
towards those opposing Shumeiko, Rossel’ was offered the position of deputy speaker, 
although he turned this down, publicly stating his deep disagreement with the 
speaker.273 It can further be suggested that accepting the role of Deputy Speaker would 
have been detrimental to Rossel’’s position at home, as acceptance would remove him 
from Sverdlovsk Oblast and risk his political base over time by absenting himself from 
the daily political life of the region, although even being linked with the position 
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enhanced his status within his region and cross-regionally as having influence at the 
national level.  
Building new networks to influence the centre – Rossel’’s as leader of the 
greater Urals region 
Concurrent to the development of vertical relations, one of the features of Rossel’’s 
political power, was his ability to construct new networks cross-regionally within the 
conditions of their breakdown under the transition from a planned to market economy. 
If we can summarise the above-noted vertical relations as a failure by Rossel’ to control 
the terms of centre-regional relations, the development of horizontal structures became 
one of the bedrocks of his self-promotion as the single actor capable of successful 
negotiation with the centre, not just in the eyes of Sverdlovsk Oblast, but extending into 
other parts of the Urals. 
 
The lack of popular legitimacy that regional executives enjoyed under the system of 
appointment in 1991 left them with considerable shortfall when seeking to consolidate 
their positions, and with popular elections off the table until the president allowed them 
to proceed, alternative sources of legitimacy had to be actively sought or created in 
order to popularly establish leaders’ political credentials. A valuable part of artificially 
creating such legitimacy entailed constructing new networks that were grounded in 
terms of halting economic decline and restarting the regional (Urals) economy. The 
most immediate and visible network in which we can see the central role of Rossel’’s 
participation and accumulation of political and economic capital was the Bol’shoi Ural 
inter-regional association, This horizontal forum of regional executives and republic 
presidents quickly developed into a convenient and regular forum, and one which 
became more than an empty discussion shop, making progress in attempts to resolve 
the supply and production problems facing the Urals region as a whole. From the 
remnants of the Soviet economic system, Rossel’, among others elsewhere in the 
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country, had quickly realised that in post-command economy Russia regional political 
power was highly dependent on the state of any regional economic recovery. To this 
end, Bol’shoi Ural offered up the opportunity for frequent and top-level inter-regional 
dialogue on the economy, although political matters were also discussed. In addition, 
and due to the nature of Sverdlovsk Oblast it provided an excellent opportunity to 
reiterate Sverdlovsk’s traditional hegemony in the Urals, with Rossel’ at the head of the 
table as the group’s spokesman. As chairman of the association (elected to the role by 
his peers following his dismissal as governor in late 1993), Rossel’ provided the 
charismatic leadership needed to promote inter-regional horizontal cooperation that 
could offer workable solutions to economic problems experienced across the Urals. 
Through coordinating their positions with each other the regions and republics of the 
Urals were argued to be stronger as a bloc rather than as individual subjects of the 
federation, and under Rossel’’s leadership, which placed industrial renewal at its heart, 
the inter-regional association in the Urals became something of a business alliance of 
its members.274 His value to other regional leaders in the forum was seen in the 
potential benefit to their own lobbying activities his federal political capital brought 
(primarily through his access to the president and also in his ability not to be cowed by 
conflict with central actors).275 Taken as a whole, the leverage that came from 
representing not only the president’s home region, but the macro-region that was the 
industrial and natural resource heartland of the new Russia, lent Rossel’  additional 
impact when bargaining with the centre. His role with Bol’shoi Ural assisted the shift in 
his political image from being a troublesome regional leader to a critical actor at the 
national level and cemented his popularity among other regional leaders, who now 
gravitated towards him as a strong advocate of regional political power at a time where 
they only received the attentions of Moscow if electoral support was required. It has 
later been noted by Urals actors that the seriousness and high level of economic policy 
proposals and debate at sessions of the association, combined with the state 
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significance of the Urals region in terms of industrial production and the military 
industrial complex, meant that neither Chernomyrdin, Stepashin nor Putin in their 
respective periods as Prime Minister could ignore the significance of the association, 
with each of these Prime Ministers attending selected sessions.276 Speaking 
authoritatively to the rest of the country on behalf of the leaders of the wider Urals, 
Rossel’ repeatedly raised issues facing the ‘backbone’ (khrebet) of the country, 
widening his political community and confirming him as the emissary of the entire Urals 
to Moscow.277 
 
While further discussed in chapter eight, it is without doubt that the perceived 
centrifugal tendencies of strong regions within the federal structure was behind the May 
2000 federal reforms undertaken by President Putin as his first major policy move 
following his election. In a significant statement of intent by the Kremlin to reduce the 
influence of Rossel’ in the Urals, the new Federal District was made up of only 6 
regions, Sverdlovsk, Cheliabinsk, Kurgan and Tiumen Oblasts, and the Khanty-Mansi 
and Iamalo-Nenets Autonomous Regions. As a way of fracturing Rossel’’s position in 
the Urals, Permskii Krai and Bashkortostan were deliberately placed in the Volga 
Federal District with a specific intent to remove their spheres of interest from those of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, reducing the possibility for a collusion of positions between three 
such strategically significant regions.278 Formally bringing Tiumen’ Oblast and its 
constituent autonomous regions into the official Urals space provided a strong 
counterweight to Rossel’, as the loyalties of these oil-rich regions, traditionally 
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considered to be part Western Siberia, were closer to the Kremlin than they were to 
any idea of a Urals’ identity.279 
Nemets v regione –international ties as a source of external legitimacy280 
The speed at which the Russian regions opened up to foreigners, including opening up 
formerly closed cities, was related to the attitudes of the ruling political elite in their 
desperate search for foreign investment in the final months of the Soviet Union. As the 
potential for foreign economic relations on a sub-national level began to develop, it was 
the republic leaders, and chief among them Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia 
(Sakha), that made the first clear demands to be allowed to develop their own foreign 
economic policies.281 Following their lead, at the oblast level, the opportunities for 
developing foreign economic relations without the centre was not lost on leaders. In 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, this process had been slowly initiated following Russian 
‘independence’ within the Soviet system, with Rossel’ actively laying the foundations 
for the organization of such relations, creating a Committee for International and 
Foreign Economic Ties (Upravlenie po mezhdunarodnym i vneshneekonomicheskim 
sviaziam administratsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti) in July 1991, under the control of the 
Oblispolkom (which can be taken to mean as being under his own control).282 Its aims 
were ‘to make plans for the development of the international business sphere’, and ‘to 
open representations of foreign enterprises and firms in the region.’283 Almost 
immediately following the collapse of Party rule, Rossel’ and a number of other 
members of his regional administration were included in presidential delegations 
abroad to seek new investment and business opportunities. The most productive of 
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Sverdlovsk Oblast’s early attempts to build foreign relations were with the German 
region of Baden-Würtemburg, which developed into a long-term programme for 
regional economic development. Close relations with Germany, (one of the key 
investors in post-Soviet Russia), can be linked to Rossel’’s German ethnicity. In the 
past, Rossel’’s ethnicity had prevented him from pursuing a career in the military and 
had seen him subjected to discrimination in Soviet times. With the need for the new 
Russia to attract foreign investment, having an ethnic German leader of a key industrial 
region was seen as offering both opportunity for the region and a symbol to 
demonstrate El’tsin’s hopes for the rest of the world to come to Russia’s aid and 
support the democratisation process by opening up parts of the state that had formerly 
been closed to the world.284 With Rossel’ by his side on trade delegations, El’tsin was 
able to show that the new Russian government was working hard to resolve the 
‘German question’, allowing the German government to make investment in the new 
Russia.285 In addition to these links, international trade agreements were reached with 
a number of regional administrations from other Western countries, including those of 
the former COMECON area and Western Europe.286  
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Towards the middle of the decade the USA began to feature heavily in the foreign 
commercial flow of investment and trade as the region sought to deepen its foreign 
connections.287 The regional potential that Rossel’ demonstrated in the early years of 
the new Russia in the sphere of foreign relations brought one of the most significant 
(both politically and economically) actions in regional development to Ekaterinburg. 
Following some heavy lobbying of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the US 
State Department, as reported by Rossel’ himself, the United States decided to change 
its plans to open a consulate in Novosibirsk to serve the rest of Russia outside of 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and their surrounding regions, locating it in Ekaterinburg 
instead.288 The importance of such a decision for the region cannot be overestimated, 
nor should the effect of Rossel’’s influence over the proceedings, most of all because 
once the USA set up a consulate in his regional capital, the majority of other Western 
European states followed, as the UK, Germany and Austria all set up consulates in the 
1990s, with the Italians, French, Danes and other nations creating representative 
offices in the city. The permanent presence of foreign diplomatic missions and their 
trade departments in the city not only increased the flow of investment and gave 
Rossel’ and his administration direct access to influential figures in the international 
arena, but it also gave the Sverdlovsk leader considerable status amongst his fellow 
regional executives, further substantiating  his standing cross-regionally as a political 
heavyweight.289  
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Much of Rossel’s leadership at home and in the Urals was based on the rebuilding of 
the regional economy, and to this effect the decision to seek greater assistance from 
the West was clearly not a difficult one, although the process of increasing the number 
of foreign enterprises and, indeed, foreigners, was a delicate matter for a region where 
the industrial elites were resistant to outside interference. Futhermore, Rossel’’s ability 
to develop diplomatic long-term foreign relations gave him influence in the Federation 
Council although foreign investment in the region was limited by Rossel’’s domestic 
policy of protecting regional heavy industry and the natural resources sector from 
outsiders (see chapter six). 
 
With regards to the ‘near abroad’, the day-to-day need for close cooperation and strong 
economic relations that the regions found to be essential can clearly be seen to be in 
conflict with Moscow’s geopolitical approach to the former Soviet states. While at the 
state level Russia was struggling to come to terms with the independence of the former 
Soviet states and formulate a clear idea for integration under the guises of the CIS, in 
the provincial capitals, there was a need to resurrect the ties of the Soviet economic 
system. Under the command economy, Sverdlovsk Oblast, like many other regions, 
had supplied and received materials and goods from all over the Soviet Union. 
Restoring these ties became not only a way to develop the region, but a necessity in 
ensuring access to cheap goods, materials and markets. The 1996 bilateral treaty 
signed with Moscow had given official recognition to the regional leadership’s attempts 
to conduct its own foreign relations (which it had been conducting previously without 
Moscow’s formal authorisation), and helped to alleviate some of the frustration that had 
been present previously when the federal centre had been an obstacle to international 
relations conducted by the region. By 1999, Kazakhstan was rivalling the USA as the 
Oblast’s largest trade partner and Rossel’ was actively engaging with heads of state of 
other CIS nations. By the end of the El’tsin decade, he had been either a guest of, or 
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received Aleksandr Lukashenka of Belarus, President Petru Lucinschi of Moldova and 
Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, as well as deepening relations with the state ministries of 
other nations, for example, in the construction of joint enterprises with the Uzbek 
Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Energy.290 By the end of the decade, 40% of all 
imported goods to the region were from various parts of the CIS, which fits with the 
geographic and historical ties the region had with this area. It is the degree of intensity 
of the ties with CIS countries that is striking due to it conflicting with the national policy 
taken by the Russian state which sought to dominate, rather than cooperate with the 
former Soviet states.291 Furthermore, the economic reality and the need for trade to 
boost the regional economy meant that economic ties with the CIS were largely 
constructed on the basis of cash payment rather than through barter (which would flood 
the region with potentially unwanted goods), to the extent that by the end of the 1990s 
barter made up less than 2.5% of foreign economic turnover.292 
Developing a national profile 
The increasing national profile Rossel’ enjoyed as came as a result of consolidating his 
connections to different groups and branches of the state and in some cases to the 
international community, as noted above. By the end of the El’tsin decade, being seen 
to be at the very heart of events concerning Sverdlovsk Oblast and the Urals was the 
standard for Rossel’, allowing him to appear dominant in the eyes of the public and the 
elite on key issues of national importance, ranging from economic policy to the state of 
the military, and clearly identifying him alongside other federal political actors. In a 
national survey conducted in the middle of July 1999, Rossel’ was rated the 11th most 
influential politician by businessmen in the country, the 18th most influential political 
                                                 
290
 ‘Godovoi otchet osnovnye itogi razvitiia mezhdunarodnykh vneshneekonomicheskikh sviazei 
Sverdlovskoi oblasti v 1999 g.’, GASO F. R-2827 O.1 D.109 L.6; ‘Otchet o vystavke promyhshlennosti 
Sverdlovskoi Oblasti’, GASO F. R-2827, O.1 D.64 L.6-11 ( a report on an exhibition held by Sverdlovsk 
enterprises in Uzbekistan, 14-17 April 1998) 
291
 ‘Godovoi otchet osnovnykh itog razvitii mezhdunarodnykh vneshneekonomicheskikh sviazei 
Sverdlovskoi Oblasti v 1999 g.’ GASO, F. R-2827 O.1 D.109 L.6 
292
 ‘Osnovnye itogi vneshneekonomicheskoi deiatel’nosti predpriiatii i organizatsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti 
za ianv-dek 1998 g.’,GASO, F. R.2827 O.1 D.87, L.2 
 156 
figure by politicians and the 13th most influential overall; the only regional leaders 
ahead of him in the ratings were Iurii Luzhkov, Minitimir Shaimiev and Aman-Geldy 
Tuleev, the Governor of Kemerovo Oblast, who had stood in the Presidential elections 
of 1991, 1996 (and was standing again in 2000).293 
 
Alongside the development of his national political persona came the dropping of the 
aggressive, informal and unilateral approach to Moscow that had previously gained him 
popular support at home but had antagonised groups at the centre. Following his 
successful election as governor in 1995, Rossel’’s demeanour towards federal politics 
was based on cooperation with Moscow and concentrated on economic issues, such 
as the regional military-industrial complex (MIC) rather than issues of state structure. 
Earlier, during his time as Chairman of the Oblispolkom, Rossel’ had sought to support 
the MIC in the region by winning permission from Moscow to sell a proportion of the 
military equipment produced in the region without having to go through the centralised 
structures that dealt with arms sales.294 The conversion of the military-industrial 
complex had shifted some of the region’s industrial production away from military 
goods, but the defence industry remained critical to the region. In order to both 
stimulate production and to advertise the range of military hardware produced in the 
region, the Sverdlovsk administration decided to hold an arms fair, the Ural Arms-Expo, 
in Nizhnii Tagil in 1999, to demonstrate equipment being made by defence enterprises 
in Sverdlovsk Oblast and other Russian regions.295 With permission from Moscow to do 
this, particularly as foreign guests were invited to attend, the arms fair was seen on a 
national level as positive action taken to stimulate this sector, all under Rossel’’s 
leadership. Such an exhibition was an important development in the post-Soviet 
defence industry, as it attempted to restore the reputation of Russian military goods 
following the very public humiliation of the Russian armed forces and its outdated 
hardware in the Chechen conflict, particularly among former buyers of Soviet 
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weaponry, but also within the context of the restoration of the role of the military of the 
Russian state that has happened under Putin. Long-term support for the military-
industrial complex paid off for Rossel’ inter-regionally and at the centre, resulting in a 
decision by Vice-Prime Minister Ilia Klebanov to turn the Expo into an annual event to 
be held in Sverdlovsk Oblast rather than in the more internationally accessible and 
infrastructurally-developed Moscow region. 296 In a precursor to the demonstrations of 
personal power chosen by President Putin who has participated in a number of ‘stunts’ 
to portray himself as a strong leader, Rossel’ opened the 1999 Ural Arms-Expo by 
flying into the ‘poligon’  (exercise grounds) in a Mig-29 fighter jet.297 This symbolism 
portrayed Rossel’ as a key player in the Russian defence sector, and was popularly 
well-received in keeping with Rossel’’s political strategy for regional dominance while 
also increasing his national profile. Yet, despite his strong recognition as a political 
figure at the national level, Rossel’ never made the leap to become a federal politician. 
He became more involved with the Russian government in 1998, under Prime Minister 
Evgenii Primakov as part of the Russian government Cabinet of Ministers and 
continued to play a minor advisory role under Sergei Stepashin and Vladimir Putin, but 
faded into the background nationally as federal politics moved on to the struggle 
between the two new political parties, Edinstvo (Unity) and Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiia 
(Fatherland-All Russia) at the end of 1999, leaving no free space in the public arena for 
figures, like Rossel’, who attempted to participate nationally without being in either of 
these two parties.298 
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Conclusions 
The release of regional power elites from the authority of the Communist Party 
structure created the necessity for actors to seek to gain control over the resources 
they required to further their institutional goals. Where this was possible, the result was 
a consolidation of power and expansion of influence over others. The examples of 
Rossel’’s actions above demonstrate how he participated in existing networks and 
created new opportunities at the federal, inter-regional and international level, 
increasing his stature in the eyes of competing forces. For central government actors, 
the development of Rossel’’s relationship with El’tsin as explained in the previous 
chapter, meant that they were forced to accommodate such a prominent regional 
figure, failing in their attempts to bring him under their influence rather than being able 
to marginalise him and other regional leaders as subordinate to their wishes.  
 
The fragmentation of central power prompted attempts by political actors at all levels to 
monopolise power resources. Nonetheless, in this fragmented state, regional leaders 
had to accumulate legitimacy within the regional leadership cohort so as not to remain 
parochial and in order to be able to lobby federal decision makers. The construction of 
horizontal ties, combined with the steady trajectory of increasing his national profile, 
developed new informal and personal ties with actors and consolidated older ties that 
could be called upon to get certain things done. The examples considered in this 
chapter demonstrate participation in networks placing Rossel’ both at the centre and at 
the periphery of network relations, demonstrating above all his ability to put himself at 
the heart of events concerning the regions. 
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Chapter 6 
Constructing the identity of patron: Rossel’ as the benevolent 
leader of Sverdlovsk Oblast’  
This chapter focuses on the process by which political power within Sverdlovsk Oblast 
was controlled on the basis of Rossel’’s development of vertically-downward networks 
and patronage over sub-national actors within the region. It questions how his authority 
was constructed and consolidated, before considering the requirement for its continual 
maintenance in order to ensure that he remained the most significant figure within the 
region. By looking at how new forms of political, economic and social capital were 
managed and manipulated the chapter deepens understanding of how the Sverdlovsk 
regional regime was constructed. Focusing on the strengths and successes of the 
creation of a new regional elite to insulate his regime within his territory, it fulfils a 
secondary function to demonstrate the ease with which regional actors allegiances 
could be controlled under Rossel’’s authority. 
 
With the political structures of each region determined by the individuals appointed to 
run them, the personal capacities and resources that they could gather around them 
influenced the development and consolidation of new political regimes. Regional power 
structures relied heavily on the use of informal personal ties and semi-formal 
institutional factors in order to retain patronage over clients. The previous chapters 
have already raised the issue of central regime approval and regional elite approval is 
discussed here through the manner in which it was harnessed to elevate Rossel’’s 
status from appointed administrator to a charismatic and popular leader. The specific 
Urals identity, with its heavy industry, productivity and a popular notion of being the 
fundament of the country (opornoi krai derzhavy) at its core, was expertly revitalised 
under Rossel’ to create a regionalist political culture to develop an atmosphere of 
regional self-reliance. This political culture served the purpose of providing moral 
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legitimacy to Rossel’’s leadership as the region (and the Urals’) struggled to survive the 
fallout of the ‘political Chernobyl’ of the Soviet collapse.299  
 
In terms of the boundary control approach to internal regional politics, this chapter, and 
the subsequent chapter focusing on the conflict between Rossel’ and Ekaterinburg city 
Mayor Arkadii Chernetskii, demonstrates the aspects of ensuring the regional elite’s 
reliance on Rossel. Using the pursuit of the Urals Republic, Rossel’ initiated his own 
transformation from appointee to popular leader, allowing him to occupy the very centre 
of regional life. With regards to the general public, public identification with his 
leadership qualities stemmed from his ability to assure society that he was not a 
politician, while at the same time convincing the regional elites that he was an industrial 
manager that enjoyed political influence (in a similar way to Luzhkov and Shaimiev). 
The significant cultivation of political resources focused elite support around himself, 
creating a personalised bureaucratic regime based on loyalty and shared beliefs over 
the identity, economic potential and future role of the Sverdlovsk region within the 
federal structure of the country.  
Charismatic leadership and the cultivation of legitimacy 
The stability of inter-elite relations and the control over interests within regions have 
already been suggested as influencing the type of regional political system and 
structures that emerged in the Russian regions of the 1990s, determining the forms of 
transition from that of a ‘winner-takes-all’ scenario of dominance by the strongest 
political actor to ‘elite bargaining’ and the emergence of political competition.300 Control 
over fractured political and social groups depended greatly on the abilities of individuals 
appointed by the centre to gather resources around them. Weber’s notion of the 
charismatic leader was placed in the struggle to overcome a heavily bureaucratic state 
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structure and remove the policy making process from the grip of such a bureaucracy 
and replacing it with a figure attributed with certain qualities that can’t be found in 
others.301 Such a leader turns popular elections into votes of confidence in the person 
rather than the policies and monopolises the political space to the extent that 
expressions by members of their own support group are devoid of individuality and 
reflect the dominance of the principal actor. Fundamentally, the existence of a 
‘charismatic leader’ can only be defined in individual terms, whereby the expression of 
individualism by a particular figure must by consequence suppress the individuality of 
those that follow him.302 The conditions of early 1990s Russian political power can be 
seen to be conducive to the emergence of a number of ‘charismatic’ political figures, 
nationally and regionally, who were able to occupy the space left by the collapse of the 
communist ideology. The rise of the individual has been viewed as typical of many 
Russian regional regimes in the 1990s, where individual leaders were allowed by the 
centre to raise their profiles as high as they possibly could, not only in those cases 
discussed in chapter three, but also Evgenii Nazdratenko of Primorskii Krai, Kirsan 
Iliumzhinov of Kalmykia, Boris Nemtsov in Nizhnii Novgorod, and Murtaza Rakhimov of 
Bashkortostan, to name a few.303  From this we can put forward the argument that the 
El’tsin decade was an era of political individualism, with power at all levels underlined 
by single figures or small groups each trying to push their own agendas and frequently 
working against the interests, and the stability, of the Russian state. The creation of 
Rossel’’s patronage over Sverdlovsk Oblast and Urals actors should be viewed from 
this starting point, as one of a number of regional leaders bringing decision making into 
their own hands by preventing other actors from promoting their own identities. As 
noted in chapter three, one of Weber’s main structural political concerns was to ask 
how an individual politician could avoid being led by a bureaucracy but instead impose 
policy making upon them. From this evaluation, a ‘charismatic’ figure, who met the 
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demands of the social conditions and needs of the populace being governed, would 
receive popular backing to make those around him or her act as directed. 
  
Rossel’ propelled himself into the Sverdlovsk popular consciousness, personalising the 
Urals Republic project as his own and framing the issue as a struggle between himself 
(as representative of the region’s best interests) and the bureaucracy of the state. It is 
from this point that we can trace the origins of his transition from a Soviet-trained 
administrator to charismatic leader. In conveying his regionalist idea to the public, 
Rossel’ shaped the values and expectations of society, converting his political status 
from appointee to that of a popular leader of the region.304 The pursuit of federal 
relations on terms different to those set out by the centre presented Rossel’ with the 
opportunity to articulate the idea to Sverdlovsk society that the region would be better 
off if it was given the right to resolve its own socioeconomic problems on its own terms.  
Using the Urals identity and values noted above, the Urals Republic rationale fostered 
an ‘us’ (Uraltsy) versus ‘them’ (Moskvichi) attitude with Rossel’ playing the role of the 
leader that could meet the needs of the region.305 Capitalising on the popularity gained 
from his unsuccessful brinkmanship against the Kremlin, the creation of a political 
movement and his decision to stay in regional politics rather than take up a national 
position (see previous chapter) allowed Rossel’ to dominate the popular vote within the 
region, bringing the regional legislature under his personal leadership as well as 
representation to the centre through the Federation Council, before beginning an 
assault on his replacement appointee as governor of the region. A technocratic 
approach taken to building the regional political system played a stabilising role in 
Sverdlovsk, and the consistency of a trusted core of actors in Rossel’’s inner circle not 
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only dominated the political space, but facilitated the construction of a bureaucracy that 
was responsive to his patronage. 
Rossel’’s core support – the parochialization of internal political power  
For the second time in the twentieth century, the Russian provinces were faced with 
the task of constructing entirely new systems of governance for regional affairs. 
Revolutionary change at the regional level of political power was subject to the actions 
of those cadres available on the spot and their will and ability to implement the changes 
demanded at the national level. Following the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks’ 
regional appointees built their regional structures around figures with whom they had 
previously worked with (and fought alongside) in the revolutionary struggle.306 As 
already noted, many of the heads of regional administration were appointed from the 
regional Oblispolkom as the perception was that they were not discredited through their 
ties to the Communist leadership and had the necessary experience to take charge of 
a region. These figures enjoyed extensive networks as a resource to draw upon in 
order to fill administrative positions. While this new regional elite had been created 
somewhat artificially, appointed rather than emerging through a process of 
legitimisation, common to all was a necessity to demonstrate an ability to rule, 
particularly by showing control over the decision-making processes in the region. This 
new crop of regional leaders had to make their authority felt within the political space, 
including through knowledge of the specifics of a territory and other actors as well as 
how and where to apply pressure or allow a freer hand in order to consolidate their 
power.307   
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The appointments made by Rossel’ to his regional administration reveal no strong 
ideological tendencies. Focusing on stability in administration, Rossel’’s early 
personnel choices were eased by the organizational weakness of the democratic 
movement, which had been so influential in Sverdlovsk during the collapse of the 
Soviet regime, but failed to make use of this position due to an absence of individual 
figures with experience of actual administration. It is unremarkable, therefore, that 
many of his appointments had Communist Party backgrounds and training (they were 
largely taken from the lower branches of the nomenklatura, such as district and town 
executive committees), as the overriding quality that they possessed was the 
necessary experience to help manage a complex region such as Sverdlovsk Oblast. 
Largely speaking, the figures that Rossel’ appointed to leading positions held similar 
perspectives with regards to the economic regeneration required. By appointing 
experienced individuals that had been loyal to the previous hierarchy of public 
administration, Rossel’ lay the foundations for the creation of a personalised 
bureaucracy that would serve his primary political interest in the economic revival of the 
region rather than pursuing their own agendas. Through exercising close personal 
control over appointments, based on experience and association with himself and 
trusted individuals, Rossel’ made his role as patron the cornerstone of the construction 
of his political regime. The lack of will from the centre to interfere in appointments made 
by the head of regional administration meant there was no pressure on Rossel’ to 
include members of the pro-reform movements in his own political team.308 Thus, upon 
Rossel’’s appointment, the ideological struggle that had gripped the region during 
perestroika was almost instantly replaced by a ‘pragmatic’ set of political actors, with 
industrial and managerial backgrounds ruled by economic values, and having strong 
opinions on state-structural issues and ideas of economic independence from Moscow. 
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A further feature of the political structure built by Rossel’ was the stability of the core 
political actors within the region. As with his relationship with the president, Rossel’’s 
regional network was based on the personalisation of relations between the key actors. 
Offering a great deal of trust to leading members of his administration and the political 
elite in the running of the region, Rossel’ reaped the benefits of a high level of political 
harmony and satisfaction amongst his supporters and a bureaucracy that was highly 
responsive to his demands. In particular, the close relationship between the executive 
and legislative branch during his second term as governor following the successful 
gubernatorial elections of September 1995 was based on the previous construction of 
the Transformation of the Urals political association and his Chairmanship of the 
Regional Duma and gave Rossel’ a ‘traditional’ system of personalised power within 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, whereby the participants’ allegiance to his person allowed for both 
branches to entirely represent his own leadership interests.  
 
Singling out the most influential members of Rossel’’s network in the region, helps to 
demonstrate the importance of personalised relations in dictating the pattern of 
relations that placed him in total control of the region (see table 6.1). The most 
important members of Rossel’’s Sverdlovsk network were Aleksei Vorob’ev (who in 
November 1991 became the Director of Rossel’’s apparatus), and Viacheslav 
Surganov, a RF CPD deputy and the head of administration of Verkhniaia Pyshma (a 
satellite town near Ekaterinburg) who moved into regional politics after the dismissal of 
the Legislative branch by El’tsin in October 1993. Both of these figures were active 
political supporters of Rossel’ in the region over a sustained period of time and were 
heavily involved in the pursuit of greater federal powers to the region; Vorob’ev as one 
of the key ideologues of the Urals Republic, and Surganov in playing a leading role in 
the 1995 regional Charter and subsequent bilateral agreements with Moscow.309 They 
both had the characteristics that were important to Rossel’’s leadership; an 
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understanding of the economic issues facing the region and the necessity to increase 
resources flowing inwards, administrative experience (within the Communist Party 
organs of the region), and personal loyalty to Rossel’ without any public expression of 
personal ambition. Their relationship with Rossel’ was reflected in their progression and 
consolidation within positions in the regional political elite – Vorob’ev rose to become 
the Chairman of the Oblast government in 1996 and Surganov became the Chairman 
of the Oblast Duma following Rossel’’s victory in 1995 gubernatorial elections (and was 
therefore Senator to the Federation Council alongside Rossel’ in the period 1996-
1998). In the post-1995 regional political conditions, the triangle of power with Rossel’ 
at the pinnacle and Surganov and Vorob’ev supporting his leadership, dominated the 
executive and legislative branches of Sverdlovsk Oblast’ and provided the basis for 
political authority within the region. A settled system of personal power and distribution 
of authorities alongside the common values that they held meant that there was no 
need for Vorob’ev or Surganov to challenge their patron or seek alternative roles 
(although the promise of future succession was never ruled out).310 Both Surganov and 
Vorob’ev made frequent public demonstrations of their loyalty to Rossel’ downplaying 
their personal roles within the region and highlighting the leadership and good 
management of the regional governor, as both became increasingly identifiable with 
Rossel’’s political system.311 From outside of the network these three figures were often 
seen as a single ‘cohesive’ political unit, although Rossel’ consistently provided the 
public face. In relations with the federal centre throughout the 1990s they worked in 
harmony to block attempts by federal actors to divide and rule the regional elite (an 
example of this can be seen in 1995 when the Head of the Presidential Administration, 
Sergei Filatov, attempted to persuade the regional Duma to delay the consideration of 
gubernatorial elections and was met with firm and public rejection by Surganov, who 
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echoed Rossel’’s opinion that gubernatorial elections should proceed as soon as 
possible).312  
 
As patron, Rossel’ rewarded both with long political careers in the region. Vorob’ev 
followed Rossel’ from the regional administration to the Oblast Duma and back again, 
as head of his gubernatorial administration (a position of great influence similar to the 
role of head of the Presidential Administration at the national level). When the third-
placed candidate in the 1995 gubernatorial elections, Valerii Trushnikov, was 
controversially removed from the post of Head of Government, to which he had been 
appointed in return for electoral support for Rossel’ in the second round, under the 
lightweight accusation of ‘too much politicking’, Vorob’ev was appointed Head of the 
Regional Government.313 While the regional Supreme Court later ruled Trushnikov’s 
dismissal to have been illegal, Vorob’ev continued in his new role, with pressure 
applied to Trushnikov not to seek to return to his Government post despite the courts’ 
ruling.314 Surganov played the role of Rossel’’s key vassal in the Regional Duma. He 
was second on the party list of Rossel’’s political association ‘Transformation of the 
Urals” (Preobrazhenie Urala) (hereafter PU) for the 1994 Oblast Duma elections (after 
Rossel’ himself), and was later appointed its Chairman. In the tradition of post-
communist Russian political parties, PU was a strongly personalised movement, and 
while, as governor, Rossel’ was no longer the official head of the association he clearly 
remained its ideological leader. 
  
A third figure should be added to the inner ruling elite of Sverdlovsk Oblast – that of 
Aleksandr Levin, the prominent press-secretary to Rossel’ who cultivated the public 
aspect of the regional leader at a time when individualism in leadership was re-
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emerging following the bureaucratization of leadership under the Soviet system. The 
role of maintaining a positive image of the regional leadership fell to Levin in late 1991, 
and was an innovation that was quickly copied by a large number of regional politicians 
throughout the country. Levin was a low-level journalist from the local ‘Sverdlovsk 
Evening News’ (Vechernii Sverdlovsk) (later re-named Vechernii Ekaterinburg), and he 
rose to become as influential on Rossel’ as Surganov and Vorob’ev.315 Once again, the 
relationship was based on a strong element of loyalty from the client to the patron, as 
Levin demonstrated an allegiance to the traditional power system with Rossel' as the 
unquestionable master of the house. Strikingly, Levin remained in the same post from 
his appointment in 1991 until Rossel’’s removal from regional politics in 2009; this 
included resigning his position as press secretary to the Head of Regional 
Administration upon Rossel’’s removal by El’tsin in 1993, acting in the same role when 
Rossel’ was Chairman of the Oblast Duma, before being amongst the first to be 
restored to his prior position following the 1995 gubernatorial elections.316 His role was 
particularly effective in the early 1990s through the use of radio broadcasts, question 
and answer programmes and regular regional television appearances, bringing the 
political elite closer to the general public in a way that it had not been since El’tsin was 
First Party Secretary of the region.317  
 
     Rossel’ 
        Levin      
 
Surganov   Vorob’ev 
Figure 6.1 – relations between the key members of Rossel’’s Sverdlovsk network  
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The settled nature of the hierarchy of power and participation in the political domains 
patronised by Rossel’ did, however, result in difficulties over time in attracting new 
political actors into the ruling elite, as it was clear to participants that the possibility for 
career advancement higher up the power chain were limited. While the creation of PU 
was primarily to provide a vehicle for election to the Regional Duma and a controllable 
faction once there, it gave a boost to lower-level members of the political elite who 
wanted to receive the political benefits of aligning themselves with Rossel’ and 
increase their role and standing in the regional political environment. The most visible 
and locally significant new actor that emerged from this movement was Anton Bakov, 
an Oblast Duma deputy from Ekaterinburg, who in the period 1995-1998, emerged 
from within the pro-Rossel’ branch of the newly elected political elite of the region. 
Young and ambitious, Bakov’s provocative manner was beneficial to Rossel’, who 
looked on benevolently as Bakov made frequent personal attacks on members of the 
opposition within the region (for example, labelling members of Strakhov’s regional 
administration as criminals, strongly criticising Ekaterinburg Mayor Arkadii Chernetskii 
and standing against him in Mayoral elections).318 Bakov was rewarded with a 
prominent position within PU and played a leading role in bilateral negotiations with the 
federal centre in 1996. He was regarded by outsiders as something of a prodigal son to 
Rossel’, and is reported to have been repeatedly forgiven transgressions against the 
regional leader.319 Ultimately Rossel’’s demand for absolute loyalty required him to 
expel Bakov from his close circle in 1998 following the latter’s brief flirtation with a rival 
regional political movement, Mai.320 While seen as something of a maverick figure in 
the region, Bakov’s swift rise and fall demonstrated the drawback of the stability of the 
top-level elite for aspiring political elites who were impatient in seeking career growth 
but found themselves faced with a career ceiling, where the only positions available for 
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the foreseeable future were committee chairmanships or departmental positions within 
the regional government. The role that Bakov played underlines Rossel’’s exercise of 
the boundary control strategy. By excommunicating Bakov from his immediate network, 
the Sverdlovsk leader was ensuring that no potential challenge to his authority could 
develop, offering a warning to other actors of the consequences of challenging from 
within, and reiterating that members of his network relied upon his patronage for 
development.  
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Table 6.1 – Key figures in Rossel’’s political elite network 
Name of 
actor 
Position held 
1991-1993 
Position held 
1993-1995 
Role in 
Preobrazhenie 
Urala / 
Preobrazhenie 
Otechestvo 
political 
movements? 
Position following 
1995 
gubernatorial 
elections 
Viacheslav 
Surganov 
RF CPD 
Deputy; Head 
of 
Administration 
of Verkhniaia 
Pyshma 
Sverdlovsk 
Oblast 
Duma 
Deputy 
Second on Party 
list in 1996 
Chairman of 
Oblast Duma 
(Lower chamber) 
and member of 
Federation 
Council 
Aleksei 
Vorobev 
 
Director of 
Department of 
Head of 
Administration 
Chairman of 
Oblast 
Duma 
Apparatus 
No First deputy 
Chairman of 
Government; 
Chairman of 
Government 
(1996) 
Aleksandr 
Levin 
Press 
Secretary to 
Rossel’ 
Press 
Secretary to 
Rossel’ 
No Press Secretary 
to Rossel’ 
Anton 
Bakov 
 Oblast 
Duma 
deputy 
Yes (expelled in 
1998) 
Deputy of Oblast 
Duma; Failed 
candidate in 
Ekaterinburg 
mayoral elections; 
Failed candidate 
in 1999 
Sverdlovsk 
gubernatorial 
elections 
 
The ability to parochialise regional power lies in the ability to make the elite reliant on 
the patron’s goodwill for their career position, development and socio-economic status. 
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While on one hand the patron must ensure that they are the only actor that can give a 
final decision on preservation or exclusion from the elite, they must also take positive 
action to retain the loyalty and services of members of the lower branches of the 
patronage structure. The process of securing patronage over elected members of the 
regional political establishment followed Rossel’’s personal career developments 
inversely, increasing as his political position with regards to the federal centre declined 
in the period 1993-1995, providing the foundation for regional political domination 
following the 1995 gubernatorial elections. 
 
Further to the role that the individuals noted above played, Rossel’’s patronage 
extended to the political association that he used as a vehicle to gain control over the 
legislative branch of power in 1994. In the period from 1991 up to the dissolution of the 
Regional Soviet, the executive and legislative branches found common ground on 
which to focus their activities; close cooperation in the development and lobbying of the 
Urals Republic, where only small pockets of opposition to the idea of extra regional 
powers and responsibilities existed allowing the regional leadership to develop its plans 
for renewed centre-regional relations in cooperation with elected members of the new 
regional political elite. Once removed from his position as Head of Regional 
Administration, there was a need for Rossel’ to initiate a vehicle that could gather in, 
develop and control the political capital he had accumulated at home over the Urals 
Republic process. With election to the Federation Council and the regional Duma being 
all but guaranteed even before he announced his participation, the formation of 
Preobrazhenie Urala consolidated a broad cross-section of the regional political and 
economic elite under a single, ‘personalised’ umbrella. Its successful performance in 
the 1994 Oblast Duma elections stemmed from Rossel’’s own popular legitimacy 
(which was based on his political charisma and the perception that he had been badly 
let-down by the federal elite). For the deputies that were elected to the regional Duma 
under Preobrazhenie Urala’s banner, it is almost impossible to single any of them out 
for any personal advocacy of political beliefs, rather they were comprehensively 
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absorbed into the Rossel’ political machine and elected on the basis that they were 
Rossel’’s people regardless of any personalisation of their electoral campaigns. The 
appointment of Surganov to the chairmanship of the regional Duma (appointed by and 
replacing the patron) returned the regional political space to the status quo ante of the 
early 1990s of total cooperation between regional executive and legislative 
branches.321   
 
The leadership of Preobrazhenie Urala closely controlled the legislative agenda and 
deputies’ voting behaviour within the legislature. Even after its less successful 
performance in the 1998 regional Duma elections, where it lost its majority and status 
as the largest party in the legislature to the rival Nash Dom Nash Gorod (NDNG) 
movement led by Arkadii Chernetskii, PU preserved its dominance by lobbying 
deputies from other fractions into support for its motions, thus re-confirming the 
influence association with Rossel’ had over political actors. This influence was seen 
most clearly when NDNG attempted to elect one of its own members as Speaker of the 
Oblast Duma, with Rossel’’s movement able to successfully counter by convincing 
deputies from other fractions to support Surganov to continue as Speaker.322 
 
Despite the existence of a competitive political system based around political parties in 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel’’s ability to link the activities of his clients to his personal 
control (including the monopoly of influence over the Preobrazhenie Urala movement) 
demonstrated the wide reach of his power, making it extremely difficult for deputies and 
members of various levels of administration to seek alternative patrons.323 Access to 
administrative resources held by Rossel’ regulated the loyalty of lower ranked 
members of the political elite, as competing forces found it impossible to break into the 
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decision making process. As a member of Rossel’’s staff during the 1990s explained, 
pressure on elected members of the regional Duma could be exerted through material 
benefits received by deputies according to their positions: 
 
[Rossel’] had one important characteristic – he supported the elites. He always found 
them work, for example, if the head of a municipality wasn’t re-elected or if he himself 
removed them. He understood that the political space was not huge and that it was 
against his interests to provoke the emergence of opposition. And so, he had different 
ways of pressuring them, particularly in the regional Duma. We had a cunning law; a 
deputy was elected for four years, and given a flat allowing them to grow into political life 
in Ekaterinburg. This was an expensive luxury, not all were wealthy. Those four years 
would pass by and for them to keep such benefits they would be offered a move into the 
regional government, or a ministry, or the administration, basically, they could become a 
bureaucrat. Or else Rossel’ would find them alternative work. And of course, this lever 
was used, and used to dilute the opposition. As a rule, deputies spent their first two years 
of a mandate in active opposition, then they would pause and think, what does the future 
hold for me? And so, they would begin to do as they were told...and leave any thoughts of 
opposition behind. This is how opposition from Chernetskii’s supporters was broken up. 
This approach worked; a deputy would suddenly feel insecure about his future – they 
may have come from Nizhnii Tagil, or somewhere like Sukhoi Log, arrived in 
Ekaterinburg, settled for four years, children at school or university, and suddenly they 
were threatened with having to leave this all behind. This was the system used to 
pressure deputies.
324 
 
Although, while he exercised close control over the accumulation and distribution of 
political capital, Rossel’ was not punitive towards clients that acted against him in the 
way that El’tsin dealt with clients that offended him, limiting action to little more than 
expulsion from his patronage, as in the case of Bakov.325   
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With the structure of the regional political system having been prescribed in the 
regional charter by Rossel’ and his team prior to his election as governor in 1995, his 
return as regional leader allowed him to begin the process of forming and implementing 
these aims. The agreement of a series of bilateral agreements reached with the centre 
in late 1995 further consolidated reliance on the regional executive; for example, one 
such agreement allowed the regional governor the right to appoint regional heads of 
federal branches of executive power, noticeably increasing the tendency towards 
personal control over all aspects of the regional political space.326 Previously Moscow 
had appointed people to positions in the region that were responsible to federal 
branches of power, maintaining the separation of federal interests from regional ones, 
however, the terms of the agreement clearly shifted the balance in favour of the 
regional leadership, further establishing themselves as their own, strongly bordered 
organizational entity within the Russian state. 
 
Administrative influence extended to local self-government, which although 
constitutionally separate from direct subordination to state authorities was subjected to 
pressure from Rossel’s executive leadership.327 Members of local self-government 
formations advocated the transfer of greater powers from regional jurisdiction to the 
local level (specifically to mayors), a tendency that was particularly visible in the 
regional capital, Ekaterinburg (see the next chapter). The argument from the regional 
leadership was that there existed a lack of clarity regarding the integration of local self-
government into the new Russia, with heads of municipal formations and districts 
enjoying too much independence from regional power at the expense of the efficiency 
of the state – a position which Rossel’ had no trouble in internally reconciling with his 
own demands for more independence from the federal centre, no matter how 
contradictory this appeared on the outside. By the beginning of 1997, the majority of 
leadership positions in local self-government had been popularly elected in Sverdlovsk 
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Oblast, but the regional executive branch voiced concerns that its influence over local 
self-government formations and the right to remove local actors had been 
diminished.328 Such a lack of oversight over local actors threatened the patrimonial 
bureaucratic system that was at the heart of Rossel’’s power, subverting the system of 
hierarchical authority in the region as local actors could potentially work outside of the 
electoral mechanisms that constructed reliance on the Rossel’ political machine for 
their positions. To counter this, Rossel’ imposed six administrative districts at the 
regional level to which he appointed prefects to act as a regulatory link on behalf of the 
regional executive over the heads of local self-government on the basis that this 
connection would simplify the ability of the regional authorities to respond to local 
needs. The introduction of such a mechanism of control over local self-government was 
a motion towards dragging local self-government into a vertical system of regional 
power to make sure that there was no area of political life outside of the reach of the 
‘organization’ of power.329 Appointed prefects held no financial authority over local self-
government and few administrative resources to wield, but they provided the regional 
executive branch with the flow of information about the actions of municipal formations, 
and a threat to local self-government formations encouraging them to coordinate and 
clear their actions with the regional executive.330  
 
The pattern emerging by the late 1990s, shows that regionally, Rossel’ had 
successfully ‘parochialised’ his own vertically integrated political system, maximising 
his hegemony over the region and detaching the Sverdlovsk political system from 
reliance on the federal centre in a way that the large majority of regions were unable to 
do. The stability of political actors, the loyalty they showed to the patron and the high 
level of trust invested in them, as well as the development of a party mechanism to 
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amalgamate and direct their level of influence in regional politics all contributed to the 
development of Rossel’ from crisis manager to establishing total control over the 
Oblast. Having appointed delegates to roles within his hierarchy, Rossel’ (assisted by 
Surganov, Vorob’ev, and the political weight of the Preobrazhenie Urala association) 
did not allow them to act for themselves in return for providing the loyalty of the 
electorate as Shaimiev allowed in Tatarstan, but instead actively controlled and 
managed the actions of his network in a way that was closer to the Luzhkov model, 
giving his clients clear limits to their scope and functions. It is worth underlining that 
such a model of power was centred on the continuation of Rossel’ in the leading 
position of the region, and by the end of the 1990s to publicly re-affirm his credentials 
he stood for re-election in a bitter contest with his main rival, Chernetskii.  
Protecting regional industry 
Protecting and incorporating regional economic interests under the umbrella of 
Rossel’’s political structure diversified reliance on the regional leader, extending it 
further than the political elite to encompass the regional industrial elite (and by 
association large swathes of the regional population reliant on regional industry for their 
livelihood). With the breakdown of the Soviet Union’s planning, production and 
distribution system, industry found itself cut adrift from finance, with neither orders nor 
vital raw materials required for production and short of material goods and money for 
the payment and satisfaction of workers’ everyday needs. Under Egor Gaidar’s 
economic reforms in 1992, it quickly became clear to the national economic elite that 
the state could no longer afford to carry the cost of loss-making sectors that were of 
much less importance to the new Russian state than they had been to the Soviet 
Union.331  
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That there was little choice for the regional government to take over control of the 
industrial base in Sverdlovsk Oblast is clear –in its two largest cities (Ekaterinburg and 
Nizhnii Tagil), and numerous other towns and districts within the Oblast, the military-
industrial complex employed the majority of the population, providing them with 
housing, education, child care and, above all, work. An estimated contraction of more 
than four fifths the number of orders from the state for defence-related products in 
1992-3 left the entire sector nationally struggling to pay wages, produce goods, 
undertake conversion, and keep the factory gates open.332 Large industrial enterprises, 
such as the Uralmash and Khimmash complexes in Ekaterinburg, and Uralvagonzavod 
and Nizhnii Tagil Metallurgical Plant in Nizhnii Tagil, found themselves adrift from 
central protection and entered into an informal agreement with Rossel’. While on the 
one hand, Rossel’ was to act as the patron of these enterprises in order to represent 
their interests to the centre, in return the Sverdlovsk region’s industrial enterprises 
would support him by maintaining the social obligations listed above. For these 
enterprises, Rossel’ was an entirely acceptable patron due to his previous experience 
as the director of a large enterprise in the region, his vocal support for keeping control 
of industry within the Urals, and certainly his perceived connection to El’tsin.333  
 
The privatization of industry and property prompted a struggle for control over 
economic and industrial resources in all regions. Due to greater access to finance and 
influential decision makers who held sway over the privatization process at the federal 
centre, Moscow-based elites found themselves with an advantage in gaining control 
over profitable regional branches of industry. Furthermore, the opening up of formerly 
closed regions to foreign-based business interests who slowly participated in the 
privatization process increased the threat to regional leaders of losing control over 
valuable sectors of the economic and social landscape of their territories, who put 
forward the argument that federal legislation on privatization was allowing outsiders to 
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acquire property at knock-down prices at the expense of interests within the region.334 
In Sverdlovsk Oblast, there was clear political capital to be gained by retaining control 
and influence over this sector, and the subsequent strategy of the leadership was to 
protect regional industry from outsiders (both Moscow and foreign).335 In a region 
where a large majority of the labour force worked in the industrial giants, by attempting 
to ensure that ownership remained in the Urals and protecting jobs, Rossel’ was able to 
build strong, grass-roots political support. Workers within the production branch of the 
organization felt happier working for their own (svoi) than being subject to the risk of 
being acquired by outsiders. This cultivated a sense of loyalty from industry towards a 
leadership that was working to keep them local. Indeed, reviving the industrial fortunes 
of a region became a cornerstone of Rossel’’s future election strategy, easily 
contributing to his fending off competition in two gubernatorial elections during the 
1990s.336 In the 1995 gubernatorial elections Rossel’, while industry was a major issue, 
centre-regional differences were still at the heart of his campaign, however, by the 
1999 gubernatorial elections, it was argued by one of his electoral strategists that by 
linking his candidacy with the protection of industry, Rossel’ was viewed as the 
guarantor of long-term development against the short-termism of his rival candidates 
who were portrayed as merchants, standing for consumption over production.337 
 
Personalised patronage was again effective amongst the industrial elite as it was with 
the political elite – Rossel’ is reported to have known almost all of the directors and 
senior management of enterprises located within the region on a first-name basis, and 
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travelled extensively around the Oblast to view conditions first-hand.338 Loss-making 
enterprises received support and representation from the regional leadership, including 
forgiving regional taxes for periods and lobbying Moscow for credit lines as well as 
vocally rejecting proposals from the RF government to liquidate some of the industrial 
giants of the region which in its consideration were no longer needed by the country, 
such as Uralvagonzavod and Nizhnii Tagil Metallurgical Plant.339 Both of these factories 
were critical to the socioeconomic structure of the region’s second city, prompting the 
regional government to devise special measures to attempt to revive both plants.340 
 
By characterising himself as an authoritative figure on the difficulties facing industry in 
the region for survival, Rossel’ absorbed the interests of the largest sector of society 
fostering the belief among enterprise management and workers that his policy of taking 
responsibility for the region’s own economic development rather than entrusting it to 
the state was the only possible route that provided for the regeneration of the industrial 
potential of Sverdlovsk Oblast. Reward for this support for industry came in the shape 
of the loyalty of industrial leaders, who notably remained supportive of Rossel’ during 
the period of his removal from the governorship preferring to aligning themselves with 
the fallen leader rather than his replacement, Aleksei Strakhov. To further deepen the 
regional government-industry relationship, a number of its representatives were given 
places on the party lists from Preobrazhenie Urala for the Oblast Duma elections, 
bringing the industrial branches into the political elite of the region. 
Electoral support from society 
It was often the case in Russian politics since the end of communism that public 
opinion and support was an afterthought for political actors that only arises when 
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elections are on the horizon. In the early post-communist period, one of the pressing 
problems for El’tsin’s appointees in the oblasts and krais was one of public legitimacy. 
Under deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, social support for regional political 
leadership fluctuated according to how they were perceived in defending the interests 
of the population from the excesses of economic and political reform.  
 
In the cases of the republics, ethnic nationalism presented political leaders such as 
Tatarstan’s Mintimir Shaimiev, and Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov, with a pre-
existing source of legitimacy, presenting themselves as the leaders of their ethnic 
groups, which carried them into the post-communist era with high levels of popularity. 
However in the oblasts and krais, nationalism was not such an important factor. In 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, while Rossel’’s appointment was a predictable choice, he was 
nonetheless faced with the need to legitimise himself, firstly with regards to the regional 
soviet and secondly, to society.341 After a short period of struggle between the regional 
executive and legislative branches for supremacy, the political cleavage that emerged 
between the region and centre over federal inequality brought them together. On the 
basis of this, and his courting of regional industry, Rossel’ strongly convinced society 
that he had the authority necessary to bring agreement among rival forces in the 
interests of the region, beginning the process of converting himself from presidential 
appointee into ‘charismatic’ regional leader.342 Although the regional soviet was as 
active as Rossel’ in developing the aims and demands for greater rights from the 
centre, it was the regional executive that became the personification of the process, 
quickly adapting to the new political circumstances to use social support as an 
additional resource to presidential approval. By putting the Urals Republic at the heart 
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of his own political persona, Rossel’ outshone the regional Soviet and presented 
himself as the only way to protect the region’s interests from subjugation to outside 
forces.   
 
Two popular strategies were adopted by Rossel’ with regards to the public; firstly, he 
began the process of building a regional political culture in society – this time based on 
finding a new status for the region for a new era. The use of centre-regional relations 
as a banner under which society could rally around Rossel’ stands out because of the 
ease by which it developed. While the regional administration carried out a propaganda 
campaign informing the public in the regional press about the comparatively worse-off 
economic status of Sverdlovsk Oblast to other regions in federal relations, the need for 
the regional elite to convince society of the need to improve its position with regards to 
Moscow has been played down by people involved in the process, noting that the 
Oblast population did not need to be convinced and that there was overwhelming 
public approval for increasing Sverdlovsk Oblast’s status to that of Republic.343 
Secondly, by using some of the tricks that El’tsin had used back in the 1970s and early 
1980s, Rossel’, with the assistance of his press secretary, made himself part of the 
everyday life of the citizens of the region by mixing with them rather than talking to 
them from above. During election cycles there are stories of him repeating El’tsin’s 
habit of abandoning his official cortege and travelling around Ekaterinburg on public 
transport and speaking to citizens about their problems.344 While this can be seen as 
an exercise in PR and electioneering in a way that El’tsin’s actions in the 1970s were 
not, it nevertheless cemented his reputation as working in the interests of the people.345 
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Following his dismissal in November 1993, Rossel’ initiated a change that catapulted 
him from simply being a visible manager to becoming a powerful political operator, 
taking advantage of this perceived wrong to further his identity as someone that would 
battle for the interests of the region against someone who sought to return to the past 
(as Strakhov sought to return the region to subordination to Moscow). Preobrazhenie 
Urala was reliant on the use of his personal identity for its electoral success and the 
electoral legitimization of his leadership at the regional Duma level provided the moral 
authority for him to enter into conflict with Strakhov over the regional Charter, while 
also lowering the stakes for El’tsin to allow gubernatorial elections to proceed in August 
1995. The short period in which public support for Rossel’ can be seen in serious 
decline coincides with the first round of the 1995 gubernatorial election, in which 
Aleksei Strakhov, who had struggled for public support as regional leader, showed 
signs of developing into a serious alternative, at least within the influential city of 
Ekaterinburg, where the urban electorate showed a tendency towards reconciliation 
with Moscow.346 By overcoming the electoral challenge presented by Strakhov, Rossel’ 
obtained the electoral legitimacy that he had wanted since the Urals Republic. Quickly 
re-establishing his former team and continuing as he had done as chairman of the 
Duma, Rossel’ was able to return to the style of his previous term as governor without 
essentially changing anything in the way he did things, and with the added  resounding 
endorsement from society.  
Conclusions 
Constructing the political regime and ensuring that it successfully preserved his power 
stemmed from Rossel’’s pursuit of the preventing other actors from encroaching on his 
position within the region. This could only be achieved through the domination of all of 
the key areas of regional life, actively seeking out and consuming as many potential 
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areas of networks that would prevent his rivals from having the political oxygen to 
mount a threat to him. Through this domination of the key sectors of Sverdlovsk 
society, Rossel’ was able to starve these rivals of sources of political, economic and 
social capital. That political competition did emerge is the subject of the next chapter, 
as we look at how the boundary control strategy was used effectively to counter the 
threat posed by Ekaterinburg Mayor, Arkadii Chernetskii.  
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Chapter 7 
The battle for control of the regional capital: the Rossel’-
Chernetskii conflict 
The final area of operation of the Sverdlovsk regional leader during the 1990s 
considered here focuses on the difficult relationship between Rossel’ and the 
Ekaterinburg Mayor, Arkadii Chernetskii. The conflict between these two figures lasted 
almost the entire decade and continued into the 2000s. The struggle that ensued for 
political control and that divided the regional capital city, Ekaterinburg, and the rest of 
the Oblast, demonstrates the implementation of the ‘boundary control’ strategy and 
how it was used by the regional leadership to suffocate political competition. This 
argument is in contrast to much research carried out in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
which positively highlighted the competitiveness of the region’s political space, while 
failing to characterise the controlled nature of this competition.347 The central focus of 
the chapter is on what became a personal conflict between the governor and mayor, 
with a deeper division between region and regional capital in the political arena of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast running as an undercurrent to this conflict. Disagreement and 
conflict between regional leaders and city mayors was commonplace in the El’tsin 
period, due to the thirst for power among leading individuals, competing ideological 
forces, differences in the possibilities for coercion of actors, competition over the 
control of resources and a lack of legal clarity over local self-government in the new 
state.  Within these intra-territorial conflicts at this time, the struggle between Rossel’ 
and Chernetskii stands out as it developed further than others into a form of 
institutionalised competition that transformed from simple personality politics into 
competing pseudo-political movements.348 While this conflict was publicly exercised 
through the city’s electorate, who were made to distinguish between oblast and city 
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interests, it continued to involve the economic elites of the region at the same time 
behind the public facade. 
Emerging from the shadow of patron-client relations 
In looking at the governor-mayor conflict in Sverdlovsk Oblast we can see the 
breakdown of patron-client relations under conditions where it was prompted by one of 
the sides independently exiting the network. This further develops the understanding of 
the nature of Rossel’’s power (and gubernatorial power as an institution), as it grew 
from informal, pragmatic leadership to seeking greater formalised elite cohesion. 
Patron-client network theory has suggested that it is possible for informal relations to 
continue after roles have been institutionalised, undermining these institutions and 
hindering their development.349 Further, it has been argued that a mutual dependency 
emerges between patron and client over the exchange of resources, stunting the will of 
actors to eventually break free from such ties.350  While it would seem logical to 
suggest that the longer patron-client ties continue, the more likely they are to develop 
into personalised relations, the fractious Rossel’-Chernetskii relationship demonstrates 
the potential for collapse in relations once a client has left the patron’s orbit.  
 
As explained below, Rossel’’s choice of Chernetskii for Ekaterinburg mayor was a 
pragmatic one, prioritising third-party support (industrial elites in this case, rather than a 
functioning bureaucracy) over institutional or personal ties. Once ‘reciprocal 
dependency’351 lost its relevance, Rossel’ found that he no longer enjoyed a position of 
control over Chernetskii’s position – a different outcome to relations enjoyed elsewhere 
in the oblast whereby he was able to retain the loyalties of clients. The short time span 
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of Rossel’’s patronage of Chernetskii (just under two years) and the distinct lack of 
personal ties between the two meant that such dependency between the patron and 
client did not become habit, and once outside of the formal boundaries of the network, 
precluded any sense of loyalty on behalf of Chernetskii towards his former patron, with 
the result that he began to challenge Rossel’’s dominance of the political space and 
allocation of resources to other clients that he had held. Whereas initially the patron-
client ties between them had served to add a layer of legitimacy to their positions, as 
these ties were severed the emerging competition between the two for political power 
at the gubernatorial and mayoral level can be seen as instrumental in the public rather 
than state-legal process of institutionalisation of the political power structure of the 
region, introducing a degree of pluralism and accountability to these positions.  
 
Considering that the breakdown of the formal relationship was caused by external 
factors to the governor-mayor relationship following the reversal of the Urals Republic, 
why did Chernetskii break out of the dyadic patron-client relationship with Rossel? To 
turn this question around, what was different about Chernetskii that made Rossel’ 
unable to retain his loyalty in the same way that he retained the loyalties of the 
industrial and economic elite in the region? Secondly, as he developed into an 
opponent of Rossel’, and became a similarly long-standing political figure in the region, 
how did Chernetskii construct his own political capital outside of this relationship and 
how did it compete with that of his former patron?  
A growing counterweight to power in the region – the trajectory of 
Chernetskii from client to opponent 
As personal power and the preservation of such took priority over the subordination to 
state interests, which were poorly, when at all, articulated by higher instances, the 
system of appointing political actors resulted in a continuation of the patronage 
traditions of regional power and precluding the development of a neutral professional 
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bureaucracy. This is not to say that those in such positions enjoyed complete free rein 
over appointments, dismissals, policy directions and other actions, as there was a need 
to at least acknowledge the competing interests of different sections of the elite.352 
Within existing patron-client structures, other clients of the same patron would certainly 
be able to lobby for or against the entry of new clients and only agreed to changes in 
the political structure to go ahead if there was a benefit to them.353 Much like conditions 
for citizens socioeconomically, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Soviet rule 
regional political power incurred its own struggle for day-to-day survival before the new 
rules of the game (loyalty to El’tsin, the seizure of resources and support of influential 
elites) established themselves.  
 
Already in late 1991-early 1992, Rossel’ clearly understood the nuances of being an 
appointed regional leader. To balance the uncertainty from above (in conditions where 
the victory of ‘pro-reform’ forces was not yet assured) he realised the value of support 
from the most influential sections from within the regional economic elite. The 
appointment of his own proposed candidate as mayor of the capital city of the region 
was the first test of Rossel’s authority within the region, and as such, it was critical that 
he not be challenged over this choice, particularly by the very elites that he supposedly 
represented. At this time, before the development and consolidation of Rossel’ and his 
team as a strong political force, support for Rossel’’s proposed candidate was 
conditionally balanced within the framework of what the industrial elite of Ekaterinburg 
saw themselves potentially gaining from the new political order. In the few months that 
had passed since the final collapse of the Soviet system, the prominent position of the 
directors’ corps in the region had hardly changed despite economic collapse in the 
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heavy industry and military-industrial sectors. Thus, the choice of Chernetskii, the 
General Director of the Uralkhimmash factory in the city, one of the largest industrial 
plants which dominated the southern part of the city, was uncontroversial and carried 
the support of other members of the city’s director-elite.354 While never personally close 
to him, the convenience of this candidate once again highlights Rossel’’s pragmatic 
early approach to leadership, shoring up his own position with regards to the economic 
elite and developing his patronage of this group at the expense of perhaps not having a 
closer ally as the head of Ekaterinburg. The directors of a number of other large 
enterprises from the city, including the influential Uralmash (Uralskii Mashinostroitel’nyi 
Zavod) plant, were firmly behind Chernetskii’s nomination, publicly praising his 
‘managerial qualities’ and ‘suitability’ for the post to convince a politicised general 
public.355 Most importantly, in selecting a candidate from within the existing ‘director 
corps’, Rossel’ was taking care to maintain the structural status quo ante of the recent 
past, under which the interests of the military-industrial complex, heavy industry and 
construction figured high on the agenda. Through bringing in another member of the 
industrial elite rather than a member of the political elite, he was acknowledging their 
primacy in the region and acquiring their support to begin the legitimisation of his 
leadership. From the perspective of the directors, their agreement to Chernetskii’s 
nomination is of importance, not least because in the hierarchy of industry in 
Ekaterinburg, the Uralmash factory can be traditionally ranked higher in importance 
than Khimmash.356 Although Rossel’ was also part of the director elite in the region, his 
movement into political power meant that he was in a position to influence and control 
the development of local and regional industry; in supporting and pressing for another 
figure from within their own sub-section of the elite to be within the upper administrative 
structures, the directors were hedging against any future risk to their interests.  
                                                 
354
 Interview with Anatolii Kirillov, Ekaterinburg, March 2011 
355
 ‘Dolzhen byt’ podderzhan’, Ural’skii rabochii, 14 January 1992, p.2. Chernetskii had presented 
Rossel’ with a list of material demands should he be the chosen figure, which the regional press seized on 
as being unreasonable and somewhat greedy. The directors of a number of industrial enterprise wrote an 
open letter to the Ural’skii rabochii paper stating that ‘the Mayor of such a city should be supported both 
morally and materially more than others’.  
356
 Ivanov (2014), p.138 
 190 
On the basis that the governor was appointed by the centre to run the region and, with 
the lack of popular elections to the position, the selection of Chernetskii as Mayor 
brought him under Rossel’’s patronage. Chernetskii’s managerial knowledge of industry 
in the region complemented Rossel’’s own enterprise management experience, and 
was promoted as being of vital importance in preventing socioeconomic conditions 
from spiralling further downwards in the regional capital. In the choice of experience 
and knowledge over political ideology, which is to say, stability and pragmatism over 
uncertainty (the very characteristics that Rossel’ pronounced himself to espouse) there 
are echoes of the choice that El’tsin made in appointing Rossel’ as regional leader.357 
Certainly, Chernetskii’s early approach to running the city chimes with Rossel’’s 
experience at the regional level; a managerialist approach to running city affairs and 
building a team based on former contacts and personnel with experience in 
administration, with the ability to fulfil the functions required given priority over 
ideological position. As expected under the terms of patronage, Chernetskii supported 
the governor in return for assistance from the regional administration in financing and 
running the city. In the period of the Urals Republic, there was cautious support from 
the city’s administration for the regional executive, while city, town and district affairs 
appeared low on the radar of the regional leadership providing the mayor with room to 
construct his own system of control over the city.358  
 
The breakdown of the patron-client relationship that tied them together allowed for 
conflict between the governor and the mayor to erupt. The effect that Rossel’’s 
dismissal as regional leader in November 1993 had on his political status regionally 
and federally has already been discussed in previous chapters, but a further effect of 
El’tsin’s decision to remove the principal actor of the Urals Republic was to set in 
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motion the future collision between the two most influential figures within his home 
region. With Rossel’’s dismissal, the patron-client relationship that Chernetskii had 
signed up to ceased to exist as the Ekaterinburg Mayor remained in his position and 
Rossel’ no longer held any political leverage over him. While the Ekaterinburg mayor 
may well have expected himself to become the next governor of the region, the 
appointment of one of his own deputies, Aleksei Strakhov, left him in an extraordinary 
position; Chernetskii now found a member of his own staff above him in the vertical 
hierarchy. While this could have led to antagonism between the mayor and the newly 
appointed governor, the important difference here is that Strakhov did not attempt to 
act as patron to Chernetskii and instead, formed close and cooperative ties with the 
mayor, providing the new governor with a minor degree of legitimacy within the regional 
capital, and re-balancing the governor-mayor into a cooperative rather than the 
hierarchical relationship that was the basis of Rossel’’s power structure.359 With 
Rossel’’s instant return to regional political life in the Federation Council and regional 
Duma moving him away from formal influence over the city mayor, Chernetskii could 
begin to assert his own political position on issues that had remained unvoiced while 
Rossel’ had been regional leader. Belatedly speaking out against the Urals Republic, 
Chernetskii grew in political confidence, and began to advocate a mildly conflicting 
approach to that of his former patron with regards to the allocation of powers between 
federal-regional and regional-city (and town and district) relations. While this was far 
removed from the struggle between the regional executive and legislative branches 
that emerged soon after over the regional charter, it marks the beginning of competition 
to Rossel’’s public appeal in Ekaterinburg, which had previously been unthreatened 
due to public sympathy in the battle against federal hegemony. Further to this, 
Strakhov’s struggle to impose his personality on the public left Chernetskii as a clear 
alternative to Rossel’ in the region overall, increasing the perceived threat to Rossel’’s 
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popularity as the former client began to openly challenge his former patron.360 It is this 
threat that sparked the development of what was to become a long-running conflict 
between the two, lasting until the end of their regional political careers at the end of the 
first decade of the 2000s. 
 
Three themes are highlighted below in governor-mayor relations in Sverdlovsk Oblast 
that demonstrate Rossel’’s loss of patronage over the mayor and the actions taken to 
try to limit the possibilities of Chernetskii threatening his domination over the regional 
elite and the political space. Firstly, we look at the role of local self-government within 
the region as the catalyst for conflict. Clear contradictions emerged between previously 
advocated positions on state structure and Rossel’’s behaviour towards local self-
government in general (not only with regards to Ekaterinburg), of which there were 62 
towns and cities and 73 municipal (and district) entities in the region by 1998.361 
Secondly, as the conflict was brought into the open and as both sides sought to 
popularise their legitimacy, competing political movements representing the positions of 
their figureheads took over the political space inside the city. While these political 
movements did indeed lend an air of pluralism to the political space, they were 
fundamentally competing at different levels, limiting the reach of Chernetskii’s own 
political party ‘Our Home, Our City’ (Nash Dom Nash Gorod) to largely within 
Ekaterinburg. Finally, we look at the role of the industrial elite that had supported both 
figures, looking at why the need to maintain elite support prevented the escalation of 
this conflict beyond electoral competition and precluded the use of force strategies.  
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Local self-government in Russia and the grounds of governor-mayoral 
contest 
Local self-government has played a mixed role in the development of Russian society 
since the nineteenth century. From the zemstvo reforms of low-level rights for local 
formations to manage a closely limited sphere of powers, to the early Bolshevik 
demands for ‘all power to the Soviets’ with local councils being formed at all levels, a 
functioning system of local self-government that could resolve specific local problems 
at the immediate level at which they arose (and able to function independently of the 
bureaucracy of both the tsarist guberniia and the communist system of subordination) 
has remained elusive in the reform of the structure of the state.362 With the end of the 
Soviet state, the system of local self-government began to evolve once again. The 
break from the system of tight Party supervision over the raikomy and gorkomy of the 
Soviet system of municipal and district power to what effectively became an 
abandoned area of the state for many years (notwithstanding the passage of the highly 
ineffective federal governing law “On the general principles of organising local self-
government in the RF” in 1995), meant that local self-government became a contested 
area of political control between regional administrations and units of local self-
government, focused around the allocation of (financial) resources, the division of 
property and the pace and results of privatization. The lack of functioning legislation to 
regulate the actions of local self-government, which was supposed to work in 
accordance to a hierarchical system of legal regulation with the Constitution of the RF 
as the highest law followed by federal law, regional law and the Charter of the local 
self-government, both provided and restricted the political-legal space for the exercise 
of power at the local level.  
 
Although according to the 1993 constitution local self-government was officially outside 
of state power, regional leaders were able to use the administrative resources available 
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to them to appoint or ensure election of their own people to positions in local 
administrations and coerce opponents into obeying the de facto hierarchy of power. As 
a result, the interests of regional power could be easily projected onto the local level, 
effectively stripping local self-government of the intended right to be able to resolve 
issues and continuing the top-down bureaucratic tendencies of the Soviet past. 
Regional capital cities and larger cities in the provinces were the strongest units of local 
self-government and generally the most capable of contesting this, whereas small 
towns were unable to resist regional pressures. As the shift of responsibilities 
transferred from the state to the regions, which in turn passed the burden of 
maintaining the social contract onto local self-government, the latter faced the rising 
costs of providing public utilities, housing, education services and basic social welfare 
on budgets that were inadequate to deal with such socially vital responsibilities. For 
affected larger cities and districts, seeking additional rights of taxation, budget 
formation and control over the privatization of property in order to pay for the essential 
services required in their territory brought them into conflict with regional 
administrations.363  
 
In Sverdlovsk Oblast and its capital, Ekaterinburg, this fuelled the long-running conflict 
between the two most powerful and influential figures in the region, gaining momentum 
throughout the 1990s, increasing in intensity after Rossel’’s election as governor in 
August 1995. The conflict between governor and mayor, importantly, kept Chernetskii 
in the public eye outside of the regional capital, and provided an element of balance to 
the dominating regional leader.364 Many of the ideas that had been central to the 
federal-regional dispute in the first half of the decade recurred at the regional-local 
level, particularly to do with the division of power and allocation of authority, resulting in 
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 195 
a struggle for control over resources (political, economic and physical) at their 
respective levels.  
 
As implied above, building a new and functional system of local self-government in the 
new Russian state was not something that held a great deal of interest to members of 
the federal or regional elite. The centre allowed regional leaders to build their own 
political systems in return for their support and, prior to a federal law outlining the 
principles of local self-government eventually being passed in 1995 (and only as 
pressure grew to have such a law in place before Russia joined the Council of Europe), 
regional leaders in the Federation Council had been able to actively hinder the 
development of any formal delineation of the powers of local self-government 
formations on the basis that it was against their interests to allow the development of 
local power outside of their influence, and worse, permit elections to local and district 
executive bodies, removing the power that they had in appointing and dismissing city, 
town and district leaders.365 With the cascading system of legal hierarchy still to be put 
into effect, in early 1995 the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma, led by Rossel’, passed its own 
regional law on local self-government before the federal law had been passed. Such a 
move was viewed by Chernetskii as both hostile and premature as it promoted 
adherence to regional law before even knowing its obligations under federal law. 
Combined with the regional charter and pursuit by Rossel’ of gubernatorial elections, it 
was clear by the summer of 1995 that Chernetskii was not prepared to return to the 
previous patronage relations. With the mayor’s mandate expiring in March 1996, 
Rossel’ and his supporters in the Oblast Duma began to lobby for the holding of an 
early mayoral election. The tactic of trying to hurry elections in the hope that one side 
would be underprepared is normally used by the incumbent trying to limit the 
campaigning time of rivals; in this case, the pro-Rossel’ camp in the regional Duma 
were trying to force the pace of mayoral elections in order to hold them on the same 
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day as gubernatorial elections to link their own candidate for mayor, Anton Bakov, to 
Rossel’s gubernatorial candidacy, while connecting Chernetskii to Strakhov.366 The 
regional Duma was unable to force the holding of mayoral elections at their preferred 
moment due to the lack of laws agreeing the procedure for mayoral elections (popular 
election or election by the City Duma), and they were delayed until mid-December 
1995, eventually being held on the same day as the RF Duma elections. The 
contesting of the first mayoral elections will be dealt with in the section below, but we 
should mention here that following Rossel’’s victory in the gubernatorial elections, a 
new series of attempts, this time through the Oblast Court (and reportedly via the RF 
Ministry of Justice), were made to prevent popular elections to the mayor’s post from 
taking place.367 
 
The development of a system of prefectures (as discussed in the previous chapter) 
came partly as a response to mayoral elections, and underline the contradiction in 
Rossel’’s own campaign to attain the right to greater economic independence from the 
centre and clarification of the status of the region with regards to local politics. As we 
have already noted, the creation of prefectures was designed to apply a degree of 
pressure on local self-government on the part of the regional executive, and it should 
be viewed not only in the context of Rossel’’s return to power, but also in the growing 
differences between himself and Chernetskii. The electoral mandate Rossel’ had just 
received from the citizens of the region and the negotiation of the bilateral agreements 
formally devolving greater political and economic powers from the centre to the region 
had resulted in his dominance over the region, but in the growing discrepancy between 
how he saw relations with Moscow and his attitudes towards internal power in the 
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region lies the development of the political rivalry with Chernetskii. The series of 
bilateral treaties agreed between Rossel’ and Moscow delineated those powers that 
were to be of federal-only, regional-only and joint jurisdiction, and Chernetskii argued 
that the next logical step was to complete a similar process between region and local 
self-government to provide the final link in the chain of state structure.368 Having 
achieved the desired transfer of powers from the centre, rhetoric from Rossel’ on local 
self-government toughened significantly from that of greater rights to be transferred 
downwards to talking openly about the need to strengthen state vertical power 
(notwithstanding agreements already reached between centre and region).369 With the 
executive and legislative branches working in tandem, Rossel’ could control the 
debate, arguing that increasing the rights of local self-government threatened to 
undermine the powers of the governor, who would no longer have any oversight over 
heads of local self-government now that they were elected.370 This was a weak 
argument, not least because through control over both branches of regional power 
Rossel’ had regained the monopoly over the allocation of administrative resources – 
such as control over (and delay of) fiscal transfers, and the transfer of regional property 
to municipal funds – that could be used to apply pressure on local actors not acting 
according to the regional executive’s wishes, even after popular elections to local self-
government formations.371 The introduction of prefectures applied increased pressure 
on local self-government formations in the region in return for obedience. That this was 
implemented in violation of federal and regional laws on the separation of powers did 
not slow down the process, as pro-Rossel’ officials, already holding administrative 
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positions in local self-government, were appointed prefects.372 In Rossel’’s view, having 
local self-government outside the vertical power system, that is to say not directly 
subordinate to regional power, increased the reality of the erosion of central power and 
the disintegration of the state (a key theme in Moscow’s rejection of the Urals 
Republic).373 Ironically, he attacked what he claimed to be his opponent’s 
‘demagoguery’ with regards to local self-government, claiming that Chernetskii was 
interpreting local self-government as the concentration of total power in the hands of 
one person at the head of local administrations.374  
Ekaterinburg versus Sverdlovsk: a case of asymmetric competition 
How the conflict, which on the surface was over ideas of regional administrative 
construction, was brought into the foreground shows the nascent institutionalisation of 
competition in the region. In the previous chapter the formation and activity of Rossel’’s 
political movement, Preobrazhenie Urala, was noted as a vehicle for consolidating his 
position and forming a disciplined and controlled political unit to compete in regional 
Duma elections, challenge the newly installed governor and maintain Rossel’’s leading 
public position in the region. As the first genuinely successful regional political 
movement in Russia (as opposed to a regional branch of a federal party), 
Preobrazhenie Urala demonstrated the value of political organization to regional actors. 
It is of no surprise then that the same approach, having being highly successful for 
Rossel’, was taken by others in the region to challenge the governor.  
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The difference in political culture between the regional capital city and the rest of the 
Oblast plays an important role in the Rossel’-Chernetskii conflict; regional capitals are 
generally expected to be more politically educated and, thus, show a greater propensity 
towards demonstrating varying preferences, than other oblast cities, due to them being 
the chief location of the academic institutions and decision making organs. This 
difference was demonstrated in the first gubernatorial elections held in 1995, where a 
wide ideological split between regional capital and oblast was represented in the 
division of the vote for Rossel’ and Strakhov based on their respective approaches to 
the federal centre. As the central location of those seeking election, the Ekaterinburg 
population was highly connected not only to the campaign process, but to the 
perceived consequences of both candidates’ approaches – subordination or 
confrontation with the centre – with the results demonstrating a clear preference for 
ending confrontation with the federal authorities. In the socio-demographic balance of 
the region, Ekaterinburg makes up approximately a quarter of the Oblast population; 
Rossel’ was aware of the fact that he only needed to maintain the support of the wider 
oblast electorate (the industrial and worker cross-section) rather than attempting to 
achieve majority support of the regional capital, while also convincing those members 
of the city population without a direct stake in the industrial sector (the intelligentsia and 
those involved in trade and services).  
 
In the inaugural Ekaterinburg mayoral elections, finally held in December 1995, the 
issues around which the gubernatorial campaign had played out were still fresh in 
citizens’ memories. Once again, campaigning was centred around two sides of the 
state-structure coin – Chernetskii  advocating greater devolution of power to local self-
government, against Rossel’’s candidate, Anton Bakov, who was campaigning on a 
platform of greater integration of the city into the system of regional power and 
returning the mayor’s post to the patronage of the governor. The incumbent mayor’s 
victory was comprehensive, and can be further viewed through the prism of the fallout 
from the gubernatorial battle between Rossel’ and Strakhov; the results of the RF State 
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Duma elections in the city that were held on the same day as mayoral elections 
showed a clear division along a region-city axis in the voting behaviour. In 
Ekaterinburg, the Our Home is Russia party (Nash Dom Rossiia) for which Strakhov  
was the regional head of party, came out on top with approximately 12 percent of the 
city vote compared to Rossel’’s Preobrazhenie Otechestva (Transformation of the 
Fatherland – the federal branch of the Preobrazhenie Urala movement), which polled 
fifth in the city with 8% of the vote, behind Iabloko, Demokraticheskii Vybor Rossii and 
the distinguished eye surgeon Stanislav Federov’s Partiia samoupravleniia 
trudiashchikhsia.375 Conversely, the results for the entire oblast put Preobrazhenie 
Otechestva party in first place, with 12.1% of the vote and NDR third, behind 
Zhirinovskii’s LDPR, with 8.35%, underlining the position of Ekaterinburg in Sverdlovsk 
regional politics with regards to Rossel.376 On the basis of the endorsement received 
from the city and the obvious differences between the regional and city electorate, 
Chernetskii formed Our Home, Our City (Nash Dom Nash Gorod – NDNG) in early 
1996, following an agreement with Chernomyrdin’s federal party, Nash Dom Rossiia 
(NDR). This new political movement united seven regional branches of federal political 
parties, including Boris Federov’s “Forwards, Russia” (Vpered Rossiia) and the local 
NDR branch. Chernetskii made the case that it was not strong opposition to 
Preobrazhenie Urala, but was a local party focused on local issues – the further 
transferral of powers taken by the region from the centre to the local level.377 With 
elections to a new, bicameral regional legislature on the horizon NDNG followed the 
model chosen by its rival Probrazhenie Urala, and constructed its political identity 
almost entirely on the personality of Chernetskii. Announcing its aims as being primarily 
‘to protect the interests of the city’ (against regional-level transgressions), NDNG 
focused its campaign on having the regional law on local self-government rewritten, as 
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by this time it clashed with recent federal law.378 The idea of weak opposition quickly 
developed into outright competition between Preobrazhenie Urala and NDNG (for 
which we should read as between Rossel’ and Chernetskii) over the 1996 and 1999 
regional Duma election cycles and also for the 1999 gubernatorial elections. 
 
Due to the effectiveness of Rossel’’s strategy towards the Oblast’s industrial sector and 
the reliant population, Chernetskii had little hope of enjoying similar reach outside of 
the capital, and candidates that attached themselves to the NDNG movement were 
from outside of the networks of the ruling elite.379 The pool from which Chernetskii 
could draw support was increasingly diminished as elections to local self-government 
became the norm, with a large number of heads of local administration participating in 
Preobrazhenie Urala in return for appointment and delaying of competitive local 
elections. The result of this was that no matter how much Chernetskii and NDNG 
attempted to place local self-government at the heart of the 1996 regional Duma 
election campaign it remained a largely Ekaterinburg-centric issue, drowned out by 
Rossel’’s gubernatorial victory that had prioritised regional primacy over local issues. 
Despite this, NDNG became an established political party in the regional Duma, and a 
counterweight to Preobrazhenie Urala in the regional legislature. By the 1998 Oblast 
Duma elections, NDNG returned sufficient deputies to break the Preobrazhenie Urala 
majority in the legislature, although not enough to form a majority itself or install one of 
its own deputies as speaker.380 Yet there was little in the party discourse to suggest 
that the movement had matured into a party that could challenge reliance of the wider 
region on Rossel’, let alone represent its interests at the federal level.381 NDNG 
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remained restricted in its reach and scope, continuing to be a party primarily of the 
regional capital and still heavily relying on the discourse of local self-government. In 
comparison, Preobrazhenie Urala, now chaired by Rossel’’s close ally Surganov, 
continued to focus on regional and federal political ideas, including where these 
intersected with local matters.  
 
The 1998 regional Duma elections had been seen as a way of measuring Chernetskii’s 
prospects for a gubernatorial challenge in 1999, and NDNG’s success led to him 
challenging for the governorship. The limitations of the NDNG movement, and of 
Chernetskii himself, were highlighted by the ease with which Rossel’ won re-election. 
According to political analysts at the time, on the basis of clearly being identified as the 
second most-visible politician in the region, Chernetskii and his electoral team 
assumed that passage into the second-round was all but a formality, and focused the 
majority of their resources on the expected head-to-head battle with Rossel’ in the 
second round. 382 His electoral campaign found itself trapped within this paradigm, 
failing to portray him as Rossel’’s equal, and suffering heavily when a leading member 
of his strategy team defected to Rossel’’s administration in early 1999.383 The national 
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political landscape was also influential in this contest. Members of the entire political 
spectrum of the region, including from Preobrazhenie Urala, allied themselves with 
Moscow Mayor, Iurii Luzhkov’s Otechestvo (Fatherland) political party, on the basis 
that Luzhkov was being viewed as the potential next president.384 Chernetskii won the 
regional branch’s nomination to become the Sverdlovsk leader of Otechestvo, while 
Rossel’ made no attempts to link himself to the movement, preferring his own 
movement. The projection of the potential benefits of patronage from Luzhkov offered 
little additional credibility to Chernetskii’s candidacy in the outlying areas of Sverdlovsk 
Oblast, which was struggling with the effects of the August 1998 financial crisis, and 
even in Ekaterinburg such an alliance seemed even less inspiring than Strakhov’s ties 
to Chernomyrdin had been previously. The perception of Rossel’ as a regional-level 
actor, who had the experience and gravitas needed to function at the national level, 
eclipsed the electorate’s view of Chernetskii as being able to function at the same level. 
The strategic mistake of Chernetskii’s team in not ensuring a favourable first-round 
vote allowed Alexander Burkov, a minor figure in the regional Duma, to take second-
place, with Rossel’ securing an overwhelming victory in the second-round of the 
election.385  
 
The separation of the Sverdlovsk and Ekaterinburg political space highlighted above 
prevented Rossel’ from gaining control of the city. However, it also limited the 
development of party competition in the region in that while Chernetskii and NDNG 
were able to participate in regional level elections (Duma and gubernatorial), they were 
not considered to be politicians or parties of the same level as Rossel’ and 
Preobrazhenie Urala. By highlighting the differences in scale between himself and his 
rivals Rossel’ was able to restrict the political ambitions of Chernetskii, despite NDNG’s 
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electoral success in 1998 and the acceptance of the Ekaterinburg mayor as the second 
figure of the region, to such an extent that Chernetskii didn’t challenge Rossel’ in the 
final competitive gubernatorial elections held in the region in 2003. With the re-
centralization of power that came with Putin’s presidency, the cancelling of 
gubernatorial elections and the emergence of Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia), regional 
party competition in its most limited form was eliminated from developing any further, 
sidelining the electorate and restoring the emphasis on centre-regional patronage. 
Stability of interests – the role of the industrial elite in the balance of 
power between regions and cities 
If the local popularity of Chernetskii and the presence of NDNG prevented Rossel’ from 
gaining a strong grip on the city, why didn’t the regional governor use his dominant 
position to force the outcome and insert a loyal client into the city? Gel’man’s typology 
of regional exit from transition suggests that a tacit agreement between regional elites 
in Sverdlovsk oblast emerged, establishing ‘competition within the rules’, rather than 
the brute force strategy of the ‘winner takes all’ scenario that was used in other 
regions.386 It has been argued that the low population proportion of Ekaterinburg to the 
rest of the region meant that it was, in a manner of speaking, punching above its weight 
in its role in the regional political system.387 For the regional administration, this meant 
that, while not ideal, their inability to dominate the regional capital was clearly not 
strategically fatal to its control over the region as a whole.  
The situation established itself as such that, as long as the governor-mayor conflict 
didn’t escalate into equal competition for political space between the two (that is to say, 
as long as Chernetskii was unable to make the step from local to regional political 
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actor), Rossel’ did not need to use stronger administrative measures, such as the legal 
pursuit of Chernetskii and his team, or the forcible seizure of municipal property.388 
More importantly, the industrial and economic elite of both city and region acted as a 
regulating force on the lengths to which competition between the two could escalate. 
Even after popular election as governor, the industrial elites behind the positions of 
power still retained a large influence. While Rossel’ could take action against 
Chernetskii’s political supporters and conduct personalised electoral campaigns, 
striking against the mayor extra-legally would seriously upset the balance of resources. 
The electoral tactics of Rossel’’s campaign demonstrate how he was able to pitch the 
region-local split in such terms that were damaging to Chernetskii’s prospects of 
election and tells us much about the strategy of the Rossel’ regime in dealing with 
competition within the region. The power structure that developed in Sverdlovsk oblast 
holds strong echoes with the Soviet system, not just for its desire to order power within 
a hierarchy and integrate downwards. In maintaining the leading role of industry in the 
region, Rossel’ was able to deflect the challenge of rivals by constructing the political 
and economic structures in a way that only he could represent regional interests. As 
noted in the previous chapter when looking at the governor’s patronage of industry, one 
of the lines used to discredit Chernetskii in the 1999 gubernatorial elections was that 
the Ekaterinburg mayor represented the merchants – the development of trade over 
the historical traditions of production that the Urals are known for.389 By presenting the 
difference in region and local development in such stark terms, there was an indication 
to the industrial elite of the possibility that, should another candidate be elected, the 
region ran the risk of losing its production identity and moving towards an unknown 
post-industrial future (the replacement of industry with services). This threat to the 
future of the Urals highlighted the different playing levels of both candidates and 
brought industrial elite support to the Rossel’ camp in the gubernatorial elections. While 
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trade was now an important facet of Ekaterinburg’s economic structure, industry 
provided employment, supported small businesses and dominated entire districts of the 
city. The different levels of financial and administrative support on offer from the 
regional and local administration (particularly in the form of tax subsidies and relief) 
could ensure that they held an interest in retaining a clear distinction between governor 
and mayor. An attack against Chernetskii using more forcible methods to completely 
remove his opponent, such as the courts, rather than beating him at the polls, would 
have been seen by this branch of the elite either as an attack against the director 
corps, destabilising the regional economic balance, and would not have been 
supported.390 The industrial elite of the city offered their support to Chernetskii at the 
city level, while recognising the benefits they could have in continuing to support 
Rossel’ at the oblast level, as demonstrated by defeat for Chernetskii in industrial 
districts of Ekaterinburg in the 1999 gubernatorial elections, but an overwhelming 
victory for him in the mayoral elections of the same year.391 
Conclusions 
What we see from the deterioration of the Rossel’-Chernetskii network is the 
management of competition by Rossel’’s regime, under which he could tolerate the 
challenge from Chernetskii as long as it showed no sign of spreading outwards from 
the regional capital into the provincial areas of the territory. In this chapter and the 
preceding one, we can see a tendency for a clear compartmentalization of the elite, 
which formed itself into a rigidly hierarchical structure, under which each leading actor 
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had a role assigned and in which ‘stability in cadres’ appears to be the order of the day. 
This rigid structure, with its closely controlled organization through the Preobrazhenie 
Urala movement and attempt at the resurrection of vertical integration, made it possible 
for Rossel’ both to deflect competition and suffocate it where necessary. This was used 
to sustain Rossel’’s hegemony over the region through his exercise of the threat of 
alternatives being unable to acquire the same resources that he could. 
 
The closed nature of the elite and the long duration of these clients of the network in 
the regional space are of great interest. None of the leading actors  – Surganov, 
Vorob’ev, Chernetskii, even Bakov –  moved any further along the line of hierarchy in 
any way during the 1990s, neither through their support for, nor opposition to Rossel’. 
Where Chernetskii failed in his challenge to Rossel’’s dominance throughout the latter 
half of the 1990s is in his inability to convince the elite (political and industrial) that he 
provided a viable alternative to Rossel’ and the Preobrazhenie Urala movement, a 
problem equally faced later by Anton Bakov in the 2003 gubernatorial elections when 
he turned from client to challenger. The rigid allocation of positions in Rossel’’s system 
provided stability and crushed any political competition to the extent that Chernetskii 
decided against challenging Rossel’ in future gubernatorial elections in 2003, instead 
choosing to align himself with the United Russia party and become a part of the state 
network of political elites, which saw him remain as Mayor until 2009. With the 
emergence of United Russia, all of the interest groups of the region were forced to step 
back from any political competition and merged into the restored centralised state 
vertical. The result going into the second decade of the new Russia was a degree of 
stagnation of cadres within the region as members of the Rossel’ clan placed position 
within the network over political development.  
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Chapter 8 
Putin’s power vertical and the decline of Rossel’’s regional 
leadership, 2000-2004 
The post-El’tsin period saw a recentralisation process that pressed regional leaders 
either into voluntarily becoming supporters of the restoration of “vertical power” or 
finding themselves coerced into working within the new boundaries of centre-regional 
relations in order to maintain their positions. With his first major policy announcement 
upon becoming President in 2000, Vladimir Putin initiated a process of reversing the 
flow of power relations between centre and regions, ending El’tsin’s individualised 
bargaining with regional leaders in return for support. The detail of Putin’s federal 
reforms has been thoroughly dealt with elsewhere, but the standout features are the 
creation of seven federal districts, with an appointed plenipotentiary (polnomochnyi 
predstavitel’ prezidenta or polpred) to each district, reform to the Federation Council to 
the detriment of regional governors, and the president taking the right to dismiss 
governors for violations of federal law.392 Leaders that had dominated their regional 
political space throughout this period were quickly forced to adapt to the new 
circumstances, with the overwhelming majority of regional executives in the early 
2000s finding it easier to abandon the previous relationship they had enjoyed with 
Moscow and subordinate themselves to more clearly articulated state interests under 
the new president. Steps towards re-establishing Moscow’s hegemony over the regions 
proceeded with little resistance, firmly closing the chapter of Russia’s experiment with 
greater scope for regional political action. 
 
Having looked at the nature of the networks that were developed by the Sverdlovsk 
regional leader throughout the El’tsin decade, this chapter takes an overview of the 
period of the first Putin presidency (2000-2004) and asks how and why Rossel’’s power 
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relations were broken up by the forcible recentralisation of political capital. The gradual 
reduction of the ability of Rossel’ (and other regional leaders) to play a determining role 
in the development of the state through federal relations sharply reduced his dominant 
position as the patron of the region. The decline in Rossel’’s political power in the 
region can be connected to the ending of his monopoly position over relations with the 
centre. The erosion of regional political power, although allowing him to remain in the 
governor’s chair until 2009, transformed Rossel’ (as it did other regional executives) 
from being the source of regional political activity into becoming a tool of regional policy 
implementation.  
 
Starting with an outline of the federal reforms that Putin pursued following election as 
president and the consequences of these reforms for regional leaders, the chapter 
notes the return to top-down leadership, removing regional leaders’ potential to 
influence outcomes through trading support in return for exceptions and favourable 
conditions. Through considering the role of the new presidential representative as an 
emerging rival for network attention in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the diminution of Rossel’’s 
position at the head of different elite groups becomes clear. Despite the lack of any 
formal powers allocated to this revival of an older system of observing the regions, 
downwards pressure from a federal centre that was tightening its hold over political 
activity of the state made it increasingly difficult for Rossel’ to maintain his prior position 
as the key distributor of resources in the region. By imposing a system of ‘total 
patronage’ exercised through a presidentially-headed pyramid (of which the key factor 
was the return of delegated powers ensuring control over political and economic 
resources), and a system of divide and rule that enforced central interests, the 
mechanisms for replacing regional patronage and why Rossel’’s boundary control 
failed under the change in federal circumstances are observed. The result was a 
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significant change from being at the heart of the movement for regions to be able to 
determine their own outcomes to that of clinging on to power at all costs.393 
Changes in the source of legitimacy  
Political power within networks is specific to the situation that it exists in, and so it 
follows that in order to shift the balance of power a prospective patron must change the 
situation to assist the emergence of new political forces.394 In the previous chapters, 
the source of Rossel’’s regional power was found to be drawn from his tightly controlled 
relations with the regional elite and the centre that prevented alternative routes to 
decision making and distribution of resources becoming available. Such a structure 
was possible while the centre was forced into devolving powers to region in order to 
shore up support for the president. With the immediate announcement of federal reform 
to return control over the provinces to the Kremlin, the support structures around 
Rossel’ (and leaders that had built their power on similar power networks) began to see 
other potential resource distributors in federal business structures and central 
appointees, reducing the role Rossel’ could play as the sole actor capable of 
representing their network interests. That these new distributors of patronage were in 
turn subject to the patronage of the Kremlin in some form or another contributed to the 
restoration of top-down ‘vertical power’ emanating from the centre in a form that led to 
Rossel’ accepting a new function over time to in order to stay within the power structure 
of the state. In this we see the weakness of the type of power structure that Rossel’ 
had constructed under the new rules of the game that Putin was introducing, in which 
his own position in centre-regional relations was invested in links to a single individual. 
Under El’tsin, the system had given the opportunity for regional leaders to build their 
own power structures – part of the idea of restoring vertical power was to return 
regional governors into delegated ‘roles’ with expectant behaviour appropriate to how 
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the centre wanted to shape the institution.395 What we see in the case of Rossel’ under 
Putin is an actor that had established himself as almost an individual client of the 
highest level patron being forcibly returned into a collective pool of network actors, 
rather than voluntarily submitting to the changes taking place.  
 
The new class of bureaucrats (‘chinovniki’) that emerged under the Putin system, while 
far from being a professional bureaucratic class, were tied ideologically to the state 
network that Putin continues to head (and for the large part separating itself from 
society through membership and participation in the party of power, United Russia).396 
Through these functionaries, the state gained a new method for the operation of 
centre-regional relations (as well as other aspects of political and social control) with a 
unifying sense of identity that the elites of the 1990s had never had. Utilising this new 
bureaucratic control, and the members of this segment of political society, the centre 
was able to rotate actors outside of their native regions, diminishing the scope for 
individual regions to act independently of the centre.397  
The federal reforms of May 2000 as the start of a slow decline in regional 
leadership 
The turnover of prime ministers between 1998 and 1999, and the associated political 
instability that this brought, heightened by the August 1998 financial crisis, meant that 
political actors at the regional level presumed that a new president would need time to 
embed himself in the system and at the same time be reliant on regional leaders 
providing a stable political environment within the country. On the basis of this, they 
expected a degree of continuation in influencing policies in Moscow. The manner of the 
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planned transfer of power from El’tsin to Putin, although not intended to herald a 
change in the political structure (rather a smooth transition and continuation of the 
system that would protect El’tsin and his ‘family’), required the construction of popular 
legitimacy in order that Putin be accepted as El’tsin’s successor. Only through 
stimulating society into supporting Putin, a previously obscure political figure before his 
appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999, could power be smoothly transferred to 
the new leader through the electoral process. As the latest in a string of Prime 
Ministers, Putin’s own political networks were not initially considered to be particularly 
strong, however, on the back of the successful and short conflict in the North 
Caucasus, the Edinstvo political party, whose primary role was to support his election 
as President in March 2000 presented him with a organised support network that could 
act as a conduit for channelling his increasing popularity398 Upon election, popular 
electoral legitimacy plus the added support he had already gained from Edintsvo’s 
showing in the State Duma elections, demonstrated the success of the transition plan 
to install a new patron over the state. This gave Putin significant space to carry out a 
major overhaul of centre-regional relations as his first major policy initiative, signalling 
his intent to create what has become known as the ‘power vertical’.  
 
In order to impose new rules of the game, the centre had to deconstruct the ‘pinch-
point’ occupied by regional leaders in the state structure from which all processes, 
whether flowing downwards or upwards had to pass through.399 In order to remove this 
bottleneck, and with it the regions’ opportunities to dictate conditions to the centre, the 
means of implementing policy required a change in the system of governance at the 
top, moving away from having a single actor (El’tsin) deciding policy on the back of 
individual lobbying, and instead placing intermediaries into the centre-regional structure 
to remove the direct president-regional leader connection and exert federal authority in 
the regions.  
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With the aim of breaking into consolidated regional structures and occupying the space 
in order to put into practice the new rules of the game, the Kremlin introduced new 
actors into regional political and economic spheres to change the nature of centre-
regional relations. One of the immediate effects of the federal reforms was the 
presentation of alternatives presented by the central leadership to the support 
structures and networks of the regional elite. The initial step for this was the 
introduction of presidential representatives. Sending emissaries into the regions was 
nothing new, and the immediate task facing these new presidential representatives was 
to assert themselves in what were largely closed elite circles. A further aspect of the 
presidential representatives’ role as overseers was that they inserted a deliberate layer 
of bureaucracy in the path of previously direct governor-presidential relations. El’tsin 
had attempted to use presidential representatives in each region to monitor the actions 
of the regional governors, but these figures had been easily rendered ineffective as his 
own appointees co-opted his monitors into becoming dependent on the resources 
controlled by the local leaders. The introduction of representatives under Putin aimed 
to avoid repeating these mistakes by reducing the number of representatives and 
making them cross-regional, with the most obvious difference being that in the 
economic recovery following the August 1998 financial crisis they were backed by (and 
had access to, although not control over) financial resources that their predecessors 
had not had, leaving them less likely to be susceptible to becoming reliant on the 
governors that they were supposed to be overseeing. With five out of the seven 
appointed representatives coming from different branches of the power ministries (the 
siloviki upon whom Putin has relied so much), we can easily equate them with 
discipline and loyalty to their master, further reducing the threat of regional co-
optation.400 Marginalising the former channel of direct patron-client relations between 
president and governor was deepened by a restructuring of the Federation Council, the 
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 The non-silovik representaties were Sergei Kirienko, the former Prime Minister (Volga Federal 
District) and Leonid Drachevskii, a former diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Siberian 
Federal District).  
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federal representative body for the regions, removing the direct connection between 
regional governors and state policy making and implementation.401 In transforming this 
into a full-time upper chamber, Putin forced the regional executives into giving up their 
position of being able to use the chamber to block legislation that was unfavourable to 
regional interests, reaching an agreement with the regional leaders for their gradual 
withdrawal from the Federation Council.402 These actions, along with the new right for 
the president to dismiss popularly elected governors, signified a shift in the power 
balance in favour of the federal centre and have been argued by some as the return to 
a unitary state.403  
 
The new president’s path to rebuilding the Russian state required control over regional 
leaders. Different methods were used by the centre to convince governors to support 
the change in patron; some regional leaders became members of Edinaia Rossiia as it 
offered them electoral support required to remain in power, for others, membership of 
this network offered the opportunity for fast career development as for example was the 
case for Sergei Sobianin, who rose from being a member of the Federation Council for 
Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Region in 1996, to governor of Tyumen’ Oblast in 2001, 
Head of the Presidential Administration (from 2005-2010) and then Mayor of Moscow, 
replacing Iurii Luzhkov in 2010. Not only was there a linearly vertical realignment 
between regional leaders and the president, but also a shift in the vertical link between 
local and regional elites, who were now able to connect federally without having to use 
regional leaders as an intermediary bridge.404 The next section of this chapter looks at 
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the strands of Rossel’’s network power under Putin and the rival influence of the 
presidential representative.  
The role of the presidential representative in Sverdlovsk Oblast – new 
patron or political inconvenience? 
Having established the reasons behind the federal reforms implemented by Putin, we 
can now turn to look at Rossel’’s approach to dealing with the impact of the revision of 
centre-regional relations. Frequent changes to the rules of how the state functions and 
their lack of transparency have been formulated into the idea of a “governance puzzle” 
existing for actors in Russian political life.405 An understanding of the how these rules 
work is an essential part of power in Russia, particularly knowing when a directive or 
order needs to be acted upon and when it can be ignored. While a number of leaders 
accepted the latest change in federal relations, the response to changes in the centre-
regional relations from Rossel’ as well as from other regional leaders, such as his ally, 
Bashkortostan president, Murtaza Rakhimov, can be seen as being influenced by the 
fact that the rules of the game had previously been a process of negotiation for key 
regions. As a result, Putin’s reforms were initially seen as the latest in a series of 
changes to the system that would not seriously change the field in which the regional 
leaders would operate, nor threaten the special relationship between governor and 
president. This attitude was displayed in Rossel’’s response to the appointment of 
General Petr Latyshev as the Urals Federal District presidential representative. The 
introduction of the presidential representatives signalled the beginning of the centre’s 
attempts to seize back control over areas of state power that had been given away. It 
left entrenched regional leaders such as Rossel’ having to adapt to the new practices 
of state administration; the unexpected lack of permanence of the settlement achieved 
                                                                                                                                               
between elites within the regions as the control over the distribution of resources and incentives for 
compliance was removed from the governors and returned to the central state. As long as activity didn’t 
challenge the strategy of the state (instead of the strategy of the governor), which included removing 
political competition to the state’s policies, then the reward was tacit permission for regional actors to act 
in their own interests. 
405
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in the El’tsin era and the swiftness with which the centre was able to start affecting the 
political and economic landscape in the regions contributed to the response to the 
reforms.406 The concept of the presidential representative was for Putin to install actors 
that were loyal to him into the regions and report back on the conditions of the regions. 
Additionally, their monitoring role was supposed to apply pressure on the regional 
governors and their manner of exercising regional power. Rossel’’s perception was that 
as the polpred had no formal powers, the arrival of Latyshev in Ekaterinburg could be 
shrugged off as being neither relevant nor affecting his relationship (as an ‘established’ 
and well-resourced regional leader) with the centre. However, the effect on Rossel’’s 
regional leadership of the introduction of the presidential representatives to the newly 
created federal districts was to threaten his position at the head of the networks 
outlined in the previous chapters. The experience of political competition that Rossel’ 
had seen his strategy focus on preventing other actors holding the same access to the 
kinds of political, economic and social resources that he wielded, resulting in him being 
the key link in the chain inside the oblast and nationally.  
 
As an outsider who was directly appointed by and reporting to the president, Latyshev 
posed a challenge to Rossel’ on how to prevent this new figure from accessing his 
networks. The creation of the presidential representative introduced a novel possibility 
into the regional political space; that the governor’s connections to the centre were no 
longer the only route to Moscow – an unfamiliar position in his role as governor.  
Formally, the presidential representative was only supposed to keep the centre 
informed of what was happening in their federal district; in practice, they took up an 
active role in inter-regional political life, and their presence served as a reminder to the 
governors that, on the basis of their reports to the centre, the state could withdraw 
support for the governors. Although governors were popularly elected until the system 
of appointing regional leaders returned after 2004, the centre began to apply its own 
resources to support or contest re-election campaigns and influence results. The initial 
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tension that surfaced between Rossel’ and the presidential representative reflected this 
new paradigm of centre-regional relations based on an assertive centre, and should be 
interpreted as the former testing the durability of this new institution and whether it was 
going to be able to enforce its own rules of operation.407 Upon Latyshev’s arrival in 
Ekaterinburg, the capital of the Urals Federal District and where he was to be based, 
Rossel’ recycled a strategy from the El’tsin era, attempting to limit the access the 
competing actor had to resources and force the polpred to submit to his patronage. By 
manufacturing a scandal in Ekaterinburg that allowed him to publicly criticise 
Latyshev’s choice to locate his institution’s offices in the city’s centrally-located 
Children’s Palace of Culture (Dom Detskogo Tvorchestva), Rossel’ was attempting to 
embarrass the ‘outsider’ in the eyes of the local population, and signal to the polpred 
that he did not accept this encroachment on his regional authority.408 In response to 
such blatant attempts to force him into reliance on Rossel’, Latyshev singled out 
Sverdlovsk Oblast within the Urals Federal District for criticism in his reports to Moscow 
over the high level of discrepancies between regional and federal law, and personally 
criticised Rossel’ over his lack of success in dealing with organised crime in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast’ in the years of his leadership.409 In order to diminish the effect of his failure to 
influence the polpred, members of Rossel’’s administration began to apply a degree of 
cognitive dissonance to claim that the presidential representatives had never posed a 
threat to the regional political structure in the first place and had in fact been demanded 
by the regions.410  
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Unlike the experience of the El’tsin administrations, the centre followed up federal 
reforms using its parliamentary support to pass legislation to substantiate it, prompting 
regional leaders to seek to adjust their own strategies for dealings with Moscow. In 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, this adjustment was necessitated by the threat of an alliance 
between the presidential representative and Rossel’’s main rival, Chernetskii. Using the 
bargaining skills that had served him well with El’tsin, Rossel’ entered into more 
constructive dialogue with Latyshev in order to preserve his formal position, but also his 
informal position as the focal point for the regional elite.411 A critical juncture in the 
Rossel-Latyshev relationship was reached ahead of the 2003 gubernatorial and State 
Duma elections, the last competitive gubernatorial election held in the region, which 
had the potential to once again result in a struggle between the ever-popular regional 
leader and the administrative resources of the state. Incorporating regional leaders into 
the new political system was a particularly clear component of Putin’s strategy for 
obtaining loyalty in centre-regional relations, particularly when it was time for 
incumbents to seek to maintain their position. Long-standing governors, who were 
proving difficult for the centre to control, were coerced into the ruling political party 
structure as a means of reducing their scope for independent political activity, starving 
them of the space to differentiate themselves from the state, and making their positions 
connected to compliance with the centre. In the run-up to the 2003 gubernatorial 
elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the deteriorating relations between region and centre 
echoed the 1990s as the central press portrayed Rossel’ as clinging to a fiefdom 
(votchina) that had no place in Putin’s attempted renewal of centralised federalism in 
                                                                                                                                               
a way of addressing the rudderless nature of El’tsin’s leadership. In the same interview, Dubichev 
commented that the presidential representatives’ significance was overestimated, based on the fact that 
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the country.412 In the new order, where loyalty to the ruling network in Moscow has 
been one of its most recognisable features,413 Latyshev offered the Sverdlovsk 
governor the opportunity to work with the United Russia (Edinaia Rossiia) party, which 
in turn offered Rossel’ the chance to make amends for his initial criticism of federal 
reforms, affirm his loyalty to Putin, and receive the support of the Kremlin in 
gubernatorial elections, which might otherwise go to his local rivals.414 Bringing Rossel’ 
under Moscow’s influence was important to Latyshev; the region was viewed as a test 
of the United Russia project in the Urals, and had Latyshev been unable to ensure this 
success for the party of power it would threaten his position both as the hand of the 
centre with regards to the regional elite and with regards to losing the confidence of his 
patron.415 This approach was seen elsewhere, such as in Orel Oblast, where Governor 
Egor Stroev, who had been the First Party Secretary of Orel Oblast under the Soviet 
system and remained a loyal member of the KPRF throughout the 1990s, was 
eventually brought into Edinaia Rossiia in 2005, by which point gubernatorial elections 
had been cancelled, and was rewarded with reappointment to the governorship by 
Putin for another term.  
 
As shown in the preceding chapters, an important aspect of Rossel’’s power had 
always been the management of the different group interests that existed in the region. 
In what should be seen as the beginning of the decline in his status as the patron of the 
region, by joining the United Russia movement, even as head of the regional branch of 
the party, Rossel’ now managed these interests as a client of the state network. 
Considering that his close circle of trusted figures remained in place and that he 
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continued to enjoy popular support (as proven by his election in 2003), it is hard to 
suggest that Rossel’ had become totally dependent on the centre at this point, nor that 
he had lost his position of authority at the head of his own networks, but he was now 
certainly subordinated to the centre in a way that he had not been throughout the 
previous decade.  
 
Inside the region, one of the consequences of Rossel’’s co-optation was that it clouded 
plans for the transfer of power for the post-Rossel’ period. By working with the federal 
state, Rossel’ had entered into a new power structure, which gave rise to the potential 
that his leadership would stagnate as it was now reliant on the centre.416 Under these 
new conditions, he was faced with the choice of either remaining in power to prevent 
an outsider being appointed who might reverse previous actions, or seek to hand 
power over early to one of his close staff in order to negotiate his own exit. The 
boundary control structure had sealed off the upper levels of power to outsiders, and 
Rossel’ had indicated at various junctures that a member of his inner circle would be 
his natural successor. Within the ruling elite, it had been indicated that his chosen 
successor was Aleksei Vorob’ev, who would continue to represent the interests of the 
pro-Rossel’ groups and protect his former patron against any future pushing back on 
decisions taken under his leadership (a El’tsin-esque solution). Such a transfer of 
power had been pencilled in for 2007. Before the appointment of governors by the 
centre was introduced, however, Rossel’ distanced himself from his potential successor 
following the 2003 gubernatorial elections, and, breaking with his previous actions, 
began to create divisions within his closest circles, favouring a group led by Aleksandr 
Levin that advocated him remaining in power for as long as he could.417 A further 
implication of Rossel’’s bargain with Latyshev to play the centre’s role in the region was 
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that previous rivalries remained in place, as in securing a further term, the governor 
was not forced to bring in outside actors into his ruling group.418  
 
Alignment with the centre affected the regional governor’s standing with regards to 
business networks the introduction of the presidential representation and wider policies 
promoting the reach of the Kremlin into the regions presented issues that participating 
in regional networks had previously been insulated against. The increasing financial 
might of federal enterprises and the introduction of the presidential representative as 
an important intermediary for business, not just in Sverdlovsk Oblast but in the wider 
Urals, removed the position at the top of the chain for representing business interests 
that Rossel’ had held throughout the 1990s. Enterprises that Rossel’ had struggled to 
keep alive during the economic crises of the 1990s were now being acquired by 
Moscow-based state enterprises and the importance of governors in looking after the 
interests of this branch of the elite weakened. Having previously been the main 
spokesperson for the industrial elite of the region and the Urals on the national scale 
the result of such acquisitions by federal enterprises of regional firms reduced Rossel’’s 
influence in Moscow when lobbying regional interests. A number of the most prominent 
business oligarchs expanded their empires in acquiring Sverdlovsk enterprises, for 
example Viktor Veksel’berg’s SUAL company purchased the Verkhnesal’dinsk 
Metallurgical Plant (that Rossel’ had fought hard to keep alive during the 1990s) and 
became a key shareholder in Ekaterinburg’s Kol’tsovo airport. 419 Other industrialists 
entering the region included Vladimir Lisin, head of the Novolipetskii Metallurgical 
                                                 
418
 Interview with Vadim Dubichev, Ekaterinburg, April 2011. The stagnation of the regional elite 
continued in the post-Rossel’ era. Dubichev, who became press secretary for Rossel’’s successor 
Aleksandr Misharin noted that one of the key difficulties for the new governor was a lack of suitable 
people with experience that could be appointed to critical positions in the region. 
419
 ‘Iz Londona vidny Ural’skie gory’, Ural’skii rabochii, 20 April 2005. This acquisition was announced 
at the Russian Economic Forum in London in 2005. This forum had traditionally been one in which 
Rossel’ had sought foreign investment into the region, but interestingly at this forum the major 
announcements had not been outside investment but the consolidation of control over Russia’s resources 
by enterprises close to the Kremlin.  
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Plant, who acquired the Ekaterinburg enterprise, ‘VIZ-Stal’’ and Oleg Deripaska, whose 
RUSAL company acquired the Bogoslovskii and Ural’skii Aluminium Factories.420 
 
The increasing pressure on business networks and the deterioration in inter-regional 
influence experienced by Rossel’ was a factor in the decline of his position as the 
lynchpin of Urals affairs with regards to other governors and business leaders. While 
Rossel’ still tried to play a role in economic activity where it affected the region, the 
presidential representative now emerged as an alternative source of support and the 
entry of federal industrial forces into the region further diluted the monopolisation of 
national-sub-national linkages. A good example of this is seen in the inter-regional 
business dispute that emerged in 2003 between the newly formed Urals Mining and 
Metallurgical Company (UGMK), based in Sverdlovsk Oblast but owned by the 
oligarch, Iskander Makhmudov, and Cheliabinsk Oblast’s Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel 
Works (MMK) over shares in the Cheliabinsk regional company ‘OAO Karabashmed’ 
(Karabash Copper Smelter).421 What began as a business dispute became overtly 
political as Rossel’ began to publicly support the claims of UGMK to acquire 
Karabashmed.422 Once ‘outside’ business interests began acquiring Sverdlovsk 
enterprises and entering the regional business space, the natural consequence was 
that these enterprises would have their own corridors of influence in Moscow, leaving 
Rossel’’s status at the head of the industrial chain under threat. In response, Rossel’ 
involved himself in this business dispute in order to demonstrate to this new 
organisation (UGMK) that he was best placed to represent their interests regionally and 
federally, and demonstrate to the wider regional business elite that his role as patron to 
enterprises was unchanged by the federal reforms.423 By involving himself in the 
                                                 
420
 Gennadii Korobkov, (2010), ‘Elit persona: vlast’, biznes, obshchestvo’, Ekaterinburg, Izdatel’stvo 
AMB, pp. 108-9 
421
 Nelson and Kuzes (2005), p.442  
422
 ‘Eduarda Rossel’ia vvodiat v zabluzhdenii’, Cheliabinskii rabochii, 4 July 2001 
(http://www.pressarchive.ru/chelyabinskiy-rabochiy/2001/07/04/320946.html) [last accessed 29/12/2014) 
423
 UGMK is now one of the most important industrial enterprises  in the Sverdlovsk region. A glance at 
the UGMK website demonstrates the extent of its penetration in the Urals minerals and natural resources 
sector (www.ugmk.com/ru). The organization conducts significant activity in the social sphere also, 
implementing the centre’s policy that Russian firms had to participate in society (Gel’man and 
 223 
dispute, Rossel’ was attempting to remind his Cheliabinsk colleague, who was 
increasingly critical of the Sverdlovsk leader and closer to Latyshev, that he still 
considered himself to be the de facto leader of the Urals and that any outcomes should 
be decided in concert with him.424 Yet, in what became an increasingly bitter dispute 
between Rossel’ and the Cheliabinsk Governor, Petr Sumin, the presidential 
representative benefitted most from the situation, acting as arbiter between the 
conflicting governors to present the centre’s position on the dispute and demonstrating 
the rise of the presidential representative as an effective conduit for regional 
enterprises. 
The dismantling of Rossel’’s inter-regional status 
Sergei Kondrat’ev has previously argued that the geographical-administrative structure 
of the Urals Federal District was created in such a way as to weaken Rossel’, who was 
seen as wielding too much influence amongst the group of Urals leaders.425 In 
removing Perm Oblast’, Orenburg Oblast and Bashkortostan from the Urals District 
(and including them in the Volga District) and bringing Tiumen’ Oblast and its two 
constituent autonomous oblasts, Khanty-Mansi and Iamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
Regions, into the District from its more traditional association with Western Siberia, the 
centre separated Rossel’ from key allies (most importantly, Bashkortostan President, 
Murtaza Rakhimov). The administrative formation of the federal district cast a shadow 
over the relevance of Bol’shoi Ural in its existing form, with the expectation that should 
the organisation continue, Latyshev would assume the role of chairman, replacing 
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Rossel’.  The potential benefit that the federal reforms gave individual regions to form 
closer ties to the state on a singular basis can be seen in the reaction of other regional 
leaders. As pointed out above, one of the critical aspects of regional leadership is to be 
able to correctly judge the mood of the leadership higher up the chain of power. A 
display of dissent from Rossel’ and Rakhimov towards the centre with regards to the 
creation of the federal districts had been observed at the assembly of Bol’shoi Ural in 
October 2000, just prior to the scandal over the location of Latyshev’s offices. Both 
leaders publicly criticised the manner in which the federal reforms had been carried out 
and displayed irritation at the centre’s indication that it was intending to withdraw from 
the bilateral agreements agreed with El’tsin.426 At this session, Cheliabinsk governor, 
Petr Sumin, chose not to support his colleagues in their criticism of the centre, and 
asked that the session itself, scheduled to be held in Cheliabinsk, be moved from his 
region as he did not wish to be associated with the positions that his Sverdlovsk and 
Bashkir colleagues were going to take.427 The only representatives of the governor 
corpus at this session, moved to the Bashkortostan capital, Ufa, were Rossel’ and 
Rakhimov, as other Bol’shoi Ural leaders also made their excuses, sending 
representatives to the session held in the Bashkortostan capital so that they would not 
be associated with the session. While this allowed the subsequent criticism of Putin’s 
reforms to hold centre-stage, it also showed a fracture in inter-regional relations, 
whereby the other regional leaders were moving away from Rossel’, motivated by the 
recognition that the value of the state’s patronage had increased since El’tsin’s time 
with strong support being shown for the presidential representatives by Sumin, 
Gennadii Igumnov (Perm Oblast) and Oleg Bogomolov (Kurgan Oblast). This approach 
to the polpred was almost certainly further influenced by the fact that all three were 
facing the prospect of gubernatorial elections in 2000 and hoped to associate 
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themselves with the popular national leader to assist their re-election hopes.428 As a 
result of this loss of inter-regional support, Rossel’ found his position as the focal point 
of Urals integration and coordination undermined.429 While Latyshev did not assume 
the chairmanship of Bol’shoi Ural, he formed his own inter-regional development group, 
‘Industrial Urals-Polar Urals’ (Ural Promyshlennyi-Ural Poliarnyi), through which he 
could offer regional leaders a ‘bridge’ to the federal centre and to the federal funds for 
regional programmes that went with cooperation.430 While Ural Promyshlennyi-Ural 
Poliarnyi faded over time, it provided an alternative for the regional governors, and an 
opportunity for them to be seen to be cooperating with the centre.431 By the end of 
2002, Latyshev was already claiming to have doubled foreign investment in the Urals 
through making the business climate more predictable and less reliant on individual 
governors.432 
  
In the eyes of the centre, restoring the reliance of the regional political and economic 
elites on Moscow-based actors, not only in Sverdlovsk Oblast but throughout Russia 
would strengthen the state. That Rossel’ resisted this process for a considerable length 
of time demonstrated the strength of the legitimacy that these two groups inferred upon 
him. As the electoral system of regional governors returned to a system of appointment 
rather than popular election, the local (regional) system of networks that had sustained 
Rossel’’s political persona throughout the El’tsin years was no longer the resource it 
had previously been, particularly as it could be interpreted as a rival power base for the 
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regional governor. Following the election of Dimitrii Medvedev as president in 2008, the 
centre embarked on a round of replacing a number of the longest serving regional 
leaders, among them Rossel’, who was retired to a role as senator for the region in the 
Federation Council in 2009, and replaced with the grey, bureaucratic manager, 
Aleksandr Misharin, originally from Sverdlovsk Oblast but with long experience of 
working in Moscow. Making up for a lack of charisma with devoted loyalty to the centre 
and to the ruling political party, Misharin consolidated both the top-down system of 
power and the position of Edinaia Rossiia in a region that was still considered to be of 
high strategic value to the centre.433 
Conclusions 
An important part of the federal reforms was to subordinate the regional elite, as a 
major section of Russian society that influenced and made decision affecting the state 
and society, to the new state system, leading them away from the individual-interest 
structures that had developed following the end of the Soviet Union. This can be seen 
as a fundamental difference in the perception of the nature of the Russian elite 
between Putin and El’tsin, particularly as Putin continued to seek to install a system of 
values that tied the elite to the idea of a strong national power network (with Putin at its 
head), in contrast to El’tsin’s interpretation of the elite system, in which personal 
support was exchanged between individuals in return for power. This fundamental 
difference in perception of the basis of the structure of centre-regional relations was 
taken by Putin as an opportunity to restore the authority of the centre over 
individualistic regional leaders, who were perceived as acting outside of the wider 
interests of Russia. 
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If in previous chapters we saw Rossel’ as being a product of the El’tsin years, acting 
independently and using the set of rules that existed, we can also see in him the effect 
of the forcible restructuring of the state that has occurred since then. During the first 
period of Putin’s presidency Rossel’ was forced to change by outside forces rebranding 
himself yet again, from firebrand regional politician to loyal representative of the state. 
From the personal closeness he had enjoyed in the second-half of the 1990s with the 
Russian President, by 2003 little remained of the independent 1990s political actor that 
had made unilateral demands of the centre.  
 
As he remained in power for almost nine years after El’tsin’s resignation, Rossel’ 
became symbolic of the decline in political activity in Russia’s regions and the 
increasing uniformity of regional life in the state. Interestingly, the period of Rossel’’s 
decline in real influence lasted almost as long as the period of his entry into power and 
its consolidation. This was a drawn-out affair in which he initially resisted accepting his 
new role as a member of the network rather than controlling proceedings. The outside-
imposed end of the boundary control strategy demonstrates further the argument that 
Rossel’ presided over a power structure that promoted as much his own interests as 
those of the oblast. 
 
  
  
 228 
Conclusions   
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the political system that was developed by 
Rossel’ in Sverdlovsk Oblast, and to question how he used networks in his regime. 
Evaluating Rossel’’s role as regional leader in Sverdlovsk Oblast allows us to reach 
certain conclusions about the nature of his power during the 1990s, as well as the 
conditions of Russian regional politics and centre-regional relations in this period and 
into the next decade. The approach taken has been to consider the role of actors, 
institutions, resources and strategies within the context of the times, demonstrating that 
Rossel’’s personality and the construction, projection and perception of his networks 
(as both patron and client) inside the region and cross-regionally determined the nature 
of his political regime, his domination of the Sverdlovsk region and longevity of 
leadership. The factors that were present, including the condition of the elites under the 
political and economic uncertainty that can be equated with the El’tsin decade and the 
existence of an organised opposition, resulted in the implementation of a strategy of 
‘boundary control’ that contained, limited and eventually suffocated threats to his 
established position at the top of the pyramid of power in the region.  
 
Research into Russian politics in the 1990s has rightly focused on the critical need for 
the development of institutions ahead of considerations of the personalised aspects of 
everyday interactions at all levels of the state. Yet, referring back to the literature 
review, this approach placed the influence of institutions on regional power above the 
personal factors that are argued here as being more influential, in the case of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast, than institutional arrangements.434 In these models, the notion of a 
network regime in regions was considered negatively, as holding back the development 
of institutions. The fundamental conclusion to be drawn is that the personalised 
structure of elite and network relations were the source of Rossel’’s power, explaining 
his regime in Sverdlovsk Oblast. Current studies of the state system in Russia have 
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now reached the conclusion that, as in Putin’s Russia, the role of networks does not 
necessarily need to be linked to replacing the role of the state.435 This thesis has 
attempted to demonstrate how, in the El’tsin years, networks were used by Rossel’ to 
fill gaps in the distribution of power to the regions under the state system, showing his 
tendency to cultivate sources of capital vertically, horizontally and within the region 
whenever required in order to achieve his aims. It should once again be highlighted, 
that the areas of political priority that regional leaders faced were vastly different, so the 
study of Rossel’ allows us to build a detailed picture of the way in which networks 
facilitated leadership in a single region, while at the same time, noting that the use of 
different sources of capital was a common feature in regional politics in El’tsin’s Russia 
as the central state struggled to impose itself on its provinces. The boundary control 
theory has provided the opportunity to delve deeper into how these networks were 
managed in order to ensure the longevity of Rossel’’s leadership.  
 
Under the system of appointment, it was easy to assume that appointed governors 
were little more than bureaucrats who were responsive only to the threat of dismissal 
by El’tsin, as stated by Shevtsova (1999).436 Instead, the case of Eduard Rossel’ 
demonstrates that being able to act and react to a wider range of political and 
economic threats, nationally and sub-nationally, was made substantially easier where 
networks were more highly developed. The role played by networks provided Rossel’ 
with an essential tool that could be mobilised to limit the space available to any 
competing forces, even in the presence of agreed rules, minimising the threat to his 
power.  
 
The discussion in the preceding chapters has attempted to underline the importance of 
the 1990s in our understanding of Russia, both from the perspective of how the country 
entered into its post-communist state and when looking at Russia under Putin. The 
                                                 
435
 Kononenko (2011), p.9 
436
 Shevtsova (1999), p. 204 
 230 
limitations of the initial centre-regional structure under El’tsin have had long-reaching 
consequences as the institutions that were expected to regulate the ties remained 
weak, resulting in informally bargained solutions between the President and regional 
leaders. The contrast between El’tsin’s use of a personalised system of centre-regional 
relations, which was used as a chip to bargain for support for his leadership, contrasts 
starkly Putin, whose reaction to this weakness was to quickly reprogramme these ties 
in favour of the federal centre, on the basis of his high evel of popular support. That this 
recentralisation project was successfully realised and brought governors under the 
influence of the state, as shown in Chapter 8, highlights the fact that the informal 
agreements reached with El’tsin remained just this, personalised agreements rather 
than institutionalised structures. 
 
Throughout the approach taken in this study, considering the role and interaction of 
networks at more than one level, it has been impossible to escape the fact that 
networks at all levels intersected and overlapped. Political actors surround themselves 
with and enter into numerous relationships from which they can benefit. Such networks, 
including their functioning and the ability to manage them, should be seen as one of the 
most critical aspects of political power in Russia at this time due to their ability to cut 
across formal and informal barriers. When understanding the dynamics of regional 
power we must remain aware that the actions of regional leaders and how they 
intersected with the networks occured quickly and concurrently. This has been 
demonstrated throughout the thesis, particularly through the example of the connection 
between Rossel’ and El’tsin, and the effect that this had on the regional leaders of 
other territories of the Urals and the Sverdlovsk political and economic elite. 
Conversely, local relations between elites were frequently influenced by the ties that 
actors had with different sectors of the political space. That this was not always a 
positive influence is demonstrated in the inability of Aleksei Strakhov and Arkadii 
Chernetskii to use the connections that bound them together and that were developed 
with other federal actors in order to overcome Rossel’’s domination of the region.  
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The networks developed and managed by Rossel’ often determined the means by 
which he achieved his political aims and became an indispensable part of the type of 
regime that Rossel’ presided over as he successfully used connections at different 
levels to prevent the emergence of legitimate competitors. In terms of Russia in the late 
20th century, Rossel’’s pragmatic use of these connections vertically upwards, 
horizontally, and vertically downward to ensure the material day-to-day survival of the 
Sverdlovsk region by filling the gaps left by the inability of the post-communist Russian 
state to support its regions while faced with the demands of political and economic 
reform and total change in ideology allows us to view his leadership as an alternative 
reaction to the conditions of the state relying on legitimising his leadership through 
representing interest groups rather than enforcing his own power from above, as seen 
in comparison with the regimes in Moscow and Tatarstan. Securing Rossel’’s own 
position within the elite, and converting the capital that he derived from his ties in order 
to legitimise his power, for example through elections, and to bring participant clients 
into those areas where they could be of use demonstrates the success of the strategy 
of boundary control for Rossel’ during the 1990s in monopolising all aspects of the 
regional and territorial political space. Nonetheless, when alternative sources of capital 
arose that offered similar or improved terms without any extreme opportunity cost to 
abandoning the former patron, these networks shifted loyalties, as seen in the 
changing demands of the political system in the 2000s that provoked the breakdown of 
Rossel’’s leadership, although not the breakdown of a structure that required patronage 
and network relations for the elite to function. 
Everything within its own context  
The study has followed the approach noted in the literature review of research carried 
out into the Gorbachev period, whereby, without judging what is right or wrong, the 
approach is to remain conscious of the boundaries of what was possible at the time 
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according to wider events and historical legacies that influenced power. 437 Although 
agency takes a prominent position in the examination of Rossel’’s actions, 
consideration of the conditions of Russian regional political life and the fast-moving, 
uncertain changes that occurred in national and regional life runs as an undercurrent. It 
is only possible to judge Rossel’’s leadership when bearing in mind the legacy of the 
communist period’s system of regional leadership, the effect of the breakdown of 
existing institutions, and the attempt to renew conditions that ended up more in a series 
of ad hoc adjustments according to the conditions and needs of a particular region with 
its own particular set of problems. Importantly, throughout the discussion it should be 
recognised that the study is looking back at a period that is now complete, which allows 
for interpretations to be made of the events and actions taken that explain why Rossel’ 
remained in power for so long.  
 
In order to survive the simultaneous political and economic reforms that turned entire 
areas of society and the economy on its head, a return to ‘traditional’ power structures 
became the fall-back position for many regions to ensure everyday survival. It is no 
coincidence that the leaders that installed such patronage structures were those that 
served longer terms, enduring beyond the period of appointment by the president and 
winning competitive elections. As El’tsin’s regime lurched from one crisis to the next, 
regional leaders seized upon the lack of supervision from the centre to follow a ‘master 
of the house’ paradigm that constructed individual power systems instead of building 
and consolidating institutions that would ensure stability. Criticism has been made of 
the early post-Soviet reformers’ rush to build a market instead of focusing on 
functioning institutions; the same criticism could be made of regional political actors, 
who prioritised personal power over the development of regional institutions capable of 
regulating regional life. When answering the questions posed at the outset, on the 
nature of Rossel’’s regional power and why he stayed in power for so long, the context 
of a lack of coherent regional strategy from Moscow combined with attempts by central 
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actors to retain their influence over regional regimes both precipitated the development 
of network regimes.  
 
The cases of Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Sobchak have shown that while different 
circumstances existed across Russia’s regions and republics, leaders succeeded or 
failed as a result of their interaction and use of the political, economic, and business 
elites within their territories, limiting rivals’ access to power, and monopolising relations 
between the centre and the region. Regional elites that found themselves left without 
the patronage of Communist Party and branch ministeries submitted to a new 
arrangement that subordinated them to regional leaders. In both the cases of Luzhkov 
and Shaimiev, there was effectively no competition to their leadership during the period 
under review and no alternative patrons in their territories. The cases of Rossel’ and 
Sobchak demonstrate challenges from organised political opponents. While Rossel’ 
implemented a strategy of boundary control to limit threats to his power to a sufficient 
degree that outweighed his rivals’ ability to encroach on these boundaries, Sobchak’s 
inability to fulfil any of the boundary control criteria left him unable to defend himself 
against rival networks and actors and could not protect his leadership from 
encroachment by rivals.  
 
One of the limitations of this study lies in the inability to obtain access to the main 
protagonist of the study; only third-party accounts have offered insight into the 
motivation of particular actions and whether they were strategic moves or accidental 
offshoots of other decisions. This underlines the value of understanding the conditions 
of El’tsin’s Russia to view the conditions decisions were taken in and the circumstances 
in which they played out. It is bearing in mind these points that all of the conclusions 
can be reached.  
 
It is also worth asking what we can draw from this to develop the boundary control 
theory further. Gibson’s original research looked at entrenched subnational 
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authoritarian regimes in the context of Latin American democratisation and North-South 
dynamics of the United States in the late nineteenth century. In transposing this 
approach to the study of Russia in the late twentieth century we should be aware of the 
different starting point that it faced. To recap from Chapter One, these primarily 
concerned the lack of an entrenched federal party following the collapse of the 
Communist Party that could gather regional leaders under its banner and exert 
influence over them (a role that El’tsin was also unwilling to play), and the fact that the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy was occurring at the federal and 
subnational levels simultaneously, unlike Gibson’s Latin American counterparts that 
had federally overthrown authoritarianism and now required the regional regimes to 
follow. With this in mind and using the case of Rossel’ to highlight this, we can consider 
that boundary control is transferrable to the examination of subnational regimes more 
widely where an element of competition to the ruling elite is present or emerging. Not 
all subnational regions in Russia can be viewed from the boundary control paradigm; 
certainly the cases of Luzhkov and Shaimiev noted in Chapter Three do not fall into the 
boundary control theory as these respective leaders advanced different methods in 
order to preserve their powers. In the case of Luzhkov, it was his mafia-esque style of 
controlling all financial and property distributions of the nation’s capital, whereas for 
Shaimiev, his bargain with local elites to delegate power to them in return for 
unswerving support as well as his demonstrated ruthlessness in dismissing those that 
tried to find ways around this system resulted in his incumbency for over two decades. 
The actions of Sobchak in Saint Petersburg provide us with a failed case of boundary 
control. The attempts to force the regional elite to work through his mayorality were 
doomed to failure specifically due to the fact that Anatolii Sobchak was unable to 
monopolise the centre-regional relationship, nor become the sole advocate of regional 
interests in the centre or achieve dominance within the Saint Petersburg political 
space. Sobchak has traditionally been seen as one of Russia’s leading democrats in 
the early 1990s, and the contrast with Rossel’, who firmly placed himself as a manager 
rather than a politician may hold the key to revising the boundary control thesis for 
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application more widely to other countries undergoing combined federal and 
subnational democratisation.  
 
The breakdown of boundary control in Gibson’s thesis arises when the incumbent 
governors’ interests were no longer able to outweigh the emergence of opposition. In 
this case, it could be proposed that the key to successful boundary control in these 
situations lies in the ability to continually incorporate, or at least not polarise, the 
interests of the different layers of the elite, finding ways of coordinating these 
overlapping networks at the vertically upwards, horizontal and vertically downwards 
that incorporates a multitude of interests in order to achieve the key pivot position that 
being able to implement all three of boundary control’s aspects suggests. Further study 
of the boundary control theory in democratising federal states would be of benefit to 
developing this paradigm. In the post-Soviet context, Russia is the obvious candidate 
for this further research under its federalist structure, and comparative research into the 
strategies taken by long-serving leaders such as Viktor Kress in Tomsk or Egor Stroev 
in Orel would result in an even greater understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between regional power and elites through the monopolisation of representation. Under 
circumstances of national democratisation, this approach could also be applied to 
regional appointees in Ukraine under non-federal conditions, up to the point of the 
recent conflict. The elite structure of the Ukrainian regions and the role of industrial 
oligarchs within these regions offer rich soil for investigation into their linkages with 
regional heads of administration, as does the case of Aslan Abashidze in the 
autonomous region of Adzharia in Georgia from 1991 until 2004 and the Rose 
Revolution that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to the Georgian presidency and resulted in 
federal intervention in the region to remove him. 
 236 
Where you stand depends on who you sit with438   
 
A significant part of any conclusion drawn about the nature of Rossel’’s regional power 
and the reason why he was able to dominate regional politics must consider the type of 
actors involved in the networks he constructed and the personal control that he exerted 
over them, as the most important resource available to him for implementing his own 
political strategies. Participation in networks penetrated all aspects of his political 
relations, and these were used according to his needs at different junctures. The most 
influential actors involved in Rossel’’s political system have been demonstrated to have 
come from the dominant sector of the elite in the region at the point of his rise to power, 
the industrial elite. Through representing their needs in terms of resource attraction and 
allocation, and through increasing their status by bringing them into the political fold, 
Rossel’ was particularly successful at constructing sets of networks that represented 
the wider requirements of the oblast, leaving the space left for the narrower set of 
interests that the regional capital city held to be occupied by his rivals, safe in the 
knowledge that this was insufficiently influential to unseat him. 
 
The overlap between vertical and horizontal networks constructed a complicated web 
of ties that kept Rossel’ as the focal point for the transmission of information, policy and 
resources from region to centre, from region to municipality and from region to region 
within the greater Urals, and it is this that is proposed as being the major strength of 
the Rossel’ system of power, as different to Shaimiev’s or Luzhkov’s leadership in their 
respective territories. Formally, Rossel’’s positioning of himself as both facilitator and 
gatekeeper in all directions was made possible by his institutional role and the nature of 
centre-regional relations, but the informal nature of these ties had its roots in his 
industrial background and managerial personality, offering him the influence to see off 
any rivals pretending to a similar position. The study of Sverdlovsk Oblast presented 
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demonstrates that rival actors attempted to compete with him by replicating his own 
system and portraying themselves as fulfilling the boundary control functions better 
than Rossel’, but that they struggled to attract the necessary elites to them, and found 
themselves categorised with a certain type, such as Strakhov’s connection with the 
central elite and Chernetskii’s connection as a representative of small and medium 
enterprises that carried little weight in a region reliant on the mammoth industrial 
enterprises that dominated many of the outlying towns and cities. That all of is 
competitors were ultimately unsuccessful in preventing Rossel’’s domination of the 
political space shows the effectiveness of this approach and the nature of the region 
that he was governing (as well as the nature of political life in other regions of the 
Urals). From this, it can be drawn that the personalisation of networks within the 
dominant sector of the region acted as the foundation of this system. 
 
Above all, the most important of these personal connections was with the first Russian 
president, Boris El’tsin. As shown in chapters four and five, the El’tsin-Rossel’ link 
demonstrated both the wish of the centre for regions to pursue their own policies, due 
to the necessity of economic decline, but also the reluctance of central elites to 
relinquish patronage. Interpersonal trust between the two, although subject to El’tsin’s 
tendency to fall out with and then reconcile with actors, underpinned the argument 
made in this chapter, that patron-client ties were an essential factor in the method of 
boundary control promoted by Rossel’ ensuring that he was the only player in the 
region able to influence the head of state; Rossel’ benefited greatly from El’tsin’s own 
self-preservation tendencies and political weaknesses, particularly in the run-up to the 
1996 presidential elections where the support of his home territory was vital, as well as 
El’tsin’s insistence on taking final decisions.  
 
El’tsin’s role in regional affairs during the 1990s is also seen in his frequently passive 
attitude that would suddenly give way to sweeping acts with consequences for 
federalism in Russia. In effect, we can see two El’tsins as being present in Rossel’’s 
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Sverdlovsk ; the real El’tsin as an unpredictable, and somewhat disappointing, head of 
state, with whom personal bargains could be reached if they fulfilled the self-interest of 
the leader, and more importantly, the imagined myth of El’tsin, in which the ‘special 
relationship’ with Rossel’ was effective. For Rossel’, it was the projection that this was 
a ‘special’ relationship that gave him the credentials at home that permitted him to 
claim to be unique amongst regional figures within Sverdlovsk Oblast and in the Urals, 
leaving only him equipped with the capital and connections to represent the region. By 
allowing the impression that he had privileged access to the president to persist, 
Rossel’ elevated the value of his leadership among the elite that he surrounded himself 
with. This was not for reason of devotion to the president, but purely for the access to 
the distribution of resources (through decision making and decrees) that this entailed.  
The struggle of national elites to impact on regional politics  
Beneath the patron-client ties of El’tsin and Rossel’, the position that the Sverdlovsk 
leader took up with regards competing elites at the national and regional levels can be 
seen in all four chapters of the study examining the El’tsin decade (chapters four to 
seven). It was put forward in chapter five that the attempts of central actors to exercise 
control over regional actors through sponsorship of regional competitors were 
successfully countered by Rossel’’s ability to construct and activate new external 
networks, in addition to the presidential link, on a territorial basis (through the Bol’shoi 
Ural group), and through increasing his profile outside of Sverdlovsk Oblast. In this and 
the subsequent chapter it was found that Moscow’s attempts to preserve its influence 
over the regions was conducted through its attempt to tie regional elites with federal 
counterparts, particularly federal political parties.   
 
The fragmentation of central authority following the collapse of Communist Party 
control and the resulting necessity to seek new networks (often through renewal of 
previously existing ones) gave rise to elites at the centre looking to become patrons to 
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actors in the regions. In the case of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Rossel’’s monopolization of the 
Moscow-Sverdlovsk link at the institutional and informal level became an essential tool 
in preventing the development of outside patrons gaining a foothold within the region 
that could threaten him. The connection between El’tsin and Rossel’, based on a 
triumvirate of regional identity, career history and electoral need, was prominently given 
such importance that even in times of its breakdown, any competing forces were 
obliged to pay considerable attention to this connection (in reality and perception). 
Within the region, this can be seen in the conflict between Rossel’ and Chernetskii 
examined in chapter seven, as Chernetskii’s attempts to use central networks were 
unsuccessful as Rossel’’s ability to circumvent central networks created the 
connotation of Chernetskii as a representative of actors in Moscow.  
 
The interaction between Rossel’, his networks and federal political parties highlights 
the incompatibility of the national ‘parties of power’ parties with regional regimes at this 
time. This was evident in the inability of federal parties in the El’tsin era to gain a 
footing in the regional legislatures, and the case of Rossel’ shows that the ties 
connecting regional political figures to federal parties had effectively broken down in 
Russia. Federal parties were attempting to organise themselves using a centralised 
system, whereas the regions were already further down the path of organising their 
own power systems, with their own routes to accessing decision makers and resource 
holders. That this is the case may largely be due to the fact that these parties were 
attempting to start from scratch, following on from an era of political party domination, 
and the personalisation of power by regional figures such as Rossel’ represented new 
interest groups connecting other regional elites with available resources instead of 
waiting for federal commands. 
 
The progression of Russian federal political parties and their lack of penetration into the 
regions since 1991 is charted in the above research. As seen in Chapter 2 discussing 
Rossel’’s rise, the strengthening of his position within the Sverdlovsk Oblast power 
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structure owed something to the weakness of the democratic movements in the region 
being unable to harmonise their ideologies into a coherent approach and was effected 
at the federal level through Elt’sin’s lack of participation in regional affairs unless they 
threatened his authority and the personalised nature of the appointment system of 
regional Heads of Administration. The economic structure of the region itself and the 
domination of powerful industrial interests resulted in the prioritisation of enterprise 
management-style leadership, and due to Rossel’’s lack of strong pro-democracy 
tendencies, it was evidently more natural for him to seek to represent his own branch, 
the industrialists, rather than to occupy a role within a movement that he had not been 
strongly allied to previously. Rossel’’s subordination of national issues in favour of 
pursuing regional (and personal) interests in the form of the Urals Republic, 
gubernatorial elections and the bilateral treaties consolidated the political landscape as 
focussed on local issues rather than national ones, diminishing the potential influence 
for federal parties to subordinate regions into a national party political space.  
 
The outcome of this was seen in the results of the 1994 regional Duma elections, 
where Rossel’’s own political movement ‘Transformation of the Urals’ dominated. The 
attempt by Aleksei Strakhov to ally himself with the federal party of power, Our Home is 
Russia (Nash Dom Rossiia) was unsuccessful due to the ability of Rossel’ to 
incorporate the regional elite into his own political movement. By bringing many of the 
enterprise directors and industrial figures into his Transformation of the Urals 
movement, he secured their loyalty (and the votes of their workers) effectively against 
support for a Strakhov-Chernomyrdin alliance that was seen as being detrimental to the 
regional elites’ interests (and was repeated later in Chernetskii’s attachment of his Our 
Home Our City party with the Our Home is Russia party). As noted in Chapters 4 and 
5, the timing of the gubernatorial elections of August 1995 and Rossel’’s victory, served 
as a primary election for the December 1995 State Duma elections, and it would have 
been surprising had the region voted for Rossel’ in August and then against him (and 
his own party) later that year. Continued closeness to the regional elite, and 
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representation of the Urals region in organisations such as Bolshoi Ural, further allowed 
Rossel’ to keep his networks closer to his own movement in the later 1990s through his 
continued ability to hold the resources that they sought. With the development of new 
potential federal parties that were structured around regional interests, such as the 
Fatherland and All Russia movements led by some of Rossel’’s close contemporaries, 
Rossel’ could continue to pursue his own movement on the basis of the continuation of 
his ability to be the only possible representative of the regional industrial and political 
elite. For his own networks, neither Luzhkov nor Shaimiev could offer them any 
potentially greater benefits than those that Rossel’’ had to offer. As discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the perception of Rossel’’s status at the centre of being able to 
attract attention to the region and bring in resources, combined with lack of any realistic 
alternative meant that federal political parties struggled to entice Rossel’’s networks 
into greater party political support. 
 
It was only with the opening of the boundaries that Putin’s leadership brought did the 
relationship between Rossel’, his networks and federal parties began to change. The 
increasing role of the United Russia party as part of Putin’s political power base in the 
early 2000s and their incorporation of regional legislative actors into the party structure 
established it as not only the most important federal political party but also the largest, 
above the Communist Party. Pressure applied from above in the 2003 gubernatorial 
elections effectively forced Rossel’ to become part of the federal party system in order 
to maintain his leading roles and retain his influence over his own networks. Again, the 
role of elite interests was critical to this process - the emergence of an alternative 
patronage system and new routes to the distribution of resources as provided by the 
presidential representative and United Russia left Rossel’ in a position where he 
needed to reassociate himself with the federal centre in order to survive politically. 
 
At the national level, federal institutions, such as the State Duma and the Federation 
Council, were an area where the construction of overlapping networks and patron-client 
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relations served to build the perception of degree of influence over national policies that 
Rossel’ held as part of the boundary control strategy. Initially based on conflict with the 
centre in the attempt to gain additional powers for the region, in the second half of the 
1990s, relations between the region and centre became more cooperative. Unlike in 
the Putin system, within the State Duma, many members from the region in 1995 and 
1999 were from the region, and by consequence many were connected to Rossel’’s 
networks. The Federation Council, that allowed regional leaders a form of check over 
the legislature, became an additional strand of influence for Rossel’ both at home and 
cross-regionally, presenting some members of the central elite with problems as to how 
to retain their influence over the regions. The procedure of electing a Speaker of the 
Federation Council and Rossel’’s candidature examined in Chapter 5 demonstrated the 
strength of cross-regional networks developed by Rossel’ prior to his dismissal as 
governor in November 1993. The intervention of the Russian government, and 
specifically Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in the election of the Speaker is telling in the 
central elites’ approach to the regions and their desire to not entirely leave centre-
regional policy in the hands of President El’tsin. Relations with the Russian government 
echoed this, with Rossel’’s ties steadily increasing over the course of the decade, as 
the government came to realise the strength of certain individual regional leaders and 
the resources they could offer in helping the government control other regions. While 
the starting point in these relations had been in a mutual weakness under conditions of 
extreme economic crisis, over time we can witness how Rossel’’s cross-regional status 
led to him working with the government in specific sectors, (particularly representing 
the military-industrial complex as a key sector in the Urals economic structure), and 
receiving a minor role under Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov as part of his 
government’s Cabinet of Ministers.  
 
If in the above-mentioned relations with central actors we can see Rossel’’s role as 
increasing in cooperation and benefit to his leadership, one area that the research has 
highlighted as more problematic is in ties with the Presidential Administration. As long 
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as Rossel’’s ties to El’tsin were not converted into a form of active capital, the 
bureaucratic Presidential Administration managed to retain a bridging role, that could 
facilitate or obstruct relations with the President according to its own interests. To some 
extent, this could be attributed to the presence of an experienced Moscow-based 
bureaucracy close to the highest echelons of power, who found their own level of 
importance threatened by the breakdown of formal centre-regional relations and the 
establishment of a system of individualised bargaining. However, upon the activation of 
the Rossel’-El’tsin network in late 1994, the gatekeeping that its Sergei Filatov as Head 
of the Presidential Administration attempted to maintain was dealt a severe blow.  
The importance of the individual leader – Rossel’’s personalised system 
of power  
Within the Sverdlovsk region, political competition was centred around regional-capital 
city interests, with Rossel’ at the head of the oblast’ and Chernetskii as the head of the 
regional capital city, Ekaterinburg. A strong focus has been placed on the individuals 
and their group relations, associating them both as the figureheads of wider tendencies 
regarding the devolution of political power in post-communist Russia. The conclusion is 
drawn that Rossel’s power as an individual outweighed the power deferred to him by 
the institution of regional governor. As demonstrated in chapter two, following his 
appointment as Chairman of the Oblispolkom, Rossel’ was able to use his appeal as 
neither a member of the old guard nor a radical reformer to consolidate ‘unified’ power 
in his own hands. This critical step instigated his domination over the region, although it 
took personalising the Urals Republic movement as his own and the subsequent loss 
of his position following his dismissal to develop his identity as the leader of the region. 
 
Using this as a foundation, chapters six and seven found that the use of networks 
constructed the personalisation of power, while also fostering deliberate institutional 
weakness, creating a political system that was reliant on Rossel’ having the right 
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connections to different groups in order to achieve the specific tasks at hand. His ability 
to delegate responsibilities to his inner circle and play a leadership and coordinating 
role allowed him to preserve his position as patron to the region while retaining an 
overview of events, leaving him free to pursue the larger tasks that required his own 
personal intervention. The power system that was constructed relied on a closed and 
carefully constructed elite that acted in a hierarchical fashion, where loyalty to the top 
of the pyramid was the key unit of currency. The closed nature of the elite was the 
fundament of Rossel’s strength, as a core group emerged to control and manage the 
networks that he patronised over this prolonged period. Through managing a system of 
overlapping networks that fulfilled roles at the oblast level and locally, and through 
economic policy internally, cross-regionally, and internationally, Rossel’ became the 
sole candidate that could unlock perceived and actual access to resources (such as 
influence, decision making and finance), and is further underlined when looking at the 
subsequent breakdown in Rossel’’s position that occurred with the emergence of Putin 
and the recentralization policies that followed. Such a conclusion supports historical 
tendencies that during times of upheaval and crisis, traditional power structures that 
offered a return to stability were preferred in Russia. The legacy of the Soviet period is 
in evidence here as the elevation of Rossel’ to such a dominant role within the region 
and cross-regionally continued the trend of the Russian population’s acceptance of 
powerfully-appointed forces, such as the Tsar’s Governors and the Communist Party 
Regional First Secretaries.  
 
The legitimacy that Rossel’ held, first as the delegate of regional power, appointed by a 
popular president, and later as the elected representative of the people of Sverdlovsk 
oblast, presented him with grounds to construct a regime that progressed from a more 
traditional form of paternalism (as the master of the house), to a neo-paternalistic form 
of leadership, whereby popular election gave approval to the construction of a system 
of relationships that allowed the exercise of personal control over regional executive 
and legislative politics. His longevity as the leading political force for nearly two 
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decades can also be assumed to be a result of his ability to manage processes of 
competition within the political space, as seen in his successful electoral campaigns for 
the Regional Duma in 1994, and the gubernatorial elections of 1995 and 1999. By 
rejecting the patronage of federal political parties in favour of developing his own 
patronage over the region, Rossel’ created a responsive political movement that took 
advantage of its personal nature to construct a loyal following in the regional and local 
legislatures.  
Power through networks  
The conditions of the boundary control paradigm can be summarised from the above 
and further demonstrate why Rossel’ stayed in power for so long. The development of 
Rossel’’s charismatic political persona (chapter six) provided the foundation for his 
parochialisation of power amongst the elite and the public, and his monopolisation of 
the vertical and horizontal links between the networks he constructed with the result 
that new members of the elite found progression within the network hierarchy difficult. 
While it could be argued that the personalisation of power broke down the bureaucratic 
structures of the Soviet system and returned an identifiable public face to executive 
decision making rather than decisions being made on behalf of the region somewhere 
else, over time it became somewhat self-fulfilling as the new system of relations ended 
up responding to the wishes of the governor rather than reacting to the needs and 
demands of the electorate. The third factor present for boundary control, where Rossel’ 
became the only individual capable of representing the region’s interests nationally, is 
present in the portrayal of conditions in the region during electoral cycles, whereby it 
was made clear that only Rossel’ had the influence at the federal level to pursue 
regionally advantageous policies at the centre, as other actors would be captured by 
central interests (chapter seven). This was the strategy used to warn the elites of all 
varieties, political and economic, that it was not worthwhile attaching themselves to 
rival competitors, specifically, Arkadii Chernetskii. By portraying Chernetskii as 
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representing traders, while Rossel’ represented industry, the Sverdlovsk governor 
became a hybrid of democratically elected leader, all-powerful Soviet Minister and First 
Party Secretary, presenting the risk that would be taken should the elite decide to 
change tack at the point of elections. As a strategy, boundary control can clearly be 
extended to the post-communist world, despite the different starting point to the original 
form described in Latin America. The idea of competition in political space is to 
convince the electorate on the basis of an argument that one set of opinions is more 
favourable to another. The boundary control strategy exercised in Sverdlovsk oblast is 
a negative tendency, in that it used the tactic of suggesting that political opponents 
were not up to the task because they were not part of a privileged relationship. In pro-
democracy conditions, such as those in Sverdlovsk Oblast as well as in other regions, 
regional leaders prioritised control over power through the use of existing or potential 
resource allocation, stunting the development of competing forces.  
 
In answer to the final question asked at the outset, why Rossel’ remained in power for 
so long, we can conclude that this was immeasurably linked to his ability to ensure 
loyalty within his political networks and the fact that this allowed Rossel’ to use 
boundary control to manage internal and external threats to his power. The 
achievement of such loyalty is closely connected to the ability of a patron to continue to 
be able to attract and distribute resources to their client structures; as long as the 
patron is viewed as a successful participant in structures higher towards the apex of 
the pyramid of political and economic influence, then the patron’s own clients are more 
likely to retain confidence and stay loyal to the client. Rossel’’s rivals were unable to 
tempt his clients away from him while El’tsin remained as president. Neither Strakhov 
nor Chernetskii were capable of disrupting these networks, due to the negative 
potential that they had of emulating the Rossel’-El’tsin dynamic through their 
connections to Chernomyrdin (and later Luzhkov). The findings of chapter eight, 
discussing the changes in the vertical patron-client relationship between Rossel’ and 
the Head of State under Putin, demonstrate the effect of the replacement of an existing 
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patron on subsidiary client networks. The introduction of the presidential 
representatives had such an effect on Rossel’’s networks due to the significant backing 
that they were given by Putin and the role they played in creating a new system of 
access to the head of state. 
 
Network influence encompassed domination of the regional economy. As the 
comparison between Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Sobchak shows, and furthered by the 
case of Rossel’, successful regional leaders were those that positioned themselves as 
regional managers (khoziainy) rather than as politicians in a new political order. With 
regards to fulfilling the terms of the social contract inherited by regional governors, 
Rossel’’s patronage of oblast-level enterprises and the protection of such from outside 
(federal) forces made it possible to isolate the regional capital’s political voice without it 
threatening the oblast vote due to the proportionality of Ekaterinburg’s industrial base 
and that of the greater Sverdlovsk region. Returning to the theme of the charismatic 
leader, the attention that Rossel’ paid to the directors of the region’s large industries, 
such as knowing them all individually and taking personal charge of representations to 
the centre in the attempt to obtain desperately needed financial support and production 
orders, Rossel’ nationalised his influence on industry, proposing national economic 
policies that assisted enterprises in his own region. 
What does this say about the Russian political system of the 1990s and 
2000s? 
As a final note, it is worth considering what this thesis can tell us about the Russia 
during the El’tsin period and beyond to the Putin and Medvedev leaderships in wider 
terms than the confines of Sverdlovsk oblast. This thesis brings a new emphasis to our 
understanding of regional networks under El’tsin’s presidency and how they shaped 
regional regimes as well as giving us some important insights into the overall nature of 
his power. One of the tendencies of the body of literature written during in the El’tsin 
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period itself was to present the transition of Russia into a series of ideal institutions 
that, largely from a Western perspective, would result in a functioning post-communist 
state that could be declared to be transitioning to democracy. With specific relation to 
centre-regional relations, these included, among others, federal and sub-national 
elections, a functioning set of laws regulating the allocation of powers between the 
units of the federation and the development of subnational executive and legislative 
power. The above discussion has focused on the processes that sprung almost 
organically out of the conditions of institutional breakdown following the end of the 
Soviet Union and substituted for the development of more formal institutional power.  
 
The breakdown of formal institutional structures that could provide a set of rules for all 
to follow, and the lack of mechanisms to enforce these rules as Russia exited 
communism left ad hoc individual bargaining, negotiation and special arrangements at 
the heart of the El’tsin political system. The fragmented nature of central political 
power, the disintegration of vertical structures and the competing nature of different 
elite groups to retain and increase their influence all contributed to the replacement of 
top-down control with a mixed system of centre-regional power whereby the federal 
centre (and particularly the President) held some levers over the appointed (and later 
elected) regional leaders, while also finding itself reliant on the regions to run 
themselves without presenting too many challenges to the centre that would require 
action that it was ill-equipped to carry out. Federal intervention, where it did occur, was 
done through the removal of governors under the appointment system and later 
through centrally-sponsored electoral competition (and in the case of separatist 
regions, through armed conflict).  
 
The weakness of the centre and its grip over the regions resulted in the swift 
decentralisation process that allowed for the rise of regional leaders that could pursue 
their own agendas. These regional actors were forced to take action to counterbalance 
volatile rule from above, while also ensuring that they remained in the president’s 
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favour. One of the key aspects of the El’tsin regime that we now understand is how he 
retained control over key decision making through deliberately fostering weak 
institutions at the centre. Central weakness transferred to the subnational territories as 
regional leaders constructed their own regimes, taking the lead from El’tsin’s lack of 
desire for strong vertical subordination. It is clear that it was impossible for El’tsin to 
enforce a strict vertical system of central power over the regions, while his own political 
position was unsteady. By being able to make deals with the regional leaders 
individually on the basis of mutual benefit and trust, we can see the high value El’tsin 
placed on informal methods, particularly personal attributes. The polarised conditions 
of Russian politics thoughout the 1990s left him in the position of being insufficiently 
strong to force subnational leaders to be subordinated to the centre, and his personal 
interest in loyalty to his leadership prompted him to install individualised relations with 
the governors as the mechanism for ensuring their support. From this, we can suggest 
that networks were the currency of political power in 1990s Russia, with ownership of 
and participation in multiple and overlapping network structures giving additional value 
to political roles, plugging the gaps that were left in formal institutions. In other words, 
we can suggest that networks became more valuable to their participants than job 
titles.  
 
In response to the weakening role of Moscow in its ties with the regions, many of the 
stronger regional leaders were able to take matters into their own hands, making 
effective and strong connections with the different layers of elites in their territories and 
cross-territorially. At the subnational level, there was a greater scope for pragmatic 
action, and a new approach to the federalisation of the country. The case of Sverdlovsk 
Oblast highlights that network activity resulted in strong bonds between actors as long 
as the interests that were being represented were adequately served. As noted above, 
the role of federal institutions was countered by the ability of regional representatives to 
use networks to work around the formal channels of power that federal bodies still 
expected to be observed. This was seen in the inability of federal political parties to 
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build strong political support bases in the regions (with the exception of the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation, which continued to have representatives in the 
regions in the legislatures and in local government). Easily undermined by regional 
leaders and members of the regional elites, the high turnover in ‘parties of power’ can 
be attributed to the lack of purchase that they had in regional systems of power, and 
the ability of governors to disconnect their regimes and networks from these parties.  
 
The decentralisation of power in this period resulted in what could be described as 
possibly the only period in Russia’s history where regions have been able (and 
allowed) to represent their own interests. Under El’tsin, the emergence and 
continuation of informal approaches offered greater returns than the costs of imposing 
new formal rules. El’tsin’s approach broke down the former authoritarian structures and 
introduced much-needed flexibility into the fledgling Russian federal system, however, 
as his leadership drew to an end it was clear that this could no longer continue, as 
seen in the attempt by regional leaders such as Luzhkov and Shaimiev to become 
federal actors and the central action taken through elevating Putin to prevent this from 
happening by reimposing vertical authority over the regions. The overreliance on 
informal agreements was seized upon immediately by President Putin in May 2000, 
and his recentralization project should be attributed as a response to the growing 
strength of regional individuals. For many of these leaders, there was the expectation 
that Putin had been appointed to continue El’tsin’s work, and the announcement of 
wide-ranging federal reforms amongst his first acts as President began a new process 
of drawing regional governors into a more formal vertical network than that experienced 
with El’tsin. As pointed out in the above discussion on the effect of the presidential 
representative to the Urals opening the boundaries of Rossel’’s political system, the 
creation of seven federal districts can be seen as a strident move from the centre to 
reduce the number of potential bargaining routes networks had to directly access the 
centre. Through basing these districts loosely upon the boundaries of the state military 
districts rather than, for example, on the structures of inter-regional associations that 
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had been functioning over the past decade, and appointing representatives from the 
law-enforcement agencies, military and security services, Putin quite clearly signalled a 
change in vertical relations that precluded the possibility of co-optation. While 
bargaining and networks were not removed from the process, the newly imposed 
vertical structure that Putin was applying served to put distance between the centre 
and the regions re-ordering patron-client relationships to the disadvantage of regional 
heads of administration, precisely due to the fact that the centre was now taking an 
active interest in regional affairs.  
 
The continuation of the centralisation policy in Putin’s second term further increased 
the influence of the centre and decreased the ability of regional regimes to act 
independently of it. Importantly, up until Putin’s second term, gubernatorial elections 
were still taking place, offering regional leaders local popular legitimacy. This 
alternative source of legitimacy was threatening to the imposition of the new vertical 
system of power as it provided an alternative to top-down approval that Putin sought to 
implement. It took the massacre at School Number 1 in Beslan in September 2004, 
where separatists killed more than 300 children and school teachers, for this to change. 
Not forgetting that much of Putin’s early popularity had been based on the swift and 
successful pursuit of the second Chechen conflict in 1999, Putin used the threat of 
terrorism to abolish gubernatorial elections, returning to a system of appointment that, 
although offering some formal oversight by the regional legislatures, which were now 
mainly dominated by his United Russia party, strengthened top-down authority over 
regional leaders. Even prior to this, governors were already been slowly subordinated 
to the ‘presidential vertical’ that was being created, as noted in Chapter 9 where 
Rossel’ had been forced to come to an arrangement with Petr Latyshev during the 
2003 Sverdlovsk gubernatorial election to bring himself under the United Russia 
banner. For many governors, including Rossel’, the return to the system of appointment 
was not inconvenient, as it refocused their accountability to the centre rather than the 
local population, and gave them the opportunity to extend their terms in office further. 
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With regards to networks, the result of this was to almost completely restructure the 
network system. Networks continued to play a critical role in the life of the regions, with 
overlapping and competing interests continuing to be important in securing internal 
support within a region, while also moving away from the sole orbit of regional leaders 
to playing a role within the wider structure of state interests. Overall, we should note 
the effect of the refederalisation changes upon the vertical, horizontal and vertically-
downwards structures that epitomised regional leadership in the 1990s in replacing 
regional leaders as the heart of such structures with loyalty to Putin and the United 
Russia mechanism. 
 
Finally, we should note the end point for many of the regional ‘old guard’ that occurred 
under Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency from 2008 onwards. The political tandem of this 
era, with Medvedev as President and Putin as Prime Minister, saw the end of the 
majority of the entrenched governor corpus that had ruled Russia’s regions since the 
early El’tsin years. Regional heavyweights such as Luzhkov, Shaimiev and Rossel’ all 
saw their regional leadership careers ended in this period, as Medvedev used the 
presidential prerogative to directly remove them (in the case of Luzhkov, who was once 
again viewed as a potential emerging threat to the leadership), or encourage them to 
retire, with the compensation of decorative roles as Senators in the Federation Council. 
Territorially, this period saw the introduction of the ‘Varangian’ governors (figures 
appointed with little or no connection to the territory over which they govern), the effect 
of which has been to construct a new corpus of technocratic governors responsive to 
the centre rather than local populations’ needs, and has been argued as contributing to 
the ‘degradation of the regional elite’.439 While the popular protests that arose following 
the 2011 parliamentary elections resulted in the centre intimating that it would start to 
allow some decentralisation back into the federal system, including the return of 
gubernatorial elections, this appears to have been simply a strategy for venting social 
                                                 
439
 Nikolai Petrov made this statement at the ‘Russia and Ukraine: Spotlight on the Regions’ conference 
held at University College London on 2
nd
 June 2015. 
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frustrations; following Putin’s election as President in 2012 those gubernatorial 
elections that have taken place have been tightly controlled, with no turnover in 
incumbents. 
 
Attempting to draw conclusions from the experiences of the El’tsin period and the post-
El’tsin era have led to an overwhelming feeling that the 1990s saw a number of missed 
opportunities to create functioning centre-regional relations on the basis of institutions 
that could have strengthened federal relations and prevented the over-centralisation of 
the state that currently exists. The El’tsin period offers a unique period in the Russian 
history of the decentralisation of power, where the interests of the regions became 
possibly more represented than ever before in Russian history. While the resulting 
asymmetry of regional regimes suited El’tsin’s system of bargaining, under Putin this 
system was viewed unfavourably and the return of centralisation began to slowly but 
surely remove the gains that had been made. The nature of regional regimes that had 
established their own systems of power and were applying this in their relations with 
the federal centre to consolidate and further their positions made it difficult for the 
return of powers to the centre to occur without imposing a more strictly controlled 
vertical system of power. In seizing back control over regional political spaces, Putin 
has ensured that Russian regional regimes are now firmly representing the interests of 
the state, rather than the territories. On the one hand, this has removed the idea that 
the regional governor was a king within his region by ensuring that their loyalties were 
to Moscow rather than to the populations of the regions they control, however, on the 
other hand it has also removed the notion that Russia is a federal state in anything 
other than name and reaffirmed the representational deficit that existed prior to the 
El’tsin era.  
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